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ABSTRACT 
Trump’s “America First” Trade Policy and the Politics of U.S. International Investment 
Agreements 
 
By 
 
Jesse Liss 
 
Advisor: Dr. Paul Attewell  
Previous sociological studies on U.S. trade policy institutions concluded that “free trade” 
political actors had durable power to determine U.S. trade policy. This conclusion was proven 
wrong when the Trump administration promised “a new direction” and to implement an 
“America First” trade policy. My dissertation serves to explain the U.S.’ political transition away 
from “free trade” and towards “nationalist” trade policy. I do this by examining the politics of 
U.S. international investment agreements, which are central to U.S. trade policy. As case studies, 
I use the investment agreements from the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and 
the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which are the first and most recent U.S. free trade 
agreements with developing countries, although the U.S. is no longer a member of the TPP. I use 
a qualitative method called “process tracing” to document their negotiations, in which competing 
actors became either policy-makers or policy-takers. I show how and why “free trade” political 
actors successfully negotiated and implemented the NAFTA, and how and why “free traders” 
unsuccessfully implemented the TPP in the U.S. I conclude that U.S. trade and investment 
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agreements had polarizing effects in the U.S., which empowered “nationalists” and social 
movements to force major revisions to U.S. trade policy.  
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Chapter One 
1. Introduction 
2. A sociological perspective 
3. Research questions 
4. The politics of U.S. international investment agreements 
5. Karl Polanyi’s “double movement” and U.S. trade policy actors 
6. Data and method 
7. Outline of manuscript 
 
I. Introduction 
In a 2011 Senate Hearing just before the U.S. hosted the annual heads of state 
meeting of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation, ranking Senators and business 
leaders commiserated over declining U.S. market shares in the Asia-Pacific due to the 
lack of free trade agreements (FTAs) with the region in relation to U.S. competitors. 
Official Peter Scher represented the United States Trade Representative (USTR), the 
government agency that coordinates trade policy. Scher responded that domestic political 
conflicts constrained the USTR’s ability to make trade deals. Scher was opining the fact 
that the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a FTA the USTR was negotiating with countries 
in the Asia-Pacific, was so unpopular in Congress that the Obama administration lacked 
Congressional mandate to negotiate the TPP, which was the first time in over thirty years 
that a Presidential administration negotiated a FTA without Congress’ authority. Scher 
revealed that domestic politics are “very relevant” to the USTR and the business 
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community, who are highly cognizant about popular concerns that “globalization [helps] some, 
but not the masses” (cited in Senate 2011).  
Five years later, reality television star Donald Trump won the 2016 Presidential election 
by promising to empower the white working class in swing states. Trump’s trade promises 
became a symbol for his nationalism. At Trump’s 2016 campaign rally in Ohio, while wearing a 
red hat with his campaign slogan “Make America Great Again,” he declared, “The Trans-Pacific 
Partnership is another disaster done and pushed by special interests who want to rape our 
country, just a continuing rape of our country. That’s what it is, too. It’s a harsh word: It’s a rape 
of our country.” Trump’s “nationalist” trade promises were a stark contrast to the “free trade” 
policy norms in Washington.  
Since at least 1986, when the U.S. began to negotiate the establishment of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO), U.S. trade policy reflected “free trade” doctrine. “Free trade” 
policies refer to a set of institutions and legal norms that seek to establish a market-based 
governance of the global economy. Since the WTO came into force in 1995 and up until the 
Trump administration took office in 2016, “free trade” political actors had the institutional power 
to determine U.S. trade policy (Chorev 2007; Dreiling & Darves 2016). During this time, 
competing political actors, including “nationalists” and social movements, were marginalized 
from U.S. trade institutions and they had only trivial victories over the “free traders.” In that 
context, “free trade” proponents championed the TTP as the largest comprehensive FTA in 
history. However, in 2017, President Trump withdrew the U.S. from the deal. He promised to 
implement an “America First” trade policy, guided by “nationalism” first and “free trade” 
second. If the “free traders” had such strong institutional control over U.S. trade policy, how did 
they lose the TPP? Why did the “nationalists” gain the political power to write U.S. trade policy? 
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II.A. A sociological perspective 
Studies on economic globalization are done by economists or political scientists and 
sociologists, and each have different methodologies and make distinct contributions to the field. 
Broadly, economists offer “structuralist” approaches, in which economic globalization is 
determined by technological change and market conditions. Political scientists and sociologists 
prefer “institutionalist” approaches, which focus on the political actors and institutions that 
condition processes of economic globalization.  
“Structuralist” approaches to economic globalization are done by trade economists who 
measure and model international trade and finance. However, the legal content of trade policy, 
trade agreements, and trade institutions relate to issues of governance of the global economy, and 
governance is not just about economics but also politics. Economic and “structuralist” research 
lacks political analysis of the role of trade policy and trade institutions in international 
governance. For this reason, economists tend to conflate “nationalist” trade orientations and 
social movements with trade “protectionism,” which is an irrational departure from the universal 
benefits of “free trade.” According to the Trump administration, “nationalist” trade policy is 
actually about prioritizing national sovereignty over multilateral trade institutions, which is not a 
traditional topic in economics (USTR 2017: 1-3). As President Trump’s appointee for USTR, 
Robert Lighthizer, explained to Congress, “The definition of protectionism is shifting.” 
Conversely, social movements that seek to alter globalization argue that trade policy should be 
revised to prioritize workers, consumers, and the environment over corporate profits. Since 
“structuralist” research does not focused on the politics of the governance of trade, “structuralist” 
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research on trade policy must be complemented by “institutionalist” analyses of trade 
institutions. 
Political scientists and sociologists provide “institutionalist” approaches to economic 
globalization, which investigate the actors and institutions that shape globalization, its scope, and 
its pace. My study is an “institutionalist” analysis of the shift from past U.S. “free trade” policies 
to Trump’s “America First” trade policy. Contrary to “structuralist” assumptions that Trump’s 
“nationalism” is trade protectionism, I argue that people who voted for Trump based on his 
campaign promises on trade policy had rational concerns about trade. Actors and institutions 
from across the political spectrum argued that past “free trade” policies had prioritized the 
interests of multinational corporations (MNCs) over national interests. In the 2016 Presidential 
elections, Trump harnessed these sentiments for his political advantage. Therefore, an 
“institutionalist” analysis is necessary to understand the political transition from a “free trade” to 
a “nationalist” trade policy, and its consequences. 
 
II.B. Existing “institutionalist” approaches to U.S. trade Policy 
In The Making of NAFTA: How the Deal Was Done (2000), political scientists Maxwell 
Cameron and Brian Tomlin detailed the NAFTA negotiations to explain the outcome of the final 
agreement. Cameron and Tomlin provided not only a historical account of the negotiations, but 
they reflected on negotiating strategies and processes, and the role of institutions in shaping 
bargaining outcomes. They conclude that negotiations were shaped by power asymmetries 
between the three countries, the structure of domestic political institutions, and differences in the 
non-agreement alternatives. Similarly, in Interpreting NAFTA: The Science and Art of Political 
Analysis (1998), political scientist Frederick Mayer presented a U.S.-centric analysis of the 
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NAFTA negotiations and ratification. Mayer’s focus was the politics of support and opposition 
for the NAFTA and he offered a political analysis of the relative success and failure of 
negotiating strategies in particular contexts.  
Both analyses offer insights into the NAFTA negotiating dynamics that produced wins 
and losses for different actors. However, neither account explains the origins and motivations the 
legal content of the NAFTA and the original authors of those policies. In broad terms, this gap in 
the literature was filled by sociologist Nitsan Chorev in her book Remaking U.S. Trade Policy: 
From Protectionism to Globalization (2007). Chorev focused on the domestic institutional 
arrangements that affected the U.S.’ scope and pace of integration with the global economy, 
which is particularly relevant because the U.S. has been a global trade policymaker. She argued 
that trade protectionists controlled U.S. trade policy for a century and a half, so throughout the 
twentieth century “free traders” had to overcome formidable political resistance from 
protectionists. She demonstrated that, “…the more consequential political struggles focused not 
on substantive policies but rather on [‘free traders’] changing the institutional arrangements in 
place, that is, the rules and procedures that govern how future policies would be formulated and 
implemented” (2007: 7). In so doing, the “free traders” successfully installed institutional 
arrangements that contained the political influence of “protectionists,” thereby providing “free 
traders” with the structural political power to implement trade policy. In political economist Jane 
Kelsey’s book, Serving Whose Interests?: The Political Economy of Trade in Services 
Agreements (2008), she documented that in order for U.S. MNCs to intellectually justify their 
trade policy proposals in key areas, they had to change the public and pedagogical discourse on 
trade. 
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Building on Chorev and Kelsey’s findings, in the book Agents of Neoliberal 
Globalization: Corporate Networks, State Structures, and Trade Policy (2016), sociologists 
Michael C. Dreiling and Derek Darves theoretically and empirically demonstrate the regulatory 
capture of U.S. trade policy by U.S. MNCs. They focused on the institutional alliances between 
MNCs and national and international trade agencies, which enabled MNCs to shape international 
markets using trade policy. In parallel, political scientists Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin combined 
a “structuralist” and “institutionalist” perspective in their book, The Making of Global 
Capitalism: The Political Economy of American Empire (2012). They argued that the post-war 
internationalization of U.S. MNCs meant that they became increasingly dependent upon cross-
border inputs and outputs. Gindin and Panitch argue, “This increased pressures on states to 
support the ‘constitutionalization’ of free trade and capital movements through both bilateral and 
multilateral agreements that effectively protected the assets and profits of MNCs around the 
world” (2012: 10). Since MNCs are the main importer and exporter of capital, U.S. MNCs 
became the “key vehicle” for the diffusion of U.S. policy abroad as well as a key source of 
domestic economic growth. Therefore, MNCs had the structural power to justify their dominant 
role in U.S. trade policymaking.  
 
III. Research Questions 
The purpose of past investigations into the NAFTA negotiations were to not only to 
provide historical documentation of the negotiations, but to explain the outcomes in terms of 
power relations (Mayer 1998; Cameron & Tomlin 2000). However, these studies exclusively 
focused on the negotiations and not the legal content of the agreements. In my study, I identify 
the origins of the legal content of the NAFTA and TPP investment agreements, and then I detail 
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their negotiations. My focuses are the political actors in the negotiations and their interactions 
with trade institutions and political processes. I have two main research questions, how and why 
did “free trade” actors defeat “nationalists” and social movements in negotiating and 
implementing the NAFTA? And, how and why did “nationalists” and social movements defeat 
“free trade” actors in implementing the TPP in the U.S.? 
 
IV. The Politics of U.S. International Investment Agreements 
There is no consensus among social scientists about the political logic that 
motivates U.S. trade policy. There are two competing characterizations of U.S. trade 
policy, the first is the theory of comparative advantage, and the second theory purports 
that U.S. trade policy is a political project to consolidate class power, called 
“neoliberalism.” However, both of these social science theories are focused on the U.S.’ 
“free trade” initiatives. Neither of the two theories explain the Trump administration’s 
“nationalist” revisions to U.S. trade policy. In this section, I outline both existing 
theories. Then I rely on Karl Polanyi’s “double movement” theory to reconcile the two 
theories with the Trump administration’s “America First” trade policy. Using Polanyi’s 
“double movement” theory, I construct three ideal types of U.S. trade policy orientations 
- “free trade,” “socialist,” and “nationalist.” Throughout my project I will use these ideal 
types of trade policy positions to analyze the political motivations of trade policy actors 
in the NAFTA and TPP negotiations. 
 
IV.A. “U.S. FTAs as comparative advantage” 
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The WTO claims the theory of comparative advantage as “the single most powerful 
insight into economics” (WTO 2016). Former USTR Carla Hills, who negotiated the WTO, 
asserted, “[comparative advantage] has successfully guided our bipartisan trade policy for more 
than six decades” (2008). Comparative advantage is credited to the early political economist 
David Ricardo in his forceful argument against British agricultural protectionism in the early 
1800s (Ricardo 1821). Ricardo aimed to prove that free trade was beneficial for all trading 
partners. He reasoned that comparative costs determine the gains from trade. When nations trade 
the goods that they produce most efficiently then they produce greater world output, even when 
one nation has an absolute advantage in producing all tradeable goods. The market ensures that 
exports exchange for an equivalent amount of imports, balancing trade. Contemporary trade 
theories combine the theory of comparative advantage with economies of scale to model patterns 
of trade and investment (Krugman 1979; Baumol & Gomory 2001).  
Economists argue that FTAs function to remove barriers to trade such that countries 
realize gains from trade and economies of scale (Krugman et. al. 2012: 5). In addition, FTAs 
establish international governance institutions, such as the WTO, that facilitate trade. Sociologist 
Min Zhou found that the institutions that FTAs create serve to promote trade flows (Zhou 2015). 
By removing barriers to trade and creating institutions that facilitate trade, FTAs are a rational 
means of raising national incomes. In early-mid 2015, Congress was engaged in a heated debate 
concerning “trade promotion authority” which would allow an “up or down” vote for the 
implementation of the TPP. The White House published a report on the benefits of FTAs and 
claimed that “…the main impact of [TPP] will be to reduce foreign barriers to U.S. exports, 
rather than further opening U.S. markets to imports” (White House 2015, emphasis added). 
Following this logic, distinguished economist Gregory Mankiw published an op-ed on the vote 
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and asserted, “If Congress were to take an exam in Economics 101, would it pass? We 
are about to find out” (2015). If an FTA facilitates trade according to comparative 
advantages then that trade policy is “rational” because it produces mutual gains, even if 
they are very small, and opposition to the FTA is “irrational.” 
Economists and political scientists have advanced several explanations of 
“irrational” opposition to FTAs. One is the role of money in politics, Congress can be 
“bought” for trade policy votes (Grossman & Helpman 1994). Another is a problem of 
“collective action.” Trade produces “winners” and “losers,” the “winners” are the public 
who experience small gains via reduced consumer prices. The “losers” are import-
sensitive industries. Since the “losses” are concentrated in import-sensitive industries, 
those constituencies become politically organized, but since gains from trade spread out 
among the public, then the public is less politically invested in FTAs (Krugman et. al. 
2012: 250). Yet another reason are the “mistaken” beliefs of voters who understand that 
FTAs bring undesirable foreign competition that increases inequality and destroys jobs 
(Caplan 2011; Mankiw 2015).  
The theory of comparative advantage explains the universal benefits of free trade 
so it is a framework to evaluate trade actions as rational or irrational. However, the 
concept of economic rationality has a limited application to twenty-first century trade 
issues and their political motivations. The theory of comparative advantage does not 
apply to trade policy in two respects, (1) it does not address politically constructed 
comparative advantages, and (2) it does not account for the role of trade institutions as 
international governance institutions that have authority over public issues that go well 
beyond trade.  
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The theory of comparative advantage does not offer any assessment of the economic 
rationality of comparative advantages that have political determinations rather than market 
determinations. For example, currency manipulation creates national comparative advantages 
because it reduces the prices of national goods in international markets, thereby promoting 
national exports. Candidate Trump promised to label China a currency manipulator, a position 
that has bipartisan support in Congress. Currency manipulation falls outside the scope of 
comparative advantage because the value of a national currency is the result of political decisions 
and not the free market. Yet currency devaluations create comparative advantages. The theory of 
comparative advantage offers no insights into to whether trade with a currency manipulator is 
economically rational. For that matter, the theory of comparative advantage is silent on the 
rationality of trade between nations that have grossly different labor and environmental practices, 
which condition their comparative costs. In this context, the theory of comparative advantage can 
only offer a limited assessment of the political motivations of trade policy. 
Similarly, U.S. trade policy and trade institutions reorganize national authority around 
international markets and property claims. In so doing, nations relinquish state sovereignty to 
multilateral trade institutions. Multilateral trade institutions gain authority to regulate public 
issues that go well beyond trade and the theory of comparative advantage. Ranking Congressman 
Sander Levin explained in a House debate over the TPP in 2015, 
“What do David Ricardo and Adam Smith have to say about the inclusion 
of investor-state dispute settlement in our trade agreements? Nothing, to my 
knowledge. What do they have to say about providing a twelve-year monopoly 
for the sale of biologic medicines? About the need to ensure that our trading 
partners meet basic labor and environmental standards? How about the issue of 
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currency manipulation? What does the theory of comparative advantage 
have to say about those issues? Absolutely nothing – and yet those are the 
issues at the crux of the TPP negotiations today” (Levin 2015).  
In short, the theory of comparative advantage focuses narrowly on the concept of 
economic rationality, which does not account for much of the political and legal content 
of U.S. trade policy. For this reason, the theory of comparative advantage does not 
explain the political motivations of the Trump administration’s most pressing trade 
priorities - national sovereignty and confronting trading partners that use “unfair” trade 
practices (USTR 2017: 1-3). 
 
IV.B. “U.S. FTAs as neoliberalism” 
There is a wealth of social sciences literature characterizing FTAs as “neoliberal” 
political projects to construct a global economy according to “free market” principles. 
Celebrated anthropologist David Harvey defined “neoliberalism,”   
“…a theory of political economic practices that proposes that 
human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual 
entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework 
characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free 
trade. The role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional 
framework appropriate to such practices” (2005: 2). 
While most studies accept that the U.S. was the principle driving force behind the 
construction of “neoliberal” globalization, “neoliberalism” had to emerge in other 
countries for a “neoliberal” trading order to institutionalize. Scholars disagree on the 
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motivations of neoliberalism in developed and developing countries, or they emphasize different 
actors and processes, but there is consensus that U.S. FTAs embody “neoliberal” governance 
(Gowan 1999; Sklair 2002; Dumenil & Levy 2004; Harvey 2005; Chorev 2007; Prashad 2013; 
Dreiling & Darves 2016). 
Sociologist Nitsan Chorev concluded that U.S. FTAs do not simply remove the state from 
the market according to free market principles. Rather, U.S. FTAs are political projects that 
replace old protectionist institutions with new “neoliberal” institutions (2005; 2007; 2010). 
Chorev identified that the main objective of “neoliberal globalism” is to “make national 
economic activities competitive in [the] global market…by subjecting domestic constituencies to 
market-based rather than state-managed growth strategies” (2005: 320). U.S. FTAs, including 
the WTO, are global governance institutions because they establish new forms of authority that 
are independent of nation-states yet are binding upon nation-states, including dispute settlement 
procedures (Chorev 2005). For sociologist Saskia Sassen, these new forms of authority 
established by FTAs reshaped the relationship between the public and private domain such that 
public interest regulatory norms became the maximization of market efficiency (2008: 186).  
Social scientists arrived at the conclusion that FTAs are neoliberal governance by 
studying the political actors in trade policy and the processes and conflicts between them. In the 
U.S., FTAs were in the interests of exporters and MNCs and contrary to the interests of labor 
unions and import-sensitive industries (Chorev 2010). In the making of U.S. trade policy and 
U.S. FTAs, MNCs had to “defeat” working-class interests and protectionist political actors, in so 
doing, U.S. FTAs reflect the interests of MNCs (Panitch & Giddin 2012). MNCs from across 
economic sectors organized policy organizations and networks, often with members in and out of 
trade policymaking positions, so as to design and implement U.S. FTAs (Chorev 2007; Kelsey 
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2008; Dreiling & Darves 2011; 2016). In turn, U.S. FTAs inspired new forms of 
transnational resistance to them, from labor unions, environmental organizations, and 
consumer advocacy groups (Kay 2005; Evans & Kay 2008; Gallagher 2014). 
Existing “institutionalist” studies share the conclusion that U.S. MNCs are the 
dominant political actor in determining U.S. trade policy, in turn, U.S. MNCs use trade 
policy to condition international market outcomes. Sociologist Nitsan Chorev concluded, 
“As a result, today’s protectionist sentiments pose little threat to the durability of 
economic globalization.” (2007: 11). Prior to the Trump administration, institutional 
analyses of U.S. trade policy had concluded that the champions of “free trade” had 
successfully captured the most significant trade policy-making institutions. However, 
President Trump announced that U.S. trade policy would no longer be determined by 
“special interests” but it would be guided by an “America First” nationalism. President 
Trump’s withdrawal of the U.S. from the TTP in January, 2017 marked a new direction 
in trade policy. The U.S.’ TPP reversal was a decisive defeat of U.S. MNCs and other 
“free trade” advocates and it was a victory for “nationalists” and social movements. 
Therefore, “free trade” political actors and institutions are not as durable as previous 
“institutionalist” studies had concluded. For this, “neoliberalism” can no longer fully 
account for the motivations and content of U.S. trade policy and agreements.  
 
V. Karl Polanyi’s “Double Movement” and U.S. Trade Policy Actor 
The social sciences literature that have assigned a political logic to U.S. trade 
policy are inconsistent with Trump’s “America First” trade policy. I propose that Karl 
Polanyi’s “double movement” theory can be used a framework to bridge this gap. Among 
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the most cited theoretical investigations into the relationship between states and markets is Karl 
Polanyi’s The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time (1944). 
Polanyi deconstructed classical liberal economics and its modern incarnations, which rely on 
conceptual models of capitalist markets as self-regulating by the “natural” forces of supply and 
demand. Polanyi argued, “No market economy separated from the political sphere is possible; 
yet it was such a construction which underlay classical economics since David Ricardo and apart 
from which its concepts and assumptions were incomprehensible” (2001: 205). Contrary to the 
assumptions of free market economics, Polanyi demonstrated that “the economy” is actually a 
social and political entity. In Polanyi’s terms, the “free market” is not possible because in every 
day practice, capitalist states create, determine, condition, support, and protect markets. 
For Polanyi, the implementation of so-called “free market” policies inspired diverse 
resistance from political actors seeking protections from market failures and abuses, a conflict he 
described as a “double movement.” Polanyi explained, “For a century the dynamics of modern 
society was governed by a double movement: the market expanded continuously but this 
movement was met by a countermovement checking the expansion in definite directions” (2001: 
136). Polanyi observed that domestic and international “free market” policies received generous 
support from the banking and trading classes, while the working and landed classes sought social 
protections and market interventions, including, industry standards, financial regulations, and 
labor and environmental protections (2001: 138-9). Polanyi mulled that this contradiction 
produced “deep seated institutional strain” within states as conflicting social groups vied for 
political power (2001: 140). 
Polanyi’s purpose was to demonstrate that the implementation of “free market” policies 
led to economic and political crises in 1930s Europe. Polanyi argued that many European nations 
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responded to capital flight, rising unemployment, and social and racial tensions by 
electing socialist and fascist leaders who promised social protections from unfettered 
markets. For Polanyi, socialism was governance guided by subordinating markets to 
democratic control, but this threatened private property rights (2001: 242). Conversely, 
fascism involved implementing social protections from markets at the expense of the 
“extirpation” of democratic institutions (2001: 242). The fascist tradeoff of greater social 
protections for less freedom and democracy was justified by nationalism, “The nascent 
fascist movement put itself almost everywhere into the service of the national issue; it 
could hardly have survived without this ‘pickup’ job” (Polanyi 2001: 249). Therefore, 
Polanyi had assigned a logic to fascist governance – nationalist social protections from 
market failures in exchange for losses of freedom and democracy. Polanyi concluded that 
there may be times and places in which socialists and fascists have similar economic 
policies, however, each have opposite principles of freedom and democracy (2001: 267). 
 
V.A. Polanyi’s “Double Movement” as Ideal Types of U.S. Trade Policy Positions 
While today’s world is entirely different from Polanyi’s, his “double movement” framework is 
still useful. To apply Polanyi’s “double movement” to U.S. trade debates, I constructed ideal 
types of U.S. trade policy positions. Ideal types are pure theoretical categories, although they are 
rarely empirically observable because in “real life” there are grey areas and overlaps (Weber 
1944). Based on Polanyi’s “double movement,” I present three ideal types of U.S. trade policy 
orientations - “free trade,” “socialism,” and “nationalism.” All three are different forms of 
government control of the economy, albeit with starkly different policy directions. U.S. trade 
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policymakers and actors rarely fit an ideal type perfectly due to conflicting political interests and 
tradeoffs. 
 
Figure One: Polanyi’s “Double Movement” as Ideal Types of U.S. Trade Policy Positions 
 
 
V.B. “Free trade” policies 
Some sections of U.S. trade deals are concerned with trade in goods and services. There 
are strong arguments that the legal content of these sections are organized by the theory of 
comparative advantage and other standard free trade principles. However, the majority of the 
legal content of U.S. trade deals are regulatory. That is, the legal content relates to issues of 
governance. In U.S. FTAs, states succeed sovereignty to international governance institutions, 
including, the WTO, the IMF, and the World Bank. In turn, international economic governance 
institutions are organized around “free market” principles, in which the regulatory norm is 
market efficiency (Sassen 2008). International economic governance institutions embody 
market-based governance (Chorev 2007; Sassen 2008). Therefore, the objective of “free trade” 
politics are to use FTAs and trade institutions to impose market-based governance, particularly 
on developing countries with histories of socialist and nationalist policies.  
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V.C. Social Protections 
In contrast to “free trade” policies, social protections do not refer to trade 
protectionism, which are tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade. In Polanyi’s terms, social 
protections are ad hoc policies that are intended to protect workers, the environment, 
productive industry, and financial stability. In this case, some social protection policies 
support free trade while others support trade protectionism. I identify two ideal types of 
socially protective trade policy, “socialism” and “nationalism.” 
 
“Socialist” trade policies 
Thea Lee, Policy Director of U.S. labor union AFL-CIO, pleaded during a House 
hearing on U.S. trade and investment policy in 2009, “…it is important that we clarify 
that the interests of the U.S. are not entirely synonymous with the interests of U.S. 
MNCs” (cited in House 2009). Since the U.S. began to negotiate the WTO, U.S. MNCs 
have been the most significant actor in U.S. trade policy formation while competing 
stakeholders have been marginalized, including, labor unions, environmental 
organizations, and consumer advocacy groups (Dreiling & Darves 2016). In Thea Lee’s 
testimony, she was imploring that trade policy include public interests and not only 
private interests. Sociologist Fred Block updated Polanyi’s definition of “socialism” as 
“the project of deepening democracy and subjecting the market to democratic control” 
(2015: 62). To that end, “socialist” trade policies are formed in democratic processes, 
specifically, public trade policy-making institutions that include the input from all 
stakeholders and not just U.S. MNCs.  
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“Nationalist” trade policies 
Soon after taking office, the Trump administration released its rhetorical vision of an 
“America First Foreign Policy” (White House 2017). The document accused that past U.S. trade 
deals were negotiated in the exclusive interests of the “Washington establishment,” and that 
President Trump will implement trade policies to “put America first” (2017). “Nationalist” trade 
policies prioritize national interests over multinational interests and national sovereignty over 
multilateral governance. The Trump administration’s top two trade policy priorities are, “(1) 
defend U.S. national sovereignty over trade policy; (2) strictly enforce U.S. trade laws” (USTR 
2017: 2). Each represents significant policy breaks from past practice. On the regulatory side, the 
USTR’s report asserted that, “…the Trump Administration will aggressively defend American 
sovereignty over matters of trade policy” (USTR 2017: 3). The Trump administration’s “2017 
Trade Policy Agenda” put considerable emphasis on stressing U.S. sovereignty in relation to the 
WTO’s dispute settlement system, setting precedent for the U.S. to ignore WTO rulings that the 
Trump administration would consider violations of U.S. sovereignty. On the income side, the 
priority to “strictly enforce U.S. trade laws” is setting precedent to use trade remedy laws to 
restrict imports from non-market economies that use “unfair trade practices” (read: China). 
Protectionist restrictions on China’s imports would be a nationalistic break from past U.S. trade 
practice. 
 
VI. Data and Method 
Method: process tracing 
19 
 
To compare these ideal types of trade policy positions to actual trade events, I do a 
process tracing of trade negotiations. Process tracing is a qualitative method often used in 
political science and international relations, defined by political scientist David Collier as “the 
systematic examination of diagnostic evidence selected and analyzed in light of research 
questions and hypotheses posed by the investigator” (2011: 823). The method focuses on the 
unfolding of events over time by utilizing “diagnostic evidence” at particular moments in time to 
explain the outcome of a dependent variable. That is, the causation(s) of a dependent variable are 
determined by observing “snapshots” of its development over time. According to Collier, process 
tracing is a distinctive methodology in three ways: causal-process observations in which causal 
evidence is qualitative, careful description to capture trajectories of change and causation, and 
close attention to the sequencing of independent, dependent, and intervening variables.  
In my project, the dependent variables are the final texts of the NAFTA and the TPP 
investment and financial services chapters. The independent variables are the different political 
actors shaping the drafts and negotiating process, such as, negotiating teams and their competing 
proposals for the same provisions. I will observe the processes and conflicts between the 
different political actors that produced the final agreements. This will provide an understanding 
of the NAFTA and TPP investment and financial services chapters that goes beyond a face-value 
legal analysis and situates the agreements in a comparative, historical, and sociological context.  
 
Data:  
Data sources include primary and secondary sources. Primary sources include: draft texts 
and competing proposals; press releases; government officials’ letters, reports, documents, 
statements; news articles; Congressional testimonies; Congressional research documents; 
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stakeholder letters, publications, press releases, and presentations; leaked information from 
negotiations, including negotiating documents, notes, and emails. Secondary sources include: 
publications on negotiations from third party commentators and analysts. 
 
VI. Outline of the Manuscript 
My study builds on existing “institutionalist” studies on U.S. trade policy by offering an 
explanation of the transitions of political power in U.S. trade policy, specifically, the switch from 
“free trade” policies to “nationalist” trade policies under the Trump administration. I use the 
negotiations of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and TPP investment 
agreements as case studies. The investment agreements of an FTA are the investment chapter 
and the financial services chapter. These two chapters facilitate capital flows between the 
countries in the FTA, therefore, U.S. investment agreements are core components of U.S. trade 
policy and U.S. FTAs.  
I will use the investment agreements of the NAFTA and the TPP as case studies to 
examine why a U.S. international investment agreement is made or unmade. My focus is how the 
politics of support and opposition to these agreements interacted with trade institutions and 
political processes. Within these processes and conflicts, competing political actors became 
either policy-makers or policy-takers. I will show how and why “free trade” political actors 
successfully negotiated and implemented the NAFTA, and how and why “free trade” political 
actors unsuccessfully implemented the TPP due to overwhelming political opposition from 
“nationalist” and “socialist” actors.  
I organize the reminder of the manuscript as follows, in chapter two I present an account 
of the historical origins of U.S. international investment policy, its role in trade policy, and the 
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stakes of investment negotiations. In chapter three, I present a process tracing of the negotiations 
of the investment agreements of the NAFTA, and I offer an analysis of the outcomes in terms of 
Polanyi’s “double movement,” in which “free trade” actors triumphed over the “nationalist” and 
“socialist” actors in all three countries. In chapter four, I synthesize the economic and regulatory 
effects of the NAFTA investment agreements. I will use this information to clarify trade policy 
positions and to measure trade rhetoric against trade policy, including Trump’s “America First” 
trade policy. In chapter five, I present a process tracing of the negotiations of the investment 
agreements of the TPP, and I offer an analysis of the outcomes in terms of Polanyi’s “double 
movement,” in which “nationalist” and “socialist” actors defeated the “free trade” actors in the 
U.S. In chapter six, I compare the NAFTA and TPP investment agreements to determine the 
direction of U.S. investment policy, which offers further clarifications about the stakes of trade 
policy debates.  
In chapter seven, I conclude using my analysis of the NAFTA and TPP to explain the 
political motivations of the Trump administration’s “America First” trade policy. I argue that 
after more than twenty years of U.S. FTAs and the WTO, and the collapse of international 
markets in 2008 and its long-term effects, voters were seeking social protections from unfettered 
“free markets.” In comparison to the “nationalist” actors in the NAFTA negotiations in the early 
1990s, I argue that Trump’s “nationalist” trade promises had far more currency with voters in 
2016 due to the polarizing effects of U.S. trade and investment agreements. Specifically, as 
employment shares shifted from manufacturing to services, the white working class in rust 
belt/swing states had the most to lose. By 2016, Trump was the first Republican nominee in over 
thirty years to run on a “nationalist” trade policy platform, thereby distinguishing himself from 
the “free trade” agenda of the “Washington establishment.” Trump won the vote of the rust belt 
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white working class by pledging to empower them with an “America First” foreign policy and 
putative immigration and criminal justice polices. Trump’s anti-TPP position had widespread 
appeal because of the activism of broad-based coalitions of labor, environmental, and consumer 
advocacy groups calling for fundamental reforms to trade policy. In so doing, “nationalist” 
political currents and social movements had forced major revisions to U.S. trade policy. 
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Chapter Two: Historical Origins of U.S. International Investment Agreements 
I. Introduction 
II. The emergence of the U.S. trade deficit 
III. The making of U.S. trade policy 
IV. Investment policy in U.S. trade policy 
V. U.S. investment policy and global competitors  
VI. Conclusion: the stakes of international investment negotiations 
 
“…no government is entitled to expropriate private property, for whatever purpose, without 
provision for prompt, adequate, and effective payment therefor.” 
-U.S. Secretary of State Hull, August, 1938, responding to Mexico’s nationalization of the oil 
industry without compensation to U.S. oil companies (emphasis added) 
 
“No Party shall expropriate or nationalize a covered investment either directly or indirectly 
through measures equivalent to expropriation or nationalization (expropriation), except…on 
payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation” 
-TPP Investment Chapter, Article 9.8: Expropriation and Compensation, 2016 (emphasis added) 
  
I. Introduction  
In the twenty-first century, in a world of unprecedented global production sharing and 
financial integration, how much sovereignty should a state have to design and implement market 
regulations? According to Oxford dictionary, sovereignty is “the authority of a state to govern 
itself or another state.” A country’s international investment policy addresses the relationship 
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between sovereignty and foreign direct investment. The U.S. government’s official position is 
codified in the U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) program, which originated to 
replace gunboat diplomacy with developing countries during the Cold War. The USTR, State 
Department, and the Treasury integrated the U.S. Model BIT into larger trade policy as a means 
of promoting the global market shares of U.S. MNCs and domestic jobs at home. In this chapter, 
I provide an account of the origins of the legal content of U.S. international investment 
agreements. First, I trace the political origins of the U.S. trade deficit, and then I consider how 
U.S. trade policymakers developed trade policy as a response to the growing trade deficit, among 
other secondary political considerations. I detail the historical origins of the U.S. Model BIT 
program and its integration into U.S. trade policy. Lastly, I provide an overview of the 
differences between U.S. international investment policy and those of global competitors, which 
explains the stakes of diplomatic conflicts over the legal content of international investment 
agreements. 
 
II. The emergence of the U.S. trade deficit 
The United State Trade Representative (USTR) is the government agency that 
coordinates U.S. trade policy and conducts trade and investment negotiations. Between 1986 and 
1994, when the USTR negotiated the World Trade Organization (WTO), a central negotiating 
objective mandated to the USTR by Congress was to establish trade and investment rules that 
would reduce the U.S. trade deficit.1 By that time, the U.S. had large and growing trade deficits 
with East Asia and to a lesser extent Western Europe. Since then, the U.S. trade deficit has 
multiplied and it has been a source of much political anxiety and conflict, as politicians and 
                                                          
1 The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Section 1001. 
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commentators link chronic trade deficits to loss of jobs, income, industrial competitiveness, 
currency wars, and global savings and investment imbalances. As such, U.S. trade policy must 
be understood within the context of rising global trade imbalances, which is a multilateral 
problem whose causes and effects are fiercely debated among policymakers and analysts.  
Karl Polanyi famously articulated that markets are not the “natural” evolution of 
capitalists’ animal spirits or an “invisible hand,” but rather markets are products of states and 
commercial and political actors (1944). States assume the core responsibilities of constructing, 
managing, and protecting capitalist markets, and in so doing they condition distribution. Political 
scientists Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin argued, “The role of states in maintaining property rights, 
overseeing contracts, stabilizing currencies, reproducing class relations, and containing crises has 
always been central to the operation of capitalism” (2012: 1). States, particularly the U.S., were 
central to the making of global capitalism. Paul Volcker, former Chairman of the Federal 
Reserve, explained, “I take it almost as an article of faith (a faith that in this case can be backed 
by facts) that the United States, as the dominant power after World War II and for decades 
afterwards, was the driving force toward a liberal trading order and the freedom of international 
investment” (Volcker and Gyohten 1992: 288). The diverse and complex motivations of the U.S. 
government’s pursuit of a “liberal” world order are beyond the scope of this paper (see Panitch & 
Gindin 2012 for a detailed account). The origins of the U.S. trade deficit are policy decisions by 
U.S. government officials in the 1970s to secure access to the necessary financing of the trade 
deficit. U.S. policymakers formulated trade and investment policy in the context of the growing 
U.S. trade deficit.  
 
The Bretton Woods system produced tiny trade imbalances 
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Emerging from WWII, there was widespread belief that “free market” policies were 
central to both world wars (Silver 2004: 151). Lead by the U.S., the world leaders of the Atlantic 
powers met at Bretton Woods to construct multilateral organizations to address international 
political economy as a root cause of war (Silver 2004: 151). The principle multilateral 
institutions (the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) were empowered to coordinate 
an international monetary and financial system, finance reconstruction and development, and 
promote trade (Gindin & Panitch 2012: 10). The Bretton Woods Accord established an 
international monetary system that placed the U.S. dollar at the center of a fixed exchange rate 
system, in which all major countries pegged their currencies to the dollar and the dollar was 
convertible to gold at $35 an ounce. In essence, the dollar became the ultimate means of payment 
as it became the quoted denomination for all major commodities and international debts. 
Therefore, the dollar became the global reserve currency as central banks had to hold dollar 
reserves for possible intervention in foreign exchange markets to maintain the value of their 
currencies (Gindin & Panitch 2012: 118). The dollar’s peg to gold theoretically imposed a 
restraint on inflation as the gold standard would act as a check on the dollar supply and the U.S.’ 
balance of payments (a country’s balance of payments is the sum of its current account and 
capital account, which according to standard free trade theory, should eventually sum to zero). 
A prerequisite to the dollar standard was the depth, liquidity, expansion, and openness of 
U.S. financial markets, such that dollar denominated financial assets provided the necessary 
investor confidence to support to the dollar standard. To that end, U.S. government debt (U.S. 
Treasury securities) became the most “quality” debt in international money markets and the U.S. 
Treasury bill became the foundation for all calculations of value in the global economy (Gindin 
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& Panitch 2012: 10). In so doing, the U.S. government institutionalized itself as the world’s 
money manager, charged with maintaining universal confidence in the dollar. Until the 1960s, 
the dollar standard and the Bretton Woods institutions facilitated strong economic growth in the 
U.S. and the development of U.S. financial markets, the reconstruction of Europe and Japan, and 
increasing financial integration between the global north and the global south. The U.S.’ political 
and military expenditures in the Marshall Plan and Korean War laid the basis for development in 
Europe and Japan, and by the 1960s they would emerge as manufacturing competitors in world 
markets, which is the reason many commentators conclude that U.S. foreign policy took 
precedence over domestic economic development in the post-war period (Gindin & Panitch 
2012). Trade imbalances were minuscule compared to more contemporary global imbalances. To 
be sure, world trade flows were tiny compared to the twenty-first century, however, the Bretton 
Woods system of fixed exchange rates imposed a far more stringent balance of payments 
constraints on the U.S. and the rest of the world, which led to economic and political constraints 
on trade imbalances.  
 
Crisis of Bretton Woods 
The shift from an asset-money (gold) to a debt-money (U.S. government bonds) 
international monetary system in the first years of the 1970s provided the foundation for the U.S. 
to finance its chronic trade and budget deficits that have been multiplying since the 1980s. 
Contrary to many academic accounts, the reinvention of the international monetary system was 
not was a deliberate plan of U.S. imperialist ambitions. Rather, it was the result of the 
unsustainability of Bretton Woods and the culmination of various policy decisions made at the 
international level. These events serendipitously permitted U.S. policymakers to adopt a policy 
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of “benign neglect” towards the growing budget deficit while securing necessary capital inflows 
to cover the growing trade deficit (Hudson 2003). Economist Robert Triffin first formalized the 
structural instability of the Bretton Woods international monetary system in 1959. Triffin 
testified to Congress that the growth of world trade and capital were outstripping the growth of 
the world’s gold supply, which would inevitably lead to a crisis of confidence in the dollar and in 
turn the Bretton Woods monetary system (Triffin 1978). Throughout the 1950s, the U.S. was 
running relatively small balance of payments deficits, meaning more capital was leaving the U.S. 
than entering. Triffin cogently argued that this condition was unsustainable for the Bretton 
Woods system of fixed exchange rates, 
“…if the U.S. corrected its persistent balance of payments deficits, the 
growth of world reserves could not be fed adequately by gold production at $35 
an ounce, but that if the U.S. continued to run deficits, its foreign liabilities would 
inevitably come to exceed by far its ability to convert dollars into gold upon 
demand and would bring about a ‘gold and dollar crisis’” (Triffin 1978: 3).  
The persistent U.S. balance of payments deficits resulted in the buildup of dollar reserves 
in the central banks of Europe and Japan, which were gradually redeeming the dollar reserves for 
U.S. gold (IMF 2016). The Kennedy administration made the initial attempts to offset capital 
outflows with a mix of policies, including, increasing the U.S. trade surplus, capital controls, and 
import taxes (Hudson 2003: 30). However, none of the efforts addressed the underlying 
dynamics driving the U.S. balance of payments deficits and by the mid-1960s Triffin’s prophesy 
was materializing. The IMF reported, “In 1966, foreign central banks and governments held over 
14 billion U.S. dollars. The United States had $13.2 billion in gold reserves, but only $3.2 billion 
of that was available to cover foreign dollar holdings. The rest was needed to cover domestic 
29 
 
holdings” (2016). World leaders and the international financial community feared that the U.S. 
would either devalue the dollar, which would cause worldwide deflation and potential social and 
political instability, or, stop redeeming gold for dollars, which would permit inflationary 
pressures to undermine confidence in the dollar and lead to social and political instability.  
Paul Volcker, Undersecretary of the Treasury, led a research and policy group at the 
Treasury on the international monetary system and its crisis. On June 23, 1969, the Volcker 
Groups issued a confidential memo to President Nixon mulling three alternatives to Bretton 
Woods:  
“…(a) a series of multilateral negotiations pointing toward a fundamental, 
but ‘evolutionary’ change in the existing system; (b) suspension of the present 
United States policy of providing for the conversion of dollars held by foreign 
monetary authorities at their discretion; and (c) a change, large or small, in the 
official price of gold” (Volcker Group 1969: 22). 
The Volcker Group established that the U.S. budget deficits paid for the U.S.’ Cold War 
military and political expenses overseas as well as domestic economic policy (1969: 7). This 
U.S. budget deficit provided the rest of the world with dollars to sustain an international 
payments system and a multilateral trading order. In so doing, the U.S. was able to base its 
economic leadership on the international role of the dollar, however, this came at the cost of 
substantial borrowing from surplus countries in the form of short-term dollar liabilities (Volcker 
Group 1969: 7). Simultaneous to the growing U.S. budget deficits, the U.S. was moving from a 
trade surplus to a trade deficit state. The Volcker Group identified two fundamental causes of 
this trade shift – domestic inflation and growing industrial competition from abroad (1969: 18). 
Therefore, with a growing trade deficit, for the U.S. to achieve an equal balance of payments, it 
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would need to attract capital inflows. The memo argued that without an equal balance of 
payments, the U.S. would have faced severe consequences in its ability to borrow in the future 
and it would have undermined the U.S.’ economic leadership and negotiating strength. Above 
all, the Volcker Group stipulated, “For both the period immediately ahead and the medium-term 
future, the dominant factor affecting the evolution of the international monetary system (and our 
success in guiding that evolution) will be our ability to contain domestic inflationary forces” 
(1969: 19). 
An internal memo among the Nixon administration’s high-level staff revealed that their 
objective was to “reassert [U.S.] leadership of international economic and trade policy” 
(McCracken 1971:7). The memo outlined that “great market strength” for the dollar and globally 
competitive industries were “indispensable” conditions for international political leadership 
(McCracken 1971:7). To achieve both of these objectives the Nixon administration first 
negotiated the international financing of both the U.S. budget deficit, and then negotiated a 
revaluation of the currencies of surplus countries.  
 
Financing the growing budget deficit 
As explained by economist Michael Hudson, to finance the growing budget deficit the 
Nixon administration had “to induce the central banks and treasuries of foreign countries to 
refrain from cashing in any more dollars for gold, but to accumulate dollar assets in growing 
amounts, whatever their fears regarding the stability of the dollar” (2003: 263). To that end, the 
Nixon administration adopted a number of policy positions: to reach political agreements with 
surplus countries such that they would not buy U.S. gold; to end dollar-gold convertibility; to 
demonetize gold. The Treasury had made various political agreements with surplus countries 
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such that they would invest in illiquid (non-marketable) U.S. government debt (U.S. Treasury 
bills) instead of using their surplus to buy U.S. gold reserves (Hudson 2003: 264-5). Beginning 
in the early 1960s, the Treasury made such agreements with Canada, Western European 
countries, and Japan. For example, according to the president of Germany’s central bank, in 
1971, the U.S. Treasury “implicitly” threatened to withdraw U.S. troops from West Germany [in 
1968] if the German central bank did not renounce its rights to convert surplus dollars into 
American gold (cited in Hudson 2003: 288). However, by the late 1960s, Europe and Japan had 
little choice but to hold U.S. Treasury bills because the size of their U.S. Treasury bill holdings 
exceeded the total U.S. gold holdings (Hudson 203: 264).  
The June, 1969 memo from the Volcker Group to President Nixon proposed suspending 
the Bretton Woods dollar-gold convertibility. The memo detailed that the main objective was to 
strengthen the U.S.’ negotiating position because it would present surplus countries with 
“essentially unpalatable alternatives” as they would have to either “passively hold dollars or 
permit a gradual appreciation of their currencies” (1969: 38). That is, if the U.S. closed the gold 
window and Europe, Japan, and other surplus countries chose not to hold and accumulate dollar 
assets thereafter, then they would devalue the dollar. This would provide U.S. exporters with a 
competitive devaluation while reducing the value of surplus countries’ dollar assets. Therefore, 
the Volcker Group endorsed suspending dollar-gold convertibility. They surmised, “If 
successfully carried off, the United States would retrieve for itself a very substantial degree of 
flexibility in financing future balance of payments deficits and would remain in an extremely 
strong position for guiding future changes in the international monetary system” (1969: 38). 
Nixon eventually did close the gold window on August 15, 1971 (discussed below).  
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In so doing, the Nixon administration effectively told the rest of the world that the U.S. 
balance of payments deficit and the dollar was their own problem, and European leaders termed 
the Nixon administration’s approach to the U.S. balance of payments deficit as one of “benign 
neglect” (cited in Hudson 2003: 284). Central banks around the world were able to hold U.S. 
government debt as reserves because they were supported by the depth and breadth of U.S. 
capital markets. The Volcker Group explained in their 1969 memo, “Foreign official short- and 
medium-term dollar holdings ($16.1 billion) and foreign private dollar holdings ($23.4 billion at 
the end of 1968) are serviced by a complex and highly developed set of banking, investment, and 
trading facilities both in the U.S. and Europe” (1969: 5). Throughout the 1960s and 70s, dollar-
based capital markets in Europe expanded and evolved and international dollar markets were by 
far the deepest financial markets in the world, which provided the foundation for investor 
confidence in U.S. government debt. In fact, by the end of the 1970s, European outward FDI to 
the U.S. accounted for half of total global FDI flows (Gindin & Panitch 2012: 148).  
For this reason, the Volcker Group prioritized controlling the domestic inflationary 
pressures on the dollar in the 1960s and 70s. The memo explained,  
“…the fact that the United States may be less harmfully affected than 
other countries by the additional strain on international monetary cooperation 
does not, in itself, make this a happy prospect. These risks could be minimized 
only if the United States were successful in its anti-inflationary efforts at home 
and in improving the structure of its balance of payments” (1969: 33). 
The inflationary domestic conditions of the 1960s and 70s undermined investor 
confidence in the dollar, which in turn threatened the U.S. government’s credibility vis-à-vis 
surplus countries holding dollar assets, which would eventually undermine the U.S.’ ability to 
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finance its budget deficit. Therefore, the Volcker Group concluded that suspending the dollar-
gold convertibility would only be sustainable if the U.S. could contain inflation to strengthen its 
balance of payments and industrial and financial competitiveness (1969: 31).  
 
Currency wars and the beginning of floating exchange rates 
On August 15, 1971, after a wave of unprecedented speculative dumping of the U.S. 
dollar, European central banks stopped accepting dollars for their own currencies, and the U.S. 
gold supply reached a critically low level, the Nixon administration decided to cancel the dollar’s 
convertibility to gold (Silber 2012: 79-85). The Nixon administration’s aim in their unilateral 
decision to suspend the gold window was to force an upward revaluation of Europe and Japan’s 
currencies to reverse the declining U.S. trade surplus (Silber 2012: 80; Stein 2010: 40). Some 
commentators refer to these acts as “currency wars” because countries were implementing 
“beggar-thy-neighbor” policies by competitively manipulating their exchange rates to promote 
national exports at the expense of competing countries (Rickards 2012).  
President Nixon’s key economic advisors, led by the Treasury Secretary John Connally, 
argued that the cause of the shrinking trade surplus was an overvalued dollar. Connally wanted to 
pressure Europe and Japan to devalue against the dollar (Stein 2010: 37). The Nixon 
administration justified their position because of the U.S.’ overseas military expenditures were in 
the “common interests” of Europe and Japan (Stein 2010: 41). After meeting with finance 
ministers from West Europe, Canada, and Japan, Treasury Secretary Connally “said blandly for 
the television cameras as he left the afternoon meeting…‘We had a problem and we are sharing 
it with the world just like we shared our prosperity…That’s what friends are for’” (cited in 
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Hudson 2003: 290). Connally was demanding exchange rate adjustments from the rest of the 
world that would return the U.S. to full employment (cited in Hudson 2003: 290).  
At that meeting, the Atlantic powers renegotiated fixed exchange rates against gold, 
however, in a world of increasingly mobile capital, those fixed exchange rates were politically 
impossible to maintain and they abandoned fixed exchange rates in 1973. The multilateral 
abandonment of fixed exchange rates cemented the dollar’s role as the global reserve currency 
and the ability of the U.S. to rely on the rest of the world to finance its budget and trade deficits. 
Countries with trade surpluses could not use their dollars to purchase gold but only U.S. 
Treasury securities. Ironically, the Nixon administration initially intended to suspend dollar-gold 
convertibility to shift the U.S. trade balance back into surplus. However, it had the long-term 
effect of permitting the endless expansion of the U.S. trade deficit as foreign governments 
recycled their trade surpluses into U.S. government debt. However, domestic social and political 
conflicts throughout the 1970s produced inflation that undermined investor confidence in the 
dollar (Stein 2010). This threatened the U.S. ability to cover its balance of payments and provide 
economic and political leadership, not to mention the negotiating strength of the U.S. 
 
Stabilizing the dollar to finance the trade deficit 
The rampant “stagflation” (a combination of high unemployment and high inflation) of 
the 1970s had multiple determinations, and it resulted in a crisis of profitability for U.S. 
industries and a loss of confidence in the dollar as the world reserve currency (Gindin & Panitch 
2012: 137; Krippner 2011: 16). Domestically, the high inflation of the 1970s had devastating 
effects, including by making investment and production inefficient, eroding returns on financial 
assets, and reducing capital investment (Bluestone & Bennett 1982). At the international level, 
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inflation undermined the dollar as world reserve currency and the creditability of the U.S. 
government. Arthur Burns, Chairman of the Federal Reserve between 1970-8, identified public 
sector labor unions and welfare programs (which he viewed as a subsidy to striking workers) in 
the 1960s and 70s as driving a wage-price inflationary spiral (cited in Gindin & Panitch 2012: 
141). Paul Volcker succeeded Burns as Chairman of the Federal Reserve and had a similar 
diagnosis, sociologist Michael McCarthy observed,  
“Above all else, the members of the FOMC and Volcker himself operated 
with a cost-push theory of inflation that specifically pointed to labor power as the 
driver. Despite their public comments to contrary, privately they understood that 
inflation was more about the balance of class forces than the amount of money in 
the economy. And this reflected in the monetary policies they pursued” 
(McCarthy 2016). 
Paul Volcker announced The Federal Reserve’s new “monetarist” policy to break 
inflation in October, 1979 (Gindin & Panitch 2012: 168). Consequently, at the end of Carter’s 
presidency the federal funds rate was at 19.1% and they remained at that level six months into 
the Reagan presidency, a period some commentators refer to as “the Volcker shock” (Gindin & 
Panitch 2012: 168). The Volcker shock thrusted the U.S. into the deepest economic downturn 
since the Great Depression, consequently, inflation was finally broken when unemployment rose 
from its 1979 level of 6% to reach above 10% in the fall of 1982 (Gindin & Panitch 2012: 168). 
It was at this point that Volcker announced the end of monetarist restraint and shifted to 
monetary easing. Economic growth finally resumed in 1983, and inflation came down to just 
over 3% and it remained at about that level for the rest of the century (Gindin & Panitch 2012: 
168).  
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Domestically, “the Volcker shock” secured broad and lasting anti-inflationary conditions 
by facilitating a shift in the balance of class forces. According to Steven Hayward, biographer of 
President Reagan, Paul Volcker praised Reagan’s firing of 12,000 public sector union strikers in 
the airline industry as “the single most important anti-inflationary step that Reagan took” 
because it influenced other labor negotiations (2010: 173). In 1979, as U.S. automaker Chrysler 
faced bankruptcy, the United Auto Workers made wage concessions and allowed for the 
outsourcing of production to non-union plants (Gindin & Panitch 2012: 171). These concessions 
became “the template” for the spread of similar concessions throughout US industry, including 
“airlines, meatpacking, agricultural implements, trucking, grocery, rubber, among smaller steel 
firms, and in public employment” (Gindin & Panitch 2012: 171-2). This was met with the 
Reagan administration’s cutbacks to welfare, food stamps, Medicare, public pensions, and 
unemployment insurance (Gindin & Panitch 2012: 171-2). Therefore, there were two main 
determinants to the shift of class power that broke inflation: (1) the Volcker shock advanced the 
U.S. as a “post-industrial” economy, in which employment transitioned from manufacturing to 
services; and (2) the anti-unionism and cutbacks to the social wage during the Reagan 
administration.  
At the international level, “the Volcker shock” effectively restored confidence in the 
dollar and saved it as the world’s reserve currency, thereby attracting capital back into U.S. 
Treasury bills to cover the budget deficit. The breaking of inflation restored confidence in the 
dollar, which was necessary to secure investor confidence in U.S. capital markets and thereby 
strengthen the U.S. balance of payments. Surplus countries continue to finance the U.S. trade 
deficit by recycling their surpluses back into U.S. financial assets, particularly U.S. Treasury 
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bills. In turn, the U.S. trade deficit allows the U.S. to import cheaper goods, particularly 
consumer goods, which further holds down inflation. 
 
III. The making of U.S. trade policy 
While the international monetary system was primarily a conflict among the Atlantic 
powers, world trade and trade policy was further complicated by challenges to the Atlantic 
powers from the global south. On November 16, 1975, the heads of state of the U.S., Canada, 
Japan, and Western Europe converged in Rambouillet, France to discuss world monetary and 
trade affairs. Despite the currency conflicts, stagflation in the major economies, and growing 
trade and payments imbalances, each of the world leaders vowed to resist domestic calls for 
import restrictions and protectionism. German Chancellor Schmidt reasoned, “The countries in 
this room should act together not just because of a deep-rooted liberalism but because the market 
system benefits us” (Memorandum of Conversation 1975: 407). However, British Prime Minister 
Wilson responded that protectionism cannot be ruled out as a response to “…lethal attacks by 
other countries directed at destroying two or three sectors of our economy. These are not lame 
duck industries” (1975: 407). Chancellor Schmidt’s response is worth quoting at length,  
“Harold, you talked of viable industries, and indicated that this excluded 
lame ducks. You referred to textiles as an example. I am a close friend of the 
chairman of the textile workers union in Germany. It is a union of a shrinking 
industry. I would hope that this would not be repeated outside of this room. Given 
the high level of wages in Europe, I cannot help but believe that in the long run 
textile industries here will have to vanish. We cannot ward off cheaper 
competition from outside…wages in East Asia are very low compared with 
38 
 
ours…The German textile industry is viable, but will vanish in ten or twelve 
years” (1975: 407). 
All of the Atlantic powers collectively mulled a new geography of production, in which 
industrial competition was not only amongst developed countries, but also from emerging low-
wage and labor-intensive manufacturing in East Asia and Eastern Europe. Domestically, 
beginning in the early 1960s, policymakers were keenly aware that the U.S. was transitioning 
from an export-oriented to an import-oriented economy, and the Kennedy administration 
identified a fundamental solution as promoting the export competitiveness of U.S. firms and 
reducing barriers to trade abroad (Gindin & Panitch 2012: 125). The 1962 Trade Act expanded 
the trade negotiating powers of the Executive branch and established the government agency that 
would become the USTR in preparation for the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) Kennedy Round of negotiations (1963-7) (Gindin & Panitch 2012: 125).  
By the early 1970s, U.S. MNCs began lobbying Congress and the President for 
fundamental reforms to GATT. The GATT’s mandate was to be a negotiating forum for only 
trade in goods. U.S. MNCs sought to include trade in services, investment, and intellectual 
property issues in the GATT’s framework (Kelsey 2008; Feketekuty 1988: 300). In the 1974 
Trade Act, for the first time Congress had instructed the President to include services, investment 
and intellectual property as “fundamental negotiating objectives.”2 In the GATT Tokyo Round 
(1973-9), the USTR’s efforts in bringing the “new issues” into the GATT were rebuked by a 
large coalition of developing countries, however, it had set a precedent for future negotiations 
(Feketekuty 1988). Following the Tokyo Round, the U.S. corporate lobbies would 
                                                          
2 Section 104(A). 
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institutionalize, multiply, build strategic alliances, and become advisors to trade policymakers to 
ensure that the new issues would be pursued in future negotiations (Kelsey 2008: 78). 
As new technologies revolutionized the cross-border movement of information, data, and 
capital, the corporate services lobbies sought to secure deregulations of any new markets based 
on information technology, particularly within developing countries (Feketekuty 1988; Kelsey 
2008: 13). A range of sectoral corporate lobbies sought to secure a multilateral agreement on 
investment for the purposes of protecting foreign investments and securing foreign market 
access, especially in developing countries (Vandevelde 1988). Securing a multilateral agreement 
on intellectual property was vital to the U.S.’ highly capitalized and knowledge intensive 
industries in both manufacturing and services. U.S. multinational firms required strong 
intellectual property rights to secure profits as labor-intensive manufacturing shifted to the global 
south (Prashad 2013). This convergence of corporate interests motivated U.S. trade policy in the 
GATT Tokyo Round and into the GATT Uruguay Round (1986-94). 
In 1975, political scientist Robert Gilpin identified the structural reasons that U.S. 
policymakers enthusiastically promoted the interests of U.S. MNCs in trade and investment 
policy. By the 1970s, U.S. MNCs were already the main importers and exporters of capital, on 
the dollar standard. As U.S. MNCs expanded, the dollar zone expanded, and U.S. financial 
markets expanded. In turn, U.S. policymakers depended upon deepening dollar markets and 
dollar-denominated financial markets to finance overseas political and military expenditures 
(Gilpin 1975: 161). Gilpin cited Henry Fowler, Treasury Secretary in the mid-1960s, to illustrate 
the point,  
“[MNCs] have not only a commercial importance – but a highly 
significant role in the U.S. foreign policy that has met with general approval by 
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the Atlantic countries…[in order to finance its military position overseas] the U.S. 
government has consistently sought, and will continue to seek, to expand and 
extend the role of the [MNC] as an essential instrument of strong and healthy 
economic progress through the Free World” (cited in Gilpin 1975: 161). 
By the mid-1980s, there had been an unprecedented expansion of the U.S. trade deficit, 
notably with East Asia and to a lesser extent Europe. As the USTR prepared for the GATT 
Uruguay Round, which produced the WTO, Congress fully embraced the U.S. corporate agenda 
in services, investment, and intellectual property rights as a means of reducing the U.S. trade 
deficit. These objectives were codified in The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, 
in which Congress mandated specific negotiating objectives for the USTR in the GATT Uruguay 
Round. In outlining the premise of the 1988 Omnibus Act, Congress found that, “The United 
States is confronted with a fundamental disequilibrium in its trade and current account balances 
and a rapid increase in its net external debt.”3 Therefore, Congress mandated a principle 
negotiating objective to address “persistent” trade imbalances and countries with structural trade 
surpluses “by imposing greater responsibility on such countries to undertake policy 
changes…including expedited implementation of trade agreements where feasible and 
appropriate.”4 In so doing, rather than restricting imports, Congress and the President sought to 
reduce the trade deficit via exports. Specifically, policymakers directed trade policy at 
establishing new multilateral trade agreements in services, investment, and intellectual property 
to create opportunities for U.S. exporters and enhancing global market shares for U.S. MNCs. 
The trade strategy of reducing chronic trade deficits with aggressive export programs was 
                                                          
3 The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Section 1001. 
4 The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Section 1101 (5) 
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adopted on a bipartisan basis from the Kennedy administration through the Obama 
administration.  
 
IV. Investment Policy in U.S. Trade Policy 
U.S. investment policy had multiple determinations. At the turn of the twentieth century, 
the U.S. sought to institutionalize international investment law to protect FDI in developing 
countries. By the 1970s, the interests of U.S. MNCs and U.S. geopolitical considerations 
converged to make services, investment, and intellectual property indispensable pillars of U.S. 
trade policy, and Congress mandated the USTR to expand agreements on those issues around the 
world. As the U.S. had fully integrated investment policy into trade policy, the USTR had 
expanded the scope investment law for the purposes of market access and deregulations in 
developing countries. 
 
The Calvo Doctrine vs. the Hull Doctrine 
In 1938, the governments of the U.S. and Mexico were entangled in a conflict over the 
relationship between international investment law and state sovereignty. The focal point was the 
location of the rights of foreign investors, were they located in domestic or international law? In 
that year, Mexico nationalized the entire oil industry, which had been dominated by U.S. and 
British oil companies (Thomas & Gimblett 2011: 664). During Mexico’s 1917 revolution, 
Mexico adopted a new Constitution and it outlined “strategic areas” of economic activity “in an 
exclusive manner” to the Mexican State, especially the oil and energy sector.5 Concurrent to the 
oil expropriations, the Mexican and U.S. governments were negotiating a settlement from 
                                                          
5 1917 Constitution, Article 25 
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Mexico’s land takings of U.S. nationals during Mexico’s sweeping land redistribution policy as a 
result of Mexico’s 1917 revolution (See Jayne 2000). 
The 1917 Mexican Constitution adopted the Calvo doctrine, which stipulates that 
foreigners must bring property disputes to domestic courts without recourse to their home 
governments. In other words, in investment and capital disputes with foreign nationals, the Calvo 
doctrine emphasized state sovereignty and rejected international law. Carlos Calvo (1824-1906) 
was an Argentine diplomat who wrote a treatise on international law in the context of European 
military interventions in Latin America, particularly France’s intervention in Argentina and 
Uruguay from 1838 through 1850 (Del Luca 2003: 20). The Calvo Doctrine was widely adopted 
in Latin America and it provided that diplomatic protections and interventions by foreign 
governments on behalf of foreign investors was a violation of state sovereignty (Del Luca 2003: 
20). 
After Mexico nationalized the oil industry in 1938, the U.S. government pursued a “good 
neighbor” policy and decided against military intervention in Mexico. The U.S. and British oil 
companies brought their claims to Mexican Federal Courts. The contentious cases were highly 
politicized as the Mexican and U.S. governments were sharply divided over two issues - the 
standard of compensation and that foreign nationals are entitled to a “minimum standard of 
treatment.” In the correspondence between the Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs and U.S. 
Secretary of State Cordell Hull, the Mexicans denied that there was any consensus on 
international law that would oblige compensation for expropriation (Thomas & Gimblett 2011: 
664). Mexico acknowledged that compensation was necessary under Mexican Constitutional law, 
however, they asserted that “…the doctrine which [Mexico] maintains of the subject…is that the 
time and manner of such payment must be determined by [Mexico’s] own laws” (Thomas & 
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Gimblett 2011: 664). A few weeks later, on August 22, 1938, U.S. Secretary of State Hull 
responded in what has since become known as the Hull Doctrine. He maintained “a self-evident 
fact” that not only does international law exist but that “…the applicable precedents and 
recognized authorities on international law” support the U.S. position (Thomas & Gimblett 2011: 
664). Indeed, there had been a range of international arbitral decisions in the 19th and early 20th 
century establishing such obligations as a rule of international law (Borchard 1940). 
In the Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs note to Secretary Hull on September 2, 1938, 
the Mexican government contended that the Calvo Doctrine and Mexico’s rejection of 
international investment law was established to defend “weak states against the unjustified 
pretension of foreigners who, alleging supposed international laws, demanded a privileged 
position” (Borchard 1940: 450). After provocative political exchanges and threats from U.S. 
Congress, the cases were eventually settled as Mexico agreed to one lump sum payment in 
compensation for the land and oil expropriations. However, the underlying cause of the 
investment dispute – a fundamental opposition between claims to sovereignty and claims to 
international law - was certainly not new and it was far from resolved.  
 
From gunboat diplomacy to investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) 
U.S. investment policy and law, even in its most elementary forms in the 19th and 20th 
century, emerged from conflicts with developing countries over state sovereignty. During the 
interwar years, Mexico was joined by the Soviet Union and Romania in implementing far-
reaching nationalizations (Thomas & Gimblett 2011). In the League of Nations in 1930, the U.S. 
attempted to codify international investment law to protect against expropriations and denials of 
justice to foreign nationals. The representative from China responded with essentially a version 
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of the Calvo Doctrine in arguing that a foreigner must be prepared for “all local conditions, 
political and physical, as he is the weather” (Borchard 1940: 451). The conference fell apart as 
the seventeen “weaker” nations located the rights of foreign investors in domestic law while the 
twenty-one “great powers” opposed that position as contrary to international law (Borchard 
1940: 451).  
Following WWII, as countries in the global south gained their independence from 
colonial rule, the rate of expropriations increased markedly while developing countries continued 
to reject international investment law. From 1960-9 there were 136 expropriations in developing 
countries, but from 1970-9 there were 423 and during 1980-92 there were 16 (Minor 1994). 
Since the 19th century, the U.S., British, and other European powers tended to respond to 
expropriations with “gunboat diplomacy,” or military intervention in a foreign country to protect 
commercial interests in that country. The U.S. has a long history of gunboat diplomacy in Latin 
America and the Caribbean and Asia, as early as 1833 the U.S. had deployed military forces to 
Argentina to protect private commercial interests during a local insurrection (Collier 1993). At 
the turn of the 20th century, the U.S. had a particularly active military intervention policy on 
behalf of on U.S. private commercial interests in Latin America and the Caribbean, mostly 
motivated by capital and investment disputes (Langley 2001). In 1937, a State Department 
official commented,  
“It was in large part the influence of pressure groups bent upon selfish 
gain and immediate material profit that led more than once to our interference in 
the internal affairs of our Central and South American sister republics, finally 
resulting in armed intervention and the sowing of fears and deep-seated 
resentment” (cited in Lowenthal 1978).  
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Throughout the Cold War, the U.S. continued military and covert operations in the 
developing world in response to nationalizations and other commercial conflicts. Among the 
most famous instances in Latin America were the U.S. military ouster of President Jacobo 
Arbenz in Guatemala in 1954 at the behest of United Fruit Company (Schlesinger et. al. 2005), 
and the CIA and International Telephone and Telegraph’s successful efforts to overthrow the 
democratically-elected Salvador Allende government in Chile in the early 1970s (Qureshi 2009). 
As the Cold War pressed on, the U.S. was increasing commercial ties and exporting capital to the 
developing world (Vandevelde 1988: 208). Simultaneously, investment and capital disputes in 
the global south became increasingly complicated. In addition to expropriations, developing 
countries imposed “performance requirements” on multinational corporations (MNCs) to ensure 
that foreign investors acted in accordance with the national policy objectives of the host state. 
The U.S. Commerce Department defined performance requirements6 as “any requirement placed 
upon a foreign controlled enterprise by a host nation” (Cited in Coughlin 1982: 129).  
By 1965, in response to the increasing amount of capital and investment disputes in 
developing countries, the U.S. and Europe established an investment dispute settlement court at 
the World Bank.7 The purpose was to enforce international investment law and “depoliticize” 
private investment disputes in the developing world by shifting the conflicts to third party 
arbitrators at the World Bank. The U.S. and European countries developed respective bilateral 
investment treaties for contract with developing countries that obliged that investment and 
                                                          
6 Performance requirements include commitments to: regional development, training local 
workers, research and development, technology transfers, mandatory exports quantities, and 
mandatory local content inputs in which a certain percentage of the value of the final output is 
sourced locally. 
7 In 1965, The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID or the Centre) 
at the World Bank was established by the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
between States and Nationals of Other States (the ICSID Convention or the Convention). 
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capital disputes be arbitrated at the World Bank and not in the host country’s domestic courts. 
The provisions are called investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS). In 2015, The United States 
Trade Representative (USTR), the government agency that coordinates U.S. trade policy and 
negotiations, explained the origins of ISDS: 
“Military interventions in the early years of U.S. history – gunboat 
diplomacy – were often in defense of private American commercial interests. As 
recently as 1974, a United Nations report found that in the previous decade and a 
half there had been 875 takings of the private property of foreigners by 
governments in 62 countries for which there was no international legal remedy. 
Though diplomatic solutions were possible, they were often ineffective and 
political in character, rather than judicial. ISDS represented a better way” (USTR 
2015). 
However, until the mid-1980s, the U.S. and Europe were largely unsuccessful in getting 
significant groups of developing countries to agree to ISDS because most of the global south 
continued to reject international investment law. The hundreds of expropriations of foreign 
property and investments by developing countries in the 1960s and 1970s reflected the Charter of 
Economic Rights and Duties of States, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 
1974. Article Two proclaimed that every state has “full permanent sovereignty…over all its 
wealth, natural resources and economic activities” (UN Documents 1974). To that end, Article 
Two addressed foreign investment and capital and provided that each state has the right to 
regulate, supervise, and expropriate foreign investment and MNCs within national jurisdiction 
(UN Documents 1974). The Mexican delegation to the UN had played a leading role in drafting 
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the 1974 UN Charter and ensuring that the Calvo Doctrine was codified in the document8 
(Shihata 1986: 4).  
It was not until after the “third world debt crisis” in the early 1980s that developing 
countries began to accept international investment law as part of broader social and economic 
reforms to attract multinational capital (Prashad 2007). In 1982, Panama became the first Latin 
American country to do so by signing a bilateral investment treaty with the U.S. and thereby 
ratifying ISDS procedures. In 1991, Mexico finally broke from the Calvo Doctrine and accepted 
ISDS during the negotiations of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with the 
U.S. and Canada. For both developed and developing countries, accepting or rejecting 
international investment law has never been a question of free trade but one of politics. The 
origins of U.S. investment policy and law was not free trade principles but conflicts with 
developing countries, in which developing countries made claims to state sovereignty and 
rejected international law. Similarly, in the twenty-first century, U.S. investment policy in U.S. 
free trade agreements is not motivated by free trade principles but rather conflicts between state 
sovereignty to implement market regulations and the rights of multinational investors. 
 
The U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaty Program 
The U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) codifies the legal rights of multinational 
investors and investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) procedures. Kenneth J. Vandevelde was 
one of the original drafters of the U.S. BIT in the Carter and Reagan administrations. Vandevelde 
situated the purpose of the U.S. BIT program, “A state’s foreign investment policy generally is 
                                                          
8 In addition, Articles Three and Five provided for the creation of raw material cartels; Article Six provided for the 
creation of “multilateral commodity agreements”; Article Twenty-Eight provided for the creation of a system to 
“promote just and equitable terms of trade.” 
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an element of its larger economic policy, particularly its understanding of the proper role 
between the state and economic activity” (2010). In other words, international investment law 
regulates the boundaries between state and market, specifically, the relationship between 
multinational investors and host states.  
The U.S. BIT program came to fruition under the Reagan administration in the early 
1980s. President Reagan explained the ‘fundamental premise’ of the first U.S. Model BIT, 
“…foreign investment flows which respond to private market forces will lead to more efficient 
international production and thereby benefit both home and host countries” (1983). To that end, 
U.S. trade theorists assert that the U.S. BIT imposes a relationship between the state and market 
according to three free market principles: (1) states must intervene to protect property rights and 
contracts; (2) the market should allocate resources and the state should not “chose winners or 
losers”; and, (3) the state may intervene to correct market failures such as supply public goods or 
protect against anticompetitive behavior (i.e. monopoly) (Vandevelde 1988).  
Table 1: Core Provisions of the U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) 
Investment 
Definition 
Broad definition, including: an enterprise, equity and debt securities, 
loans, interest, real estate and property, profits and returns from 
enterprise 
National 
Treatment 
Investments and investors of another Party must be treated “no less 
favorably” than nationals  
Most-Favored-
Nation 
Investments and investors of another Party must be treated “no less 
favorably” than investments and investors of another Party or non-Party 
Minimum 
Standard of 
Treatment 
Investments and investors must be treated with “full protection and 
security” and “non-discriminatory treatment” 
Performance 
Requirements 
No Party shall impose or enforce requirements upon an investment or 
investor of another Party, with an expansive list detailing prohibited 
performance requirements  
Transfers Each Party permits all transfers relating to an investment of an investor 
of another Party “to be made freely and without delay” 
Expropriation No Party may nationalize or expropriate an investment of an investor of 
another Party, except for public purpose and on a non-discriminatory 
basis, in which case compensation be “fair market value” 
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Investor-State 
Dispute Settlement 
(ISDS) 
Foreign investors may bring claims of violations of investor rights 
against a host state to the World Bank, arbitrators can make monetary 
awards but not change laws in the state. 
The core investor rights in the U.S. BIT have antecedents in international investment 
agreements and laws from the late 19th and early 20th century. However, the U.S.’ objectives in 
the BIT program were shaped by conflicts with developing countries during the Cold War, in 
which developing countries were prone to expropriations, appropriations of intellectual property, 
highly restrictive investment regimes, and imposed a range of costly regulations on U.S. MNCs. 
As a response to such “Third World nationalism,” the global north codified Hull doctrine in the 
OECD’s adoption in 1961of the binding Code of Liberalization of Capital Movements. U.S. 
Treasury Secretary Henry Fowler addressed the International Chamber of Commerce in 1965. 
Fowler shared that the experience of U.S. MNCs in Europe showed that “a vast area of potential 
conflict” could be minimized provided that host states applied “equal treatment under the law for 
foreign and domestic enterprises” and exorcised “the specter of state confiscation and state 
operation of competitive units” (cited in Gindin & Panitch 2012: 116). As the U.S. had growing 
commercial ties with developing countries, the original U.S. Model BIT (1982) sought to 
reregulate developing countries to support the interests of U.S. multinational investors in the 
developing world. Jose Alvarez, another former U.S. BIT negotiator, concurred that the objective 
was to bind developing countries to investment law that would “resist the forces of change often 
demanded by the political and economic life of host countries” (cited in 2009: 4).  
 
V. U.S. investment policy and global competitors 
Globalization and free trade agreements (FTAs) 
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USTR Ambassador Michael Froman, who oversaw negotiations of the TPP and the U.S.-
EU FTA (Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership), addressed the think tank Cato 
Institute in June 2016, 
“But it’s important not to conflate trade agreements with globalization. 
Globalization has impacted the workplace; trade agreements can be part of the 
solution. Trade agreements allow us to shape globalization to our advantage. They 
are the vehicle through which we help write the rules of the road for the global 
trading system, and do so in a way that reflects our interests and our values” 
(USTR 2016). 
In the social sciences, globalization is a complex, interdisciplinary field concerned with 
the exchange, transfer, and mix of people, places,9 and things. Trade and investment, global 
production sharing, and financial integration, and other forms of economic globalization are 
enabled by technological development and motivated by new supply and demand pulls. 
However, economic globalization is also a function of international trade and investment law. As 
stated by USTR Froman, FTAs shape economic globalization by establishing “the rules of the 
road” for private enterprise in a global economy. Multilateral, regional, and bilateral FTAs 
establish regulations and market access rules that condition patterns of global trade and 
investment. 
By the end of 2016, out the 423 regional FTAs that are in force worldwide, 19 are U.S. 
FTAs. Not all FTAs are the same and the U.S.’ FTAs are unique. The difference between FTAs 
is their regulatory reach. The WTO is the least intrusive into a country’s policy space, while 
                                                          
9 A “place” maybe “transferred” as MNCs invest and operate globally, such as the globalization 
of McDonalds; “places” maybe “mixed” as MNCs adjust their business model to local markets, 
such a McDonalds tailoring its menu to meet local tastes in a particular country.  
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U.S.-style FTAs are the most intrusive. In other words, U.S. FTAs contain the most demanding 
regulatory commitments while the WTO provides countries with the most flexibility to regulate, 
the FTAs of other countries fall somewhere in between. At issue is not necessary the quantity of 
regulations contained in the FTA but its quality of regulations in trade-related and investment-
related issues. It is necessary to distinguish between the content of different regional FTAs to 
understand how each relates to processes of globalization. 
 
FTAs and differential impact on state sovereignty 
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was the Bretton Woods institution 
that governed the multilateral trade system in the post-war years and membership eventually 
grew to include the vast majority of countries in the world. The GATT’s regulatory scope only 
applied to tariffs on goods and commodities. However, by the GATT Tokyo Round negotiations 
in the mid-1970s, the USTR was making strong pushes to include “new issues” of intellectual 
property rights, investment, and services (i.e. “anything you can’t drop on your foot”). The 
USTR’s effort was in large measure rebuked by developing countries but the Tokyo Round set 
precedent for the eventual inclusion of the “new issues” into the GATT Uruguay Round (1986-
1994). The highly contentious negotiations during the prolonged Uruguay Round successfully 
incorporated intellectual property rights, investment, and services into the GATT’s regulatory 
scope and the GATT became the WTO in 1995. However, the USTR’s proposals for deep 
regulatory commitments on the “new issues” were successfully opposed by developing countries. 
For this reason, the WTO is the trade agreement that has the least impact on state sovereignty to 
implement market regulations. 
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A central free trade principle in WTO agreements is “most favored nation,” which 
stipulates that WTO members must extend the same preferential treatment towards one WTO 
member as to all other WTO members. However, the WTO provides exceptions for bilateral and 
regional FTAs.10 In so doing, FTAs are an exception to WTO commitments because FTAs create 
preferential trading arrangements. For comparative purposes, the EU is not an FTA but rather a 
political project to establish a common market with a common currency and harmonized fiscal, 
monetary, migration, and social policies. From the perspective of the USTR, any FTAs that do 
not go beyond WTO commitments on the intellectual property rights, investment, and services 
are considered “low standard” deals; any agreement that goes beyond WTO commitments is 
called “WTO-plus”; and any FTAs that approximate U.S.-style FTAs are “high standard” deals.  
In broad historical terms, the USTR’s policy stance reflects U.S. commercial interests as 
the global competitiveness of U.S. exporters and U.S. MNCs depends upon deep market access 
and “high standards” in intellectual property rights, investment, and services. For this reason, 
U.S. FTAs contain many WTO-plus issues. In the TPP, the USTR included regulations on state-
owned enterprises, the digital economy, labor and environment, new intellectual property areas, 
among others. The Obama administration frequently described the TPP as the U.S.’ “rules of the 
global economy” in relation to those of China. The competitor to the TPP is the China-led 
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). The RCEP includes the ten11 countries 
from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) plus six12 additional regional 
countries. The ASEAN began as a geopolitical grouping in 1967 but they formalized an FTA in 
                                                          
10 Paragraphs 4 to 10 of Article XXIV of GATT cover trade in goods; Article V of GATS covers 
trade in services. 
11 Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, 
Thailand, and Vietnam. 
12 Australia, China, India, Japan, South Korea and New Zealand. 
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1992 that mostly focused on tariff reductions to facilitate intra-regional trade and attract 
investment. Since then, the ASEAN signed “low-standard” FTAs with other Asian countries, 
including, China, India, Japan, and Korea.  
The primary goal of the RCEP is to harmonize the various ASEAN agreements into a 
single FTA (CIL 2011). Therefore, the RCEP assumes ASEAN centrality, which adopts a 
flexible and sensitive approach to the differential interests of developing countries, whereas the 
TPP does not (CIL 2011). To that end, the scope of the RCEP is mostly focused on tariff 
reductions in goods, with some partial WTO-plus elements in services and investment (Xiao 
2015: 36). For instance, in the RCEP there are only six non-tariff issues whereas the TPP has 
twenty (Xiao 2015: 36). In sum, U.S. FTAs seek to “shape globalization” to “reflect U.S. values 
and interests” by establishing trade and investment rules that go beyond WTO commitments and 
have far-reaching regulatory implications, whereas China’s FTAs are more WTO-consistent 
which preserves greater policy space to regulate the private forces of globalization. 
 
Table 2: Differences Between International Trade Agreements 
 WTO TPP ASEAN RCEP 
Membership Vast majority of 
the world 
Twelve Pacific 
Rim countries* 
Ten ASEAN 
countries** 
ASEAN plus 
six Asian 
countries*** 
Regulatory scope Global benchmark 
standards in 
goods, services, 
intellectual 
property, 
investment 
“WTO-plus” 
including range 
of new 
regulatory 
areas 
“WTO-
consistent” 
Partial “WTO-
plus”  
Sectoral 
liberalization**** 
All sectors: 
positive list 
All sectors: 
negative list 
All sectors: 
positive list 
Goods: blend 
Services: 
positive 
Investment: 
negative  
Liberalization 
standards 
All sectors: low All sectors: 
high 
Goods: high 
Services: low 
Goods: high 
Services: low 
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Intellectual 
Property: low 
Investment: low 
Intellectual 
Property: low 
Investment: 
medium 
*TPP members include: U.S., Japan, Malaysia, Vietnam, Singapore, Brunei, Australia, New 
Zealand, Canada, Mexico, Chile and Peru. 
**ASEAN members include: Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, 
Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. 
***RCEP members include: The ten ASEAN countries “plus six,” including, Australia, 
China, India, Japan, South Korea and New Zealand. 
****Sectoral liberalization is negotiated on either a “positive list” or “negative list” basis. 
The positive list approach entails countries choosing which of their economic sectors they 
will negotiate liberalization; the negative list approach entails countries liberalizing all sectors 
and then negotiating which sectors will not be liberalized. 
 
VI. Conclusion: the stakes of international investment negotiations 
The stakes of international investment agreements are their impacts on state sovereignty 
to regulate foreign direct investment (FDI) and capital flows. There are two areas of debate in 
negotiations, (1) industrial policy, and (2) the “public-private divide.” The regulation MNCs and 
capital flows are fundamental to industrial policy in both the developed and developing world, 
with acute consequences to social and economic development in developing countries. Second, 
in international investment policy, policymakers must balance the private legal rights of “the 
market” against the states’ policy space to regulate MNCs, known as the “public-private divide.” 
 
Foreign direct investment and industrial policy 
The U.S. BIT program also serves as the negotiating template for the investment chapter 
in U.S. free trade agreements (FTAs), and in many respects, the investment chapter may be 
considered the “heart” of U.S. FTAs. The investment chapter, in tandem with the financial 
services chapter, functions to support, facilitate, and protect private flows of capital and 
investment. Cross-border capital and investment flows play increasingly important roles in both 
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developed and developing countries. From the perspective of multinational interests in developed 
countries, “Foreign direct investment (FDI) is the most important vehicle to bring goods and 
services to foreign markets.” (Sauvant 2009). Ban Ki-Moon, Secretary General of the UN, 
explained the perspective of multinational interests in developing countries,  
“Increasingly, transnational corporations are engaging with developing 
and transition economies through a broadening array of production and 
investment models…[developing countries engage MNCs] to deepen their 
integration into the rapidly evolving global economy, to strengthen the potential 
of their home-grown productive capacity, and to improve their international 
competitiveness” (cited in UNCTD 2011). 
As FDI has assumed an integral part of the growth strategies in both the developed and 
developing world, policymakers and trade negotiators have crafted investment agreements to 
support and facilitate multinational investment interests. The U.S. and other developed countries 
are capital-exporters and policy-makers of international investment law, whereas most 
developing countries (China notwithstanding) are capital-importers and policy-takers (Alschner 
& Skougarevskiy 2015). For this reason, the social sciences literature widely describes 
contemporary FTAs as “transnational governance regimes,” because trade and investment 
agreements export extensive market regulations from developed to developing countries. This 
has differential impacts in developed and developing countries. For the U.S., the U.S. BIT 
program reflects the interests of U.S. MNCs that use FDI to increase the scale of their operations 
and thereby their global market shares. Conversely, developing countries have a wide range of 
policies towards FDI from MNCs. 
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The U.S. BIT provisions combine technical rules on market access and regulations. In so 
doing, the U.S. BIT functions to enhance an investment-friendly climate in developing countries 
by eliminating “barriers” and restrictions to investment, establishing transparent, common, and 
predictable rules, and reducing political and social risks to investors (Menghetti 2011). In U.S. 
FTAs, the investment chapter has complex and substantive interconnections with the other 
chapters in the FTA. In the most recent U.S. FTA, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP),13 the 
investment chapter is a support to the other regulatory chapters, notably, intellectual property, 
services, competition policy, labor and environmental commitments, tariffs, and rules of origin 
(rules of origin establish product-specific requirements for regional content as inputs into a final 
product) (Elms & Low 2013). In all comprehensive FTAs, particularly U.S. FTAs, this “trade-
investment-intellectual property-services nexus” provides the legal underpinning of global 
supply chains, global production sharing, trade in services, and international financial integration 
(Elms & Low 2013). The investment protections and deregulations contained in the U.S. BIT 
facilitate MNCs using FDI to achieve economies of scale. In so doing, the U.S. BIT program is a 
component of U.S. industrial policy to strengthen the global market shares of U.S. MNCs, which 
has a range of economic and political benefits to the U.S. 
Economist Thomas Friedman refers to U.S. investment policies as a “golden 
straightjacket” on developing countries because U.S. investment agreements enhance market 
efficiency by constraining arbitrary government regulations (2000). However, many 
policymakers and commentators in developing countries disagree with Friedman’s assessment. 
For capital-importing developing countries, the ability to regulate FDI is central to development 
policy. Developing countries that have the policy space to regulate FDI can do so to realize a 
                                                          
13 Signed by the U.S. in 2016 but not ratified by Congress. 
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range of industrial development goals. Consider the investment policies of Mexico and 
China, the two top U.S. trade partners that are developing countries, and their subsequent 
divergent development paths. Mexico signed the NAFTA, which entailed granting the 
broadest investor rights and ISDS to multinational capital, while China was only 
constrained by the WTO’s investment agreement, which grants significant policy space 
for regulating FDI and capital inflows. Mexico studiously followed the liberalization 
principles espoused by the U.S. and the IMF and yet Mexico has been losing international 
competitiveness since the early 2000s. Conversely, in the words of Enrique Dussel 
Peters, director of The China-Mexico Studies Center, “China was the worst student and 
got the best grade” (cited in Wang 2006). China rejected the investment liberalization 
guidelines of the U.S. and IMF and China’s industries grew to be highly dynamic and 
globally competitive.  
Mexico dismantled its public sector, committed itself to the unrestrained free 
movement of capital, and deregulated FDI. As U.S. companies invested in Mexico, most 
Mexican companies were unsuccessful in integrating their operations with U.S. MNCs, 
and when U.S. MNCs saw better conditions elsewhere the footloose companies simply 
left Mexico for the Asia-Pacific, particularly in the information technology and textile 
sectors (Gallagher & Zarsky 2007). On the other hand, China’s nationalistic investment 
policymakers imposed a range of regulations on FDI and international capital flows while 
China’s public sector dominated domestic markets. China did not permit the free 
movement of capital and obliged MNCs to partner with China’s state-owned enterprises 
and transfer their technology and intellectual property in exchange for access to China’s 
rapidly growing domestic market (Roach 2014).  
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In sum, as both Mexico and China imported capital and opened their markets to MNCs, 
Mexico’s domestic industries waned in global markets while Chinese enterprises were able to 
climb the value-added chain and eventually become globally competitive industries. The key 
difference was that under the NAFTA, Mexico could not legally regulate investment and capital 
inflows, while China had far more policy space to do so under WTO commitments and China’s 
policymakers used it to the max. The relationships between state sovereignty and international 
investment laws are central to development and development policy.  
 
The “public-private divide” 
Legal debates concerning international investment law focus on the balance between 
investor rights and regulatory policy space. Legal scholars have a number of different 
perspectives and interpretations to this dichotomy. For law professor Wenhua Shan, “the featured 
debate of international investment law-making seems to have shifted from a ‘North-South 
Divide’ to a ‘Private-Public Debate’” (Shan 2006). That is, throughout the Cold War, most 
developing countries rejected international investment law, which was representative of the 
larger conflicts between the global north and the global south. Beginning in the 1980s and 1990s, 
developing countries turned away from import-substitution industrialization and sought to attract 
international capital. In so doing, developing countries signed investment agreements with 
developed countries. For Shan, the content of the debate over international investment law 
shifted “to be the conflict between the private interests of foreign investors and the public 
interests of states, namely host states” (2006: 660).  
However, while Shan recognized the public-private conflict he did not define it. Law 
professor Barnali Choudhury framed the debate in terms of a “democracy deficit” (2008). For 
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Choudhury, “democracy can be characterized both by principles of public participation 
and accountability” (2008: 783). Choudhury argued that since ISDS arbitrators rule on 
public interest regulations without input from the public, international investment law 
contributes to a “democratic deficit.” Investment lawyer Suzanne Spears characterized 
the dichotomy as “a balance between principles regarding the protection and promotion 
of foreign investment on the one hand and principles regarding the protection of society 
and the environment on the other” (2010). 
Multinational corporations and investors have successfully used ISDS to 
challenge public interest legislation around the world, motivating an existential debate 
about ISDS. For example, the NAFTA ISDS cases overwhelming targeted environmental 
regulations. Around the world, other ISDS cases have successfully challenged public 
health, labor, financial, and a range of other public interest regulations. Strong investor 
rights and the offensive use of ISDS have the effect of “locking-in” a government’s 
regulatory environment. However, regulatory norms evolve. For example, the TPP 
investment chapter contained a complete carve-out of tobacco companies from ISDS. The 
regulatory norms on tobacco evolved from treating tobacco as a “safe” product to a 
“dangerous” product, and states introduced public interest legislation accordingly. The 
TPP’s tobacco carve-out confirms MNCs use ISDS as a deregulatory tool.  
Tobacco is not the only commodity that is patently against the public interest and 
in which regulatory norms have evolved. Nor is tobacco the only public issue that has 
motivated public interest legislation that has been a target of ISDS claims. The U.S. fossil 
fuel industry understands that they are contributing to global warming, which is against 
the public interest as global warming causes an increasing frequency of natural disasters, 
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among other public issues. Yet the oil and gas industry has won billions of dollars in successful 
ISDS cases, thus weakening climate change and fossil fuel regulations in those countries. Two 
NAFTA examples include a successful ISDS case against a ban on fracking in Canada, and the 
pending $15 billion claim against the U.S. for the Obama administration’s denial of the Keystone 
XL oil pipeline. In the lead up to the 2008 global financial crisis, the “toxic assets” that were 
fraudulently sold to investors all over the world by U.S. multinational banks were malicious to 
the public welfare as they destabilized the global financial system. Yet, the TPP extends the 
“minimum standard of treatment” protection to the financial sector and one multinational bank 
has already successfully used ISDS against emergency financial measures.14 Similarly, the 
international regulatory norms on capital controls have been shifting and evolving for at least the 
last hundred years (Abdelal 2009), yet the TPP cements a stringent and limiting approach to 
capital controls that domestic lawmakers cannot change. Since at least the industrial revolution, 
the relationship between capital and labor has been mediated by government and labor standards 
have consistently changed, yet MNCs have used ISDS to challenge labor protections including a 
minimum wage bill.15 Pharmaceutical MNCs have used ISDS to extend patent monopolies on 
medicines even though many countries have laws recognizing that patent laws evolve over 
time.16  
In these examples, MNCs have used ISDS to lock-in a favorable regulatory climate, 
thereby undermining a country’s sovereignty and democratic law-making processes. In other 
words, international investment law categorically limits the parameters of acceptable national 
                                                          
14 Saluka Investments B.V. vs. The Czech Republic, Partial Award, Ad hoc-UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules (2006). 
15 Veolia Propreté v. Arab Republic of Egypt (ICSID Case No. ARB/12/15) 
16 Eli Lilly and Company v. Government of Canada. 
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policy. For these reasons, a number of countries have renounced any future trade and 
investment agreement that includes ISDS, including, Germany, India, Brazil, and 
Ecuador. However, there are thousands of investment agreements with ISDS in force 
worldwide. States use international investment law to accommodate multinational 
interests. The widespread international acceptance of ISDS reflects a broader 
reorientation of national policy agendas towards the needs of MNCs and the demands of 
global markets. Policymakers around the world support the position that ISDS is a 
mechanism for resolving frictions in international affairs, and it is therefore a necessary 
to the global economy.  
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Chapter Three: Negotiating the NAFTA Investment and Financial Services Chapters 
I. Introduction 
II. U.S. trade policy in the NAFTA 
III. Negotiations of the investment and financial services chapters 
IV. The “double movement” and the NAFTA investment agreements 
“In the post-Cold War world, our national security depends on our economic strength…We will 
ask companies and workers to join in partnership with government to build competitive 
industries.” 
-USTR Michael Kantor, 1993, testifying to the Senate on U.S. trade policy and the NAFTA 
 
“For the first time, different social groups have been brought into the negotiations over a trade 
pact…Trade has become a public issue.” 
-Rick Swarz, May, 1991, business lobbyist commenting on the unprecedented corporate 
lobbying effort to win the necessary Congressional votes to extend fast-track to the NAFTA 
 
I. Introduction 
The NAFTA set many precedents in international trade law, especially the investment 
and financial services chapters. However, the NAFTA also inspired an unprecedented broad-
based resistance to international trade law. This chapter documents the origins, contexts, and 
objectives of U.S. trade policy in the NAFTA investment and financial services chapters. In my 
process tracing of the negotiations, my dependent variables are the NAFTA investment and 
financial services chapters; the independent variables are the USTR, domestic political actors, 
and other country negotiating teams. Using the “double movement” framework, I show that the 
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USTR, representing the “free traders,” secured an unprecedented expansion of the rights of 
multinational investors and corporations over the objections of the “nationalist” and “socialist” 
domestic and international political actors. 
 
II. U.S. Trade Policy in the NAFTA 
II.A. Origins of the NAFTA as U.S. trade policy 
Mexico’s restrictive trade and investment regime during the Cold War 
In 1991, USTR Carla Hills explained to Congress the origins of the proposed FTA with 
Mexico, “Consideration of the FTA initiative is possible because of a reorientation in Mexico 
away from statist, interventionist policies toward a market-oriented system.”17 The “statist, 
interventionist policies” that Hills referenced were parts of Mexico’s restrictive trade and 
investment regime during the Cold War. These policies reflected the articles enumerated in the 
1974 United Nations Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States,18 which the Mexican 
delegation played a lead role in drafting.19 In the 1974 UN Charter, developing countries argued 
from the perspective of dependency theory that unfavorable terms of trade with developed 
countries alongside unfavorable power relations with multinational corporations (MNCs) were 
sources of their perpetuating poverty. The Charter implicitly confronted U.S. trade and 
investment policies during the GATT Tokyo Round (1973-9) by asserting that international 
                                                          
17 USTR Carla Hills testimony before U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Finance. 1990. 
“United States-Mexico Free Trade Agreement: hearings before the Committee on Finance”, One 
Hundred Second Congress, first session, February 6 and 20, 1991. 
18 UN General Assembly, Resolution adopted by the General Assembly 3281 (XXIX). “Charter 
of Economic Rights and Duties of States”, 12 December 1974, Twenty-ninth Session. 
19 Shihata 1986: 4 
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commerce be organized around principles of sovereignty, equality, and social justice.20 Mexico 
imposed high tariffs, far-reaching investment restrictions, and included the Calvo Doctrine in the 
Mexican constitution. The Calvo Doctrine was widely incorporated in the constitutions of Latin 
American countries and it prioritized national sovereignty over foreign investors, including 
requiring foreign investors to settle dispute claims in domestic courts, which was a direct 
opposition to U.S. investment policy towards developing countries.21 In tandem with highly 
restrictive foreign investment policies, Mexico pursued import substitution industrialization 
policies to encourage the growth and development of domestic industries. Therefore, USTR 
Carla Hills testified to Congress that a “sea change” in Mexico’s domestic politics was the 
prerequisite to the NAFTA, 
“While Mexico is a key U.S. trading partner, for many years we had basic 
disagreements over trade policy. We saw a Mexico whose policies were highly 
interventionist, characterized by trade protection, a restrictive investment 
environment, a large degree of state ownership and control of business, and an 
overly regulated business climate.”22 
 
                                                          
20 Each State has the right: to regulate and exercise authority over foreign investment and MNCs 
within its national jurisdiction, including the right to nationalization and expropriation (Article 
Two); to create raw material cartels (Article Six) and “multilateral commodity agreements” 
(Article Thirteen); to regulate/promote technology transfers to developing countries (Article 
Eighteen); to promote generalized treatment and tariff preferences for developing countries 
(Article Twenty-Two); to “adjust” and promote “just and equitable terms of trade…in a manner 
which is remunerative for producers” (Article Twenty-Eight). 
21 According to the USTR, prior to the U.S. Model BIT program, the U.S. exercised “gun-boat 
diplomacy.” See “FACT SHEET: Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS),” Office of the 
United States Trade Representative, Press Release, March, 2015. 
22 USTR Carla Hills testimony before U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Ways and Means, 
Subcommittee on Trade. 1990. “US-Mexico Economic Relations,” hearings (28 June). 101st 
Cong., 2nd sess. 
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Mexico’s sovereign debt crisis and gradual commitment to open commerce 
Mexico’s sovereign debt crisis in 1982 triggered the “sea change” in Mexican domestic 
politics, shifting from inward-looking to outward-looking economic policies (Cameron & 
Tomlin 2000). Following a banking crisis and facing sovereign default in 1982, Mexico began to 
gradually respond to low-growth and high-debt with unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral trade 
and investment liberalizations, notably with Mexico’s accession to the GATT in 1986. Since the 
Mexican economy was so dependent upon oil exports, Mexican President de la Madrid “had 
made it clear” that low oil prices were the key factor in Mexico’s expanding foreign debt, which 
increased ten-fold up to USD $200 billion between 1984 and 1988. 23 Therefore, de la Madrid 
insisted that Mexico accede to the GATT to acquire new sources of foreign capital. In so doing, 
de la Madrid began Mexico’s liberalization process by overriding domestic political pressure 
against joining the GATT, perceived to largely reflect U.S. influences and interests. The Salinas 
Administration took office in 1988 and pursued unprecedented unilateral liberalizations to make 
Mexico one of the most open developing countries, often going beyond their formal GATT 
obligations. Notably, the Salinas administration slashed tariffs, licensing restrictions, reduced the 
role of government as an owner/operator of businesses,24 and implemented major unilateral 
reforms in the “new issues” of investment and intellectual property, near and dear to the heart of 
U.S. trade policy.25  
                                                          
23 Cameron & Tomlin 2000: 58 
24 In 1982 the state owned 1155 enterprises and by 1990 Salinas authorized 801 for divestment 
and 619 for privatization. 
25 USTR Carla Hills testimony before U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Ways and Means, 
Subcommittee on Trade. 1990. “US-Mexico Economic Relations,” hearings (28 June). 101st 
Cong., 2nd sess. 
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While Mexico’s domestic political reforms were the “impetus” for the NAFTA, 
according to USTR Carla Hills, the U.S. “encouraged and supported Mexico in its process of 
reform.”26 As Mexico was acceding to the GATT they concurrently established with the U.S. a 
consultative mechanism to discuss trade issues and bilateral sectoral negotiations in agriculture, 
investment, intellectual property, services, tariffs, and key industries including steel and 
textiles.27 Most importantly, in 1989, Mexico became the first country to reach a new debt accord 
under the Brady Plan, named after then U.S. Treasury Secretary Brady, designed to rearrange the 
terms of debt service for developing countries. The debt agreement exchanged substantial debt 
service relief for Mexico with greater assurance of future collectability and further market-
oriented reforms. In the Uruguay Round (1986-94), USTR Carla Hills and her Mexican 
counterpart Minister Jaime Serra became a dynamic lever in the conflicts at the bargaining table 
between developed and developing countries.28 The emerging political partnership between the 
U.S. and Mexico at the end of the Cold War became the origins of the NAFTA.  
 
II.B. Context of the NAFTA as U.S. trade policy 
II.B.1. Foreign policy context 
Emerging “regionalism” in a world economy 
Between Mexico’s formal request (1990) for an FTA with the U.S. and NAFTA’s 
passage in the U.S. Congress (1993), Congress and the USTR repeatedly justified the agreement 
as an exigent response to the emergence of regionalism and regional trading blocs as the Cold 
                                                          
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
28 USTR Carla Hills testimony before U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Finance. 1990. 
“United States-Mexico Free Trade Agreement : hearings before the Committee on Finance”, One 
Hundred Second Congress, first session, February 6 and 20, 1991. 
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War closed. Congruent to the NAFTA talks, the EC had quickly moved on from the Cold War 
and was pursuing political and economic integration that culminated with the founding of the 
European Union in 1992. In 1993, USTR Michael Kantor argued that European integration 
policies created new barriers to U.S. exports and investment.29 Simultaneously, Japan, then 
second-largest economy in the world, was leading an inward-looking Asian integration on the 
Pacific Rim. U.S. competitors were expanding their markets in Europe and Asia while barriers to 
U.S. exports were becoming increasingly problematic. USTR Kantor warned, “…allowing other 
nations to promote and protect their industries, building profits from secure home markets, while 
targeting our open market, is a formula for competitive suicide.”30 The USTR and a chorus of 
congressmen called for an American regionalism. An early NAFTA proponent, Rep. Bill 
Richardson, pleaded to Congress, “If we are to avoid being ‘frozen out’ of the world market it is 
imperative that we look to the future with the same [regional] strategy.”31 
To that end, in 1990, President Bush announced the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative 
which mounted the goal of a hemisphere-wide FTA from “Anchorage to Tierra del Fuego” called 
the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA).32 The U.S.-Mexico FTA was to be the stepping-
stone to the FTAA, a plan that was subsequently adopted by Presidents Clinton and Bush II as 
well. As Canada joined the FTA negotiations, the proposed NAFTA would create an integrated 
                                                          
29 USTR Michael Kantor testimony before U.S. Senate, “U.S. trade policy and NAFTA: hearing 
before the Committee on Finance”, United States Senate, One Hundred Third Congress, first 
session, March 9, 1993. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Congressman Bill Richardson. US Congress, House. Committee on Ways and Means, 
Subcommittee on Trade. 1990. “US-Mexico Economic Relations,” hearings (28 June). 101st 
Cong., 2nd sess. 
32 James Baker, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 
testimony U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Finance. 1990. “United States-Mexico Free 
Trade Agreement : hearings before the Committee on Finance”, One Hundred Second Congress, 
first session, February 6 and 20, 1991. 
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North American market larger than the EU which would boost the competiveness of the region. 
In so doing, North American economic integration would increase the region’s influence – 
individually and collectively – to keep markets open in other parts of the world, which became 
particularly significant as conflicts escalated in the GATT Uruguay Round negotiations.33 
 
U.S. trade strategy in the Uruguay Round 
The NAFTA emerged on North America’s trade relations agenda during the GATT 
Uruguay Round, which were the contentious and prolonged multilateral negotiations that 
founded the WTO. Since the inception of the NAFTA, the overriding goal of both the U.S. and 
Mexico’s trade strategy was to conclude the Uruguay Round.34 However, by 1991, the Uruguay 
Round collapsed over seemingly irreconcilable differences between U.S. and EC in agricultural 
disputes. As the Uruguay Round stalemate persisted, Washington turned its attention to the 
NAFTA. In this context, the proposed NAFTA assumed new significance in U.S. trade policy 
debates, aptly summarized in Sen. Clark Reynold’s address to Senate, “The breakdown in the 
GATT Uruguay Round negotiations makes it all the more important to rely on regional 
agreements as a ‘second best’ approach in the direction of ultimate global liberalization.”35  
According to trade policy advisors Fred Bergsten and Jeffrey Schott, the NAFTA 
“reminded” the EC “that the United States could pursue alternative trade strategies” (1997). 
                                                          
33 U.S. trade policy and NAFTA: hearing before the Committee on Finance, United States 
Senate, One Hundred Third Congress, first session, March 9, 1993. 
34 USTR Carla Hills testimony before U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Ways and Means, 
Subcommittee on Trade. 1990. “US-Mexico Economic Relations,” hearings (28 June). 101st 
Cong., 2nd sess. 
35 Senator Clark Reynolds, U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Finance. 1991. “United States-
Mexico Free Trade Agreement : hearings before the Committee on Finance”, One Hundred 
Second Congress, first session, February 6 and 20, 1991. 
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Indeed, the EC released a study on potential effects of the NAFTA,36 and concluded that the 
NAFTA is not a threat to the EC but that “an expanded NAFTA would not necessarily be in the 
Community’s best interest.”37 Considering U.S.’ ambitions for hemispheric trade and investment 
integration in the Americas, the EC report “strongly” urged the conclusion of the Uruguay 
Round and suggested that free trade areas “can be useful building blocks of the world trade 
regime.”38 Subsequently, the EC found a new resolve to conclude the faltering Uruguay Round 
and in so doing the NAFTA is inseparable from the founding of the WTO.  
 
II.B.2. Domestic political context 
Renewing fast-track authority 
As the Bush administration pursued the Mexico FTA which became the NAFTA, they 
immediately had to address the domestic legislative process in Congress because it has the 
authority to both implement a trade agreement and set the President’s negotiating objectives. 
Beginning in the 1970s, Congress and the Executive branch agreed that in order to make 
politically expedient deals with trading partners the Executive branch would need the power to 
negotiate an agreement without interference from Congress. As a result, the 1974 Trade Act 
established “fast-track negotiating authority” (simply “fast-track”) which obliged Congress to 
“suspend its ordinary legislative procedures” and vote a trade agreement “up or down” with 
limited debate and no amendments.39 In addition, fast-track legislation contained Congress’ 
negotiating objectives for the President, among other checks on the Executive including 
                                                          
36 Report of the European Parliament Committee on External Economic Relations on the Free 
Trade Agreement Between the United States of America, Canada and Mexico. 
37 Cited in Abbott 1993: 15. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Trade Act of 1974 
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consultations with Congressional committees. In a 1990 Congressional testimony, USTR Carla 
Hills explained the political importance of fast-track, “Although the Congress cannot preclude 
negotiations as a legal matter, without the procedural advantages of fast-track authority, the 
practical impediments to negotiating an agreement would be all but insurmountable.”40 Annex 
One presents an explanation of the political procedures of fast-track and relevant processes in the 
development of the Bush administration’s negotiating objectives in the NAFTA. 
President Bush entered office with fast-track negotiating authority provided by the 
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, which was designed for the Uruguay Round 
but it legally applied to all trade and investment agreements under negotiation. However, when 
the legislation was drafted, Congress was expecting the Uruguay Round to be completed by 1991 
so Congress set fast-track to expire in June, 1991 with an automatic two-year extension that 
could be vetoed by a simple majority vote in either the House or Senate. By early 1991 it was 
evident the Uruguay Round would not be completed that year and the Bush administration would 
need the two-year extension on fast-track, including for negotiating the NAFTA. On March 1, 
1991, President Bush formally requested the two-year extension, and five days later, disapproval 
resolutions (H.Res. 101, S.Res. 78) were introduced in both houses.  
 
Congressional resistance to the Bush trade agenda 
The March-May, 1991 political battle for the renewal of fast-track is well documented,41 
however, at issue in this study is the extent to which the fast-track renewal process either 
                                                          
40 USTR Carla Hills testimony before U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Ways and Means, 
Subcommittee on Trade. 1990. “US-Mexico Economic Relations,” hearings (28 June). 101st 
Cong., 2nd sess. 
41 See Mayer 1998 and Cameron & Tomlin 2000, among others. 
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contested or amended the Bush administration’s negotiating objectives in the NAFTA. The 1988 
Omnibus Act enjoyed broad bipartisan support and it passed the Senate by 85 to 11 votes and the 
House by 376 to 45 votes.42 However, the Bush administration’s plan to extend this fast-track 
legislation to the Mexico FTA (NAFTA) inspired unprecedented domestic resistance to U.S. 
trade policy. During the March to May debates in Congress over the renewal of fast-track, the 
number of hearings on trade with Mexico exceeded those on the Uruguay Round by almost 10 to 
1, even though the Uruguay Round was of far greater significance.43 A large minority of 
Democrats were either opposed to the Mexico FTA for fear of loss of jobs or sought to shape its 
content to reflect labor and environmental concerns. They were bolstered by an unprecedented 
and increasingly organized alliance among the major labor unions, environmental groups, human 
rights groups, and consumer advocacy groups, each with a unique set of concerns/demands that 
were fundamentally opposed to the Bush trade agenda.  
On May 1, the Bush administration responded with political concessions to Democrats 
that included a trade-displaced worker adjustment program, future cooperation with Mexico on 
health and safety issues, a joint border environmental plan, and appointment of environmental 
experts to the USTR’s trade advisory committees.44 Simultaneously, the Bush administration 
engaged in a major outreach effort to win Congress’ votes as Bush personally contacted “scores” 
of lawmakers.45 On May 9, House Majority Leader Gephardt introduced H.Res. 146 to 
implement the Bush administration’s new labor and environmental commitments even though 
the commitments were legally non-binding. Major U.S. business groups organized a massive 
                                                          
42 H.R. 4848 (100th): Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988. 
43 Sek 1999: 2. 
44 Ibid. 
45 “‘Fast Track’ Sprint: Frenzied Lobbying on a Treaty Not Yet Written,” by Gary Lee, The 
Washington Post, Published May 23, 1991. 
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lobbying campaign to defeat the fast-track disapproval bills, “It’s a pan-business effort, I’ve 
never seen a larger grouping from the private sector,” remarked a top lobbyist from the 
Emergency Committee for American Trade.46 At the end of May, the House and Senate voted 
down the fast-track disapproval resolutions (House: 192 to 231; Senate: 36 to 59) and fast-track 
was renewed. In sum, the Bush administration was forced to make relatively small (non-binding) 
concessions to environmental critics to win fast-track. The negotiating objectives from the 1988 
Omnibus Act remain unchanged. 
 
II.C.1. U.S. Objectives in the NAFTA 
The official U.S. negotiating objectives in both the Uruguay Round and the NAFTA were 
detailed by Congress in the 1988 Omnibus Act. The bill was designed to “enhance the 
competitiveness of American industry,”47 signifying that for U.S. policymakers, international 
trade and investment was an industrial strategy. However, the NAFTA also represented the Bush 
administration’s trade strategy vis-à-vis the Uruguay Round and trade policy increasingly 
reflected foreign policy and security goals. Therefore, the U.S. objectives in the NAFTA had 
evolved as a carefully combination of industrial strategy, trade strategy, and foreign policy.  
Table 3: Synthesis of U.S. objectives in the NAFTA 
Industrial Strategy Trade Strategy Foreign Policy 
                                                          
46 Cited in Devereaux et. al. 2006: 196. 
47 H.R. 4848 (100th): Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988. 
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 Establish WTO-plus 
standards in North 
America  
 Competitive 
liberalization: leverage 
negotiations in the 
Uruguay Round; 
encourage other 
developing countries to 
negotiate FTAs 
 Reposition key U.S. 
industries by shifting 
production to Mexico 
 NAFTA was the 
cornerstone of the Free 
Trade Area of the 
Americas (FTAA) 
 “Asymmetrical trade 
liberalization” to reduce 
the trade deficit 
 Support and 
compliment bilateral 
initiatives on border 
safety and security 
(narcotics trafficking,  
undocumented migration, 
environmental concerns) 
 Support democracy in 
Mexico and promote 
reforms in Latin America 
and the Caribbean  
 
The NAFTA as U.S. industrial strategy 
The 1988 Omnibus Act directed three overall negotiating objectives to the USTR, to 
obtain: (1) open markets, (2) reductions to barriers to trade, and (3) a more effective system of 
international trading disciplines and procedures.48 However, at the Uruguay Round the U.S. 
faced fierce resistance from developing countries in negotiations over the USTR’s proposals in 
the “new issues” of investment, services, and intellectual property.49 The purpose of the U.S. 
proposals on “new issues” was to establish and protect U.S. comparative advantages in advanced 
manufacturing, advanced services, and high intellectual property content commodities.50 By 
extension, supporting U.S. industries (U.S. MNCs) would support U.S. exports and therefore 
U.S. jobs. In fact, the USTR found that jobs supported by exports paid higher wages in both 
manufacturing and services.51 However, due to geopolitical resistance at the Uruguay Round, the 
USTR was unable to negotiate “high standard” agreements in investment, services, and 
intellectual property (“high standard” trade agreements are referred to as “WTO-plus”). The 
                                                          
48 Ibid.  
49 See Stewart 1995 and Kelsey 2008. 
50 Ibid. 
51 USTR Carla Hills testimony before U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Ways and Means, 
Subcommittee on Trade. 1992. “North American Free Trade Agreement,” hearings September 9, 
15, 17, and 22, 1992. 102nd Cong. 
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NAFTA was an opportunity for the U.S. to reach a WTO-plus agreement with a geopolitically 
important developing country, setting precedent for future trade agreements including the FTAA.    
The NAFTA marked the beginning of the U.S. trade policy strategy of “competitive 
liberalization,” which uses bilateral or regional FTAs with “ready and willing” countries to 
overcome resistance to U.S. trade policy elsewhere. This trade strategy had its roots in the U.S.-
Canada FTA (1988). James Baker, then U.S. Treasury Secretary, described the geopolitical 
significance of the FTA as “a lever to achieve more open trade.”52 He explained, “Other nations 
are forced to recognize that the U.S. will devise ways to expand trade – with or without them. If 
they chose not to open markets, they will not reap the benefits.”53 The NAFTA would develop 
that strategy, President Clinton explained, “[bilateral and regional] agreements, once concluded, 
can act as a magnet including other countries to drop barriers and to open their trading systems. 
The [NAFTA] is a good example.”54 That is, the NAFTA would make Mexico and Canada a 
“magnet” for international capital which would pressure other countries to negotiate with the 
U.S. The competitive liberalization strategy is a part of U.S. industrial strategy inasmuch as it 
encourages and facilitates the opening of new markets to U.S. exports and capital.  
 
The NAFTA as U.S. trade strategy 
The NAFTA was part of a U.S. trade strategy to generalize the maquiladora model in 
Mexico which would facilitate the competitive restructuring of U.S. manufacturing industries to 
better compete with East Asia, particularly in autos, electronics, and textiles (Peters 2009). The 
                                                          
52 Baker 1988: 41. 
53 Ibid. 
54 President Clinton, “Remarks at the American University Centennial Celebration,” February 
26, 1993. 
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emergence of Asian manufacturing exporters in the 1970s eventually turned some U.S. 
manufacturers into importers, including in shoes, luggage, toys, games, sporting goods, and 
bicycles (Watkins 2013). However, other industries shifted assembly operations to Mexico to 
preserve production in the U.S., notably autos, textiles, and electronics. U.S. imports from 
Mexico contained much higher U.S. content than imports from Asia, therefore, by importing 
from Mexico (rather than Asia) manufacturing plants would be maintained in the U.S. By the 
time the NAFTA came into force cross-border production sharing, or supply chains, had already 
emerged in autos, textiles, and electronics. The USTR’s main private sector advisory committee 
explained, “With a NAFTA that allows companies to plan long term investments based on 
economic efficiencies rather than government imposed barriers, costs can be reduced and 
economies of scale achieved, allowing North American products to compete more effectively in 
world markets.”55 Those industries, in addition to U.S. financial services and agricultural 
exporters, were the main business lobbies promoting the NAFTA (Watkins 2013). 
The Bush administration’s vision for the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) was 
not simply about expanding U.S. market shares in Latin America and the Caribbean. Another 
central motivation in the FTAA was to leverage European and Asian negotiators so as to “keep 
their markets open” (Destler 2005). Joan Spero, an executive at American Express and a leading 
corporate lobbyist, reasoned to Congress,  
“U.S. exporters and investors must have access to rapidly growing and 
increasingly sophisticated Asian markets in order to meet and beat our 
                                                          
55 “Report of the Investment Policy Advisory Committee for Trade on the North American Free 
Trade Agreement”. September, 1992. Washington, D.C.: Executive Office of the President, 
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative. 
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competitors. Our positive decision on the NAFTA will confirm to the world that 
the U.S. is ready to lead and compete in a changing global economy.”56 
The 1988 Omnibus Act was a response to the unprecedented yet structural expansion of 
the U.S. trade deficit in the 1980s with East Asia and to a lesser extent Europe. Moreover, U.S. 
exporters were increasingly frustrated by Europe and Japan’s problematic, or “unfair,” 
protectionism. USTR Michael Kantor summed up the dilemma, “We will not stand by and 
pretend that other nations share our commitment to expanded trade and open markets if the real 
world evidence suggests that they do not.”57 The NAFTA and the Bush administration’s plans 
for the FTAA would leverage negotiations with Europe and East Asia. To that end, the 1988 
Omnibus Act, Congress laid out specific negotiating objectives for developing countries58 and 
for countries with persistent trade surpluses.59  
Since the U.S. was the most open country to trade, negotiating partners had relatively 
higher barriers to trade, especially developing countries. In the Uruguay Round, the USTR 
sought to lower barriers to trade in areas where the U.S. already had low barriers, and 
policymakers described this dilemma as achieving “reciprocity” in the exchange of trade 
obligations. Therefore, in the 1988 Omnibus Act, the principal negotiating objectives of the U.S. 
towards developing countries were two-fold, (1) to “ensure” that developing countries commit to 
“reciprocal” trade obligations, and (2) to reduce the “nonreciprocal trade benefits” for the more 
                                                          
56 Cited in “Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and U.S. policy toward Asia,” hearing 
before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred Third 
Congress, first session, November 15, 1993. 
57 USTR Michael Kantor testimony before U.S. Senate, “U.S. trade policy and NAFTA: hearing 
before the Committee on Finance”, United States Senate, One Hundred Third Congress, first 
session, March 9, 1993. 
58 The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Section 1101 (4). 
59 The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Section 1101 (5). 
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advanced developing countries.60 In the Uruguay Round, solidarity among developing countries 
prevented the USTR from realizing these objectives. However, in the NAFTA negotiations the 
U.S. was able to practice its objectives of “asymmetrical trade liberalization” with an important 
developing country (Bergsten & Schott 1997).  
Achieving reciprocal market access was a means to the next negotiating objective, 
“restoring current account equilibrium,”61 in other words, balancing total imports and exports. In 
outlining the premise of the 1988 Omnibus Act, Congress found that, “The United States is 
confronted with a fundamental disequilibrium in its trade and current account balances and a 
rapid increase in its net external debt.”62 Therefore, Congress mandated a principle negotiating 
objective to address “persistent” trade imbalances and countries with structural trade surpluses 
“by imposing greater responsibility on such countries to undertake policy changes…including 
expedited implementation of trade agreements where feasible and appropriate.”63 In so doing, 
Congress sought to “restore” the trade deficit not with protectionism on imports but with an 
aggressive trade policy on exports.  
 
The NAFTA as U.S. foreign policy 
As outlined by President Clinton in a foreign policy speech in 1993, “…it is time for us to 
make trade a priority element of American security,” signifying that the Clinton administration 
had developed a “comprehensive trade policy” that also reflected foreign policy objectives.64 The 
                                                          
60 The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Section 1101 (4). 
61 The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Section 1101 (5). 
62 The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Section 1001. 
63 The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Section 1101 (5) 
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NAFTA reflected foreign policy goals in that it would support and compliment regional 
partnership and cooperation, which was necessary to advance border security and support 
democracy in Mexico and Latin America. In early congressional debates on U.S. trade policy in 
the NAFTA, various congressmen promoted the agreement on foreign policy grounds in that it 
would ameliorate social and political problems along the U.S.-Mexico border, which extends 
more than 2000 miles over four states. In 1990, Congressman Bill Richardson of New Mexico 
catalogued these border problems to Congress, “high unemployment, substandard living and 
health conditions, drug trafficking, and a continued influx of illegal immigration.”65 Richardson 
was joined by a coalition of Congressmen from border states in promoting the NAFTA because a 
strong commercial relationship with Mexico would be the basis of a political partnership that 
would be necessary to address common bilateral problems along the border. Even more 
fundamentally, the NAFTA proponents in Congress repeatedly cited reports that the agreement 
would bring prosperity to Mexico, which they argued, would reduce instances of undocumented 
immigration and narcotics trafficking. 
The emerging U.S.-Mexico political partnership became a symbol of the twenty-first 
century as U.S. politicians elevated Mexico to a signpost for the rest of Latin America’s “fragile 
democracies”66 seeking to prevent policy reversion to their nationalist and socialist policies of 
the Cold War. The U.S.-Mexico partnership that was the foundation of the NAFTA quickly 
became necessary to U.S. foreign policy to advance free trade and investment in Latin America 
                                                          
65 Congressman Bill Richardson. US Congress, House. Committee on Ways and Means, 
Subcommittee on Trade. 1990. “US-Mexico Economic Relations,” hearings (28 June). 101st 
Cong., 2nd sess. 
66 Congressmen Jim Kolbe, U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Ways and Means, 
Subcommittee on Trade. 1990. “US-Mexico Economic Relations,” hearings (28 June). 101st 
Cong., 2nd sess. 
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and the Caribbean. Concurrent to the NAFTA, other regional trade agreements in Latin America 
were emerging, notably the Southern Common Market, and President Bush had made a political 
commitment to Chile for an FTA after completion of the NAFTA.67 In addition, many Latin 
American countries began to undertake their own unilateral market-oriented economic and 
political reforms, often as part of IMF structural adjustment programs. As Latin America began 
to turn the page on its Cold War policies, U.S. policymakers recognized that the region needed 
Mexico to be “an example of success with a market-oriented economy.”68 In 1993, President 
Salinas met with leaders from twelve Latin American nations in Chile and described the regional 
importance of the NAFTA,  
“[NAFTA is] …a fundamental test of American relations not only with 
Mexico but also throughout the hemisphere…When negotiations for the treaty 
began, many people thought Mexico was turning its back on Latin America, and 
events have shown the opposite to be true. For Latin America, the free trade 
agreement has come to mean a different policy of the U.S. toward the region.”69  
 
II.C.2. U.S. negotiating objectives in the NAFTA investment chapter (Chapter 11) 
Even from before the Uruguay Round, the U.S. had a well-developed international 
investment policy, which was eventually codified in the 1984 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment 
Treaty (BIT). In NAFTA negotiations, the Treasury imported the 1991 Model BIT to their 
                                                          
67 Wethington 1994: 11. 
68 Congressmen Jim Kolbe, U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Ways and Means, 
Subcommittee on Trade. 1990. “US-Mexico Economic Relations,” hearings (28 June). 101st 
Cong., 2nd sess. 
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negotiating position, which was a slightly revised version of the 1984 Model BIT. The U.S.’ 
objectives in the BIT program are summarized in Chapter One.  
 
II.C.3. U.S. Negotiating Objectives in Financial Services (Chapter 14) 
As in the beginning of the Uruguay Round, investment and financial services were 
negotiated by the U.S. Treasury Department while most other working groups were negotiated 
by the USTR. At the Uruguay Round, the Treasury proposed a separate financial services 
agreement that would not be included in the GATS and it lobbied hard towards that end.70 The 
Treasury argued that regulations on financial institutions were “substantially different from those 
governing other services because, among other things, special controls were necessary to prevent 
bank failures.”71 To that end, the U.S.-Canada FTA had a separate chapter for financial services 
and the NAFTA would significantly build upon that foundation.  
The NAFTA financial services chapter was the first financial services agreement to 
merge free trade theory with banking law, in that it applied free trade principles to the agreement. 
The Treasury specifically sought this approach for a number of reasons, including, to facilitate 
the free movement of capital. International financial services provide critical infrastructure to 
international commerce. Krista Schefer, international investment law expert, explained, 
“Closely connected to movement in investment is trade in financial 
services. The transfer of funds, necessary for setting up a business and engaging 
in international transactions, as well as repatriation of profits or income across 
national borders, requires the interaction of banks, non-bank financial institutions, 
                                                          
70 Stewart 1995: 2365. 
71 Cited in Stewart 1995: 2365. 
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insurance corporations, and security brokerages, on either side of the border, if 
not around the world” (1999: 271). 
Moreover, international financial institutions facilitate greater efficiency in multinational 
commercial activities by minimizing transaction costs in making foreign direct investment. A 
central purpose of the NAFTA financial services chapter was to lower the costs of doing 
business between the “three amigos,” thereby facilitating and encouraging regional trade and 
investment. Indeed, a main reason Canada joined the NAFTA was to prevent investment 
diversion to the U.S. and Mexico.72 Similarly, several East Asian countries declared the NAFTA 
as “sneaky protectionism” because by lowering intra-NAFTA transaction costs the agreement 
would likely divert investment to North America.73  
The application of free trade principles to financial services also reflected the aggressive 
interests of U.S. financial institutions seeking both new markets and new profit from increased 
trade flows. According to Wethington, the U.S. financial services negotiators entered 
negotiations “having formulated certain core, substantive negotiating objectives” (1994: 11). The 
right to pre-establishment74 and national treatment were essential and there would be no NAFTA 
without these provisions in financial services. The right of establishment was to give U.S. 
companies “unimpeded access” to the Mexican and Canadian markets. National treatment 
guaranteed U.S. firms non-discriminatory treatment, and in drafting the agreement U.S. 
                                                          
72 See Schefer 1999: 271; Cameron & Tomlin 2000. 
73 Schefer 1999: 271. 
74 Right to pre-establishment is a clause in the national treatment provision that extends the 
national treatment provision to the pre-investment stage (ex-ante) not simply the investment 
stage (ex-post). The pre-investment phase refers to the entry of investments and investors of a 
Party such that they have the right to establish an investment in the host state on terms no less 
favorable than those that apply to domestic investors in the host state (national treatment). The 
post-investment phase refers to the operations of the investment. 
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negotiators added the provision of “equal competitive opportunity.” The emphasis on “equal 
competitive opportunity” was essential for situations in which law may read in neutral fashion 
but in practice it leaves U.S. firms at competitive disadvantage.75 Provisions allowing for the 
entry of new products and data processing would provide them with the free right to enterprise. 
Indeed, since the 1970s, a fundamental objective of U.S. financial services industries was to 
secure deregulations in developing countries on new financial products based on the use of 
information technology (Feketekuty 1988). Moreover, since policymakers situated the NAFTA 
in a context of a long-term pursuit of a hemispheric free trade agreement, the financial services 
negotiators were “extremely cognizant of the precedential effect” of the agreement.76 
However, U.S. financial services negotiators placed little emphasis on regulation. Olin 
Wethington, the principle U.S. negotiator in financial services, published their negotiating 
objectives after the NAFTA was concluded (1994). None of Wethington’s objectives addressed 
regulation except reference to specific exceptions to national treatment in accordance with 
“internationally recognized [regulatory] principles” (1994: 18). In other words, the financial 
services chapter would address regulation up to the standards of “internationally recognized” 
regulations, which were codified by the IMF and followed “free market” orthodoxy.77 Krista 
Schefer observed,  
“As most of the negotiators came from a trade or free-market economic 
background, the main Chapter 14 provisions demonstrate a firm commitment to 
the principles of free trade (market access, non-discriminatory treatment, 
                                                          
75 Wethington 1994: 11. 
76 Wethinton 1994: 10. 
77 See NAFTA Article 2104: Balance of Payments 
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arbitration-based dispute settlement procedures) and a lesser consideration of the 
interests of financial service regulators and practitioners” (1999: 120).  
Table 4: Core Provisions of the NAFTA Financial Services Chapter  
Scope and 
Coverage 
Applies to financial institutions of another Party, investments and 
investors of another Party, cross-border trade in financial services, and it 
incorporates the Transfers provision (1109) from the Investment Chapter 
Establishment An investor of another Party has the right to establish “in the juridical 
form chosen by such investor” 
Cross-border 
trade 
No Party may adopt any measure restricting cross-border trade in 
financial services, including purchase of services in another Party 
National 
Treatment 
The same principle as the investment provision and it requires that Parties 
provide equal competitive opportunities rather than outcomes 
Most-Favored-
Nation 
The same principle as the investment provision, although emphasis is 
placed on ensuring that prudential measures are non-discriminatory 
New Financial 
Services and Data 
Processing 
Parties shall permit a financial institution of another Party to provide “any 
new financial service” and shall permit the free transfer of data across 
borders 
“Balance of 
Payments” 
Exceptions 
Parties may violate obligations in the event of a balance of payments 
crisis, although under highly specific conditions 
Dispute 
Settlement 
Disputes are done on a state-to-state basis; the financial services chapter 
incorporated the “transfers” and “expropriation” provisions from the 
investment chapter and subjected each to ISDS. 
 
III. The NAFTA negotiations in investment (Chapter 11) and financial services (Chapter 14) 
III.A. The NAFTA opening rounds (June to September, 1991) 
As NAFTA negotiations began, trade ministers from the U.S., Mexico, and Canada 
divided the negotiations into nineteen working groups within six broad areas: market access for 
goods; services; investment; intellectual property; dispute settlement; and trade rules on 
subsidies, dumping, and rules of origin.78 The USTR was Carla Hills and her office appointed 
officials from the Treasury to head the investment and financial services working groups, 
consistent with the negotiating format from the Uruguay Round. 
Table 5: The NAFTA opening rounds (June to September, 1991) 
                                                          
78 Cameron & Tomlin 2000: 82. 
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Negotiatin
g issues in 
investment 
and 
financial 
services 
Domestic interactions with the USTR  
 
Mexico 
 
 
Canada 
Labor 
unions, 
NGOs, civil 
society 
organization
s 
Business 
lobbies, 
private sector 
trade policy 
advisors 
Congress and 
government 
agencies 
Investor 
rights and 
investor-
state 
dispute 
settlement 
(ISDS) 
ddf Labor and 
environmenta
l concerns do 
not belong in 
the NAFTA 
Large minority 
wary of 
offshoring and 
Mexico as 
“pollution 
haven” 
Rejects 
expropriatio
n and ISDS 
Unsuccessfull
y counters 
U.S. Model 
BIT with U.S.-
Canada FTA 
Market 
access for 
FDI 
Demands 
high value 
deal 
N/A Demands right 
to screen FDI 
Investor 
rights and 
FDI in 
financial 
services  
N/A The private 
sector 
“framed 
parameters of 
domestic 
political 
acceptability” 
Apply free trade 
principles to 
financial 
services/bankin
g law 
No national 
treatment, 
cap on 
foreign 
market 
share, long 
transition 
period 
U.S. wants 
branching, 
Canada wants 
changes to 
U.S. banking 
law 
 
III.A.1. Investor rights and investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) 
USTR tables the Model BIT 
In the account of political scientists Maxwell Cameron and Brian Tomlin, at the 
beginning of the investment negotiations the USTR tabled the U.S. Model BIT while Canada 
proposed to use the U.S.-Canada FTA as the point of departure (2000: 100-101). The U.S. Model 
BIT contained far more comprehensive and stronger investor rights than the FTA, and both the 
U.S. and Canada attempted to persuade Mexico to join their side. There were two fundamental 
differences between the U.S. BIT and the U.S.-Canada FTA, first, the U.S. Model BIT assumes a 
“negative list” approach to sectoral liberalization while the U.S.-Canada FTA had a “positive 
list” like the WTO. A “negative list” agreement assumes complete liberalization of all economic 
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sectors and with sectoral exceptions that are negotiated, whereas the “positive list” only 
liberalizes certain negotiated sectors. The second difference between the U.S. BIT and the U.S.-
Canada FTA was the dispute settlement provisions, in which the U.S. Model BIT delineated a set 
of procedures for investors to bring claims against states to the International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Dispute at the World Bank, and arbitration panels can make legally-
binding monetary awards. Conversely, the U.S.-Canada FTA directed disputes to a binational 
committee or the GATT. However, concurrent to the NAFTA, Canada was negotiating a BIT 
with Argentina79 that utilized the same dispute settlement procedures as the U.S. Model BIT, and 
in the all of official draft texts of the Investment Chapter, Canada had never bracketed the 
dispute settlement clauses. Therefore, since the beginning of (or early into) negotiations, Canada 
was either in favor of (or not opposed to) the dispute settlement procedures tabled by the U.S.80  
Despite Canada’s movement towards the U.S. on the negative list approach and dispute 
settlement, there were fundamental differences between the two sides. Canada sought to narrow 
the definition of investment in the U.S. BIT, thereby narrowing the scope of the entire chapter. In 
addition, Canada insisted on maintaining the right to screen foreign investments which the U.S.-
Canada FTA had allowed, and the U.S. sought to eliminate this carve-out. The FTA permitted a 
                                                          
79 “Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Republic of 
Argentina for the Promotion and Protection of Investments”, 1993. 
80 In Cameron and Tomlin’s account of the negotiations, both Mexico and Canada initially 
rejected the U.S. BIT dispute settlement provisions. However, Cameron and Tomlin make no 
indication of Canada eventually accepting dispute settlement. Further, in all of the official draft 
texts of the Investment Chapter, published after Cameron and Tomlin’s research, Canada had 
never bracketed the dispute settlement clauses while Mexico did. Therefore, there is no 
indication that Canada was opposed to dispute settlement, although there is clear evidence 
Canada insisted on a carve-out for their investment screening act. Therefore, it appears that only 
Mexico was opposed to dispute settlement from the beginning of negotiations, contrary to 
Cameron and Tomlin’s account. 
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Canadian law which sanctioned government review of direct acquisitions valued over Can$150 
million, and Canada resisted the U.S. until the end of negotiations. 
The U.S. BIT provisions posed two significant problems for Mexico, firstly, the U.S. BIT 
expropriation clause provides that compensation must be “prompt, adequate, and effective.” This 
language was unacceptable to Mexico as it was the language used by the U.S. when Mexico 
expropriated U.S. oil companies in 1938.81 Secondly, Mexico did not accept the BIT dispute 
settlement procedures, and Mexico took this position due to Calvo Clause in the Mexican 
constitution, which was adopted from the Calvo Doctrine (discussed in Chapter One), and it 
mandated that foreign investors can only seek disputes in local courts with no recourse to their 
home state.  
 
Investment-related labor and environmental concerns 
Labor union representatives testified to Congress that an FTA with Mexico would not 
boost U.S. exports because Mexico lacked consumption power to buy U.S. goods, rather, the 
NAFTA would worsen labor conditions in all countries. This argument had currency with a 
growing number of House Democrats who were wary of offshoring to Mexico, some cited a 
general lack of enforcement of labor and environmental standards in Mexico as an “unfair trade 
subsidy”82 that would distort investment towards Mexico. They warned that offshoring to 
Mexico would put downward pressure on wages, working conditions, and employment. In 
addition, some argued that Mexico would become a “pollution haven” for dirty industry as plants 
would relocate to Mexico in search of lower environmental standards/costs, causing 
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environmental deterioration especially in the border region. During the early rounds of 
negotiations, the coalition of labor, environmental, and other citizens groups protested their 
exclusion from negotiations and began to “shadow the negotiators wherever they went” (Mayer 
1998: 126). Environmental groups filed a law suit against the USTR on the grounds that the 
NAFTA and the GATT Uruguay Round required environmental impact assessments. Former 
U.S. Treasury Secretary James Baker, advisor to the USTR, responded by asserting that the 
NAFTA was not the “appropriate mechanism for labor and environment concerns.”83 
 
III.A.2. Investor rights and FDI in financial services 
Each country had a consultation process with representatives of financial services 
subsectors. Olin Wethington reflected that the U.S. consultation process with the private sector 
“…framed, early in the process, the parameters of domestic political acceptability and became a 
two-way education process on specific issues, with both government and the private sector 
learning and exploring the limits of negotiating feasibility” (1994: 21). To this end, from the 
beginning of the negotiations there was a “high degree of convergence” on core principles 
between the USTR and the private sector, particularly in establishment, national treatment, and 
Mexico’s transition period.84 In negotiations, the majority of sticking points concerned how 
much liberalization and how soon. Wethington reflected,  
“Much of the NAFTA negotiations in the financial services sector 
concerned the elements of the transition period - its length, the speed of the 
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liberalization during the transition, the extent of market share for the U.S. and 
Canadian firms…and certain special rules that would apply only to the transition 
period” (1994: 55).  
Negotiations were slow to begin as Mexico initially did not agree to negotiate financial 
services on the grounds that they had just reprivatized their banks and they feared U.S. 
competition. The U.S. responded that without a financial services agreement there would be no 
NAFTA.85 Mexico conceded and then called for a permanent 5% cap on foreign ownership of 
financial institutions and the Mexicans did not accept the core issue of national treatment, the 
U.S. responded that is “not serious.”86 Both the U.S. and Mexico were “nowhere” near an 
agreement.87 Both the U.S. and Canada wanted build on the FTA and establish the right to open 
retail and commercial bank branches, but the U.S. claimed it was unable to permit branching due 
to interstate banking laws and the Glass-Steagall Act, in turn Canada would not give anything on 
the issue. 
 
III.B. From fact-finding to drafting (October 1991 to January 1992) 
 
Table 6: From fact-finding to drafting (October 1991 to January 1992) 
Negotiating 
issues in 
investment 
and financial 
services 
Domestic interactions with the USTR  
 
Mexico 
 
 
Canada 
Labor unions, 
NGOs, civil 
society 
organizations 
Business 
lobbies, 
private sector 
trade policy 
advisors 
Congress 
and 
government 
agencies 
Investor 
rights and 
Successfully 
motivate 
Maintains that 
NAFTA is not 
Offshoring 
concerns 
Concedes to 
U.S. BIT 
Continues to 
push for 
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investor-state 
dispute 
settlement 
(ISDS) 
USTR to 
address 
investment-
related 
environmental 
concerns, 
although 
unclear to 
what extent 
forum for 
labor and 
environmental 
concerns; all 
BIT 
provisions 
necessary 
leads some 
Congress 
members to 
oppose the 
NAFTA 
provisions; 
unsuccessfully 
tables 
performance 
requirements 
narrower 
definition of 
investment 
Market 
access for 
FDI 
Maintains 
right to 
screen FDI 
Investor 
rights and 
FDI in 
financial 
services 
Mexico has 
political 
motivations 
for 
maintaining 
control of 
banking 
system 
Treasury 
drafts 
balance of 
payments 
safeguard 
provision 
Accepts 
establishment; 
rejects 
national 
treatment; 
demands caps 
to market 
share 
Pushes for 
repeal of 
Glass-
Steagall 
III.B.1. Investor rights and investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) 
Investor rights 
By the meetings of January 7-10, 1992, each side had “cut and pasted” its wish list onto a 
draft text.88 Mexico continued to reject the U.S. BIT expropriation and dispute settlement 
procedures through the initial January 16, 1992 draft.89 Mexico had not proposed an 
expropriation text although it had agreed that the subject should be covered in “in a manner 
consistent with its Constitution, which does not preclude fair market value.”90 The U.S. was 
continuing to push for a broad definition of investment and “national treatment” over the 
objections of Canada and Mexico.91 In 1989, during the GATT Uruguay Round, Mexico had 
sided with India in support of performance requirements designed to support domestic industrial 
development. In January, 1992, Mexico had proposed voluntary performance requirements in 
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which “a company could voluntarily agree to meet a certain content requirement in exchange for 
a subsidy payment.”92 The U.S. and Canada rejected this proposal for voluntary performance 
requirements and investment incentives. As investment talks progressed, Mexico began to accept 
the investor rights and ISDS enforcement that it originally rejected and Mexican negotiators 
would come closer to the U.S. position in favor of strong investment disciplines because 
Mexico’s objective was to attract U.S. capital (Cameron & Tomlin 2000: 100-101).  
 
Investment-related labor and environmental concerns 
A GATT dispute panel ruled that a U.S. environmental law that protected wild dolphins 
was in violation of GATT obligations because it prohibited imports of Mexican tuna. Public 
Citizen spokeswoman Lori Wallach explained, “This case is the smoking gun, we have seen 
GATT actually declaring that a U.S. environmental law must go” (cited in Mayer 1998: 128). 
Sixty-three congressmen joined environmentalists in protesting the ruling with concerns of the 
implications of the ruling for other U.S. environmental laws (Mayer 1998: 128). Congressmen 
easily made connections to the NAFTA negotiations denouncing Mexico as a partner in 
protecting the environment and advancing the “pollution haven” argument in which Mexico 
would attract offshoring due to its lax environmental standards/enforcement. Mexican President 
Salinas responded to the concerns of U.S. congress that Mexico would ignore the GATT ruling 
and implement a new law to prevent the killing of dolphins (Mayer 1998: 128). U.S. negotiators 
responded by inserting into the investment chapter draft, “Language on the environment may be 
provided for this chapter and/or generically.”93  
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III.B.2. Investor rights and FDI in financial services 
In a January, 1992, the Mexican financial services negotiators prepared a document for 
their counterparty negotiators in the U.S. Treasury. In the document, the Mexicans were in broad 
agreement with U.S. liberalization objectives: “Behind the program for opening the domestic 
financial system under NAFTA is the assumption that allowing foreign intermediaries to operate 
in Mexico could contribute to economic efficiency and facilitate the globalization of the financial 
sector.”94 However, the Mexican financial services negotiators retained the objective of 
minimizing risks of instability that might result from “too sudden and too significant infusion of 
foreign competition.”95 Therefore, by January, 1992, Mexico had agreed to the right of 
establishment of foreign firms but was demanding a transition period until roughly 2010, with 
permanent limitations on foreign ownership and foreign market share afterwards. Further, 
Mexico was unwilling to accept the principle of “national treatment,” which the U.S. and Canada 
outlined as an “essential condition” to the agreement.96 
The U.S. negotiators responded that financial instability was not the core Mexican 
motivation for insisting on permanent caps to foreign ownership and market share, but rather, 
there were political motivations. U.S. negotiator Olin Wethington reflected, “The political 
element stemmed from a strongly held view in certain Mexican political circles that the financial 
system must be maintained under the control of Mexican nationals” (1994: 13). To that end, 
Mexican negotiating documents characterized the Mexican banking and financial system 
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generally as a “national asset” and “essential to the country’s economic security.”97 The Mexican 
negotiating document asserted the necessity of permanent ceilings on foreign ownership of banks 
- “…a ceiling is needed to assure adequate domestic control of the banking system so vital to the 
national economy…”98 However, the U.S. rejected any permanent limitations on the principle of 
national treatment.99 
As negotiators prepared the first draft of the financial services agreement, they remained 
“far apart” in seven areas: national treatment, coverage of agreement, administration of trade 
laws and regulations, commercial presence, which services to include and exclude, transparency 
of rules and regulations, and the extraterritorial application of U.S. laws.100 In addition, the U.S. 
was pressing for the agreement to cover financial services rather than financial firms, whereas 
Mexico and Canada countered that the agreement should cover only firms subject to government 
regulation. Mexico introduced a “sweeping proposal” that would ban financial service providers 
from many programs that included government involvement, such as student loans, pension 
funds, and export/import financing, and the U.S. rejected these exclusions. Canada insisted upon 
the removal of Glass-Steagall restrictions on foreign banks and securities affiliates in U.S. 
markets.101 Moreover, Canada sought to enlarge the ability of its securities firms to provide 
cross-border securities services into the U.S. Towards Mexico, Canada was generally in line with 
U.S. objectives but the Canadians did not make demands of Mexico as the U.S. did. 
Simultaneously, in the “transfers” provision, the U.S. Treasury indicated that it would provide an 
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emergency “safeguard” provision for balance of payment crises, although the language was not 
yet drafted.102 
 
III.C. “The Dallas Jamboree” and aftermath (February to April 1992) 
Before the Dallas meeting there was a conclusion of the main draft text at the Uruguay 
Round, although the U.S. and EU were still engaged in a standoff over agriculture. The 
negotiations at Dallas assumed greater significance because concluding NAFTA would 
demonstrate to the EU that the U.S. had an attractive non-agreement alternative to the Uruguay 
Round. Presidents Bush and Salinas ratcheted up the pressure on their negotiators to complete 
the NAFTA as soon as possible and the Dallas meeting was dubbed the “jamboree,” or large 
gathering. In Dallas, all of the working groups met with chief negotiators for outstanding issues 
to be decided at a higher political level. 
Table 7: “The Dallas Jamboree” and aftermath (February to April 1992) 
Negotiating 
issues in 
investment 
and financial 
services 
Domestic interactions with the USTR  
 
Mexico 
 
 
Canada 
Labor unions, 
NGOs, civil 
society 
organizations 
Business 
lobbies, 
private sector 
trade policy 
advisors 
Congress and 
government 
agencies 
Investor 
rights and 
investor-
state dispute 
settlement 
(ISDS) 
Leaked copy 
of negotiating 
text confirms 
labor and 
environmental 
concerns 
NAFTA 
should not 
address labor 
and 
environment; 
NAFTA is 
embraced as 
alternative to 
Uruguay 
Round; 
debate over 
labor and 
environmental 
concerns 
Expropriation 
language had 
to avoid Calvo 
doctrine 
Concedes to 
U.S. 
investment 
definition 
Market 
access for 
FDI 
N/A U.S. 
concedes to 
Canada’s 
FDI screen 
Investor 
rights and 
FDI in 
N/A Scope needs 
to be 
financial 
Unsuccessfully 
defends 
“national 
Sides with 
U.S. vis-à-
vis Mex.; 
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financial 
services 
services and 
not just 
firms; 
pressures 
Mex. 
treatment” 
exception 
still pushes 
for reforms 
to Glass-
Steagall 
 
III.C.1. Investor rights and investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) 
Investor rights and ISDS 
At Dallas, under pressure to conclude the NAFTA, Mexico finally conceded 
“expropriation” and ISDS. In drafting the “expropriation” provision, negotiators had to figure out 
how to word the obligation without violating the Mexican constitution, which permitted 
expropriation on the grounds of national interest.103 An anonymous negotiator explained the 
tradeoff, “We had to craft the expropriation language not using the words ‘prompt, adequate, and 
effective.’ There are three paragraphs, and if you read them, you find that what they say is 
exactly those three words, but in substitute language.”104 In market access talks, the U.S. had 
conceded to Canada’s demand to maintain its foreign investment screen but the USTR sought to 
reduce its scope.  
 
Investment-related labor and environmental concerns 
A leaked copy of the draft text from the Dallas jamboree was published in March by the 
Washington DC journal Inside U.S. Trade. It had confirmed all of the warnings of NAFTA 
critics. The Sierra Club responded in a statement: “It’s pure and simple, the document does not 
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pay attention to anything but expanding trade….The best you get is meaningless language or no 
mention of the environment.”105  
 
III.C.2. Investor rights and FDI in financial services 
Similar to the investment negotiations, the Mexican financial services negotiating team 
closely followed their directive to finish negotiations as soon as possible. At Dallas, the 
Mexicans accepted the principle of national treatment in financial services.106 In addition, while 
they maintained demands for a permanent cap on foreign market share, they abandoned their 
fight for permanent caps on foreign ownership in banking. However, the Mexican negotiators 
immediately repented this concession because they did so without any exchanges with the U.S. 
or Canada, to the delight of those parties. As a result, U.S. negotiators became “hungry for 
more.” An anonymous negotiator recalled, “They were giving things away; so I am going to 
keep asking until they stop giving.”107 As the U.S. continued to push for the agreement to cover 
financial services rather than financial firms, negotiators upped the ante, insisting that there 
would be no NAFTA unless every financial intermediary who wanted access to the Mexican 
market got it (Cameron and Tomlin 2000: 114).  
Mexican financial markets had come to expect a NAFTA agreement, and the success of 
NAFTA negotiations were already “factored into the market.”108 Therefore, any indication of 
failure to reach an agreement would make Mexican markets highly volatile. The U.S. negotiating 
strategy was to “keep demanding, and be patient.”109 The U.S. knew that Mexico was anxious for 
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a deal as the country was in dire need of foreign capital. Therefore, U.S. negotiators were patient, 
and when the Mexican markets became impatient, the U.S. would push Mexican negotiators for 
concessions. The Mexican negotiators felt pressure from their superiors to conclude the 
agreement as soon as possible and they would make tremendous concessions in a number of 
working groups, especially investment and financial services. 
 
III.D. Reaching an agreement (May to August 1992) 
Table 8: Reaching an agreement (May to August 1992) 
Negotiating 
issues in 
investment 
and financial 
services 
Domestic interactions with the USTR  
 
Mexico 
 
 
Canada 
Labor unions, 
NGOs, civil 
society 
organizations 
Business 
lobbies, 
private sector 
trade policy 
advisors 
Congress and 
government 
agencies 
Investor 
rights and 
investor-
state dispute 
settlement 
(ISDS) 
Unsuccessfully 
argued that the 
NAFTA would 
increase 
offshoring and 
decrease 
employment; 
unsuccessfully 
lobbied for 
labor and 
environmental 
provisions; 
presented 
studies 
contesting 
official studies 
Concerns 
over Canada 
and Mexico’s 
FDI screens 
Official study 
shows 
investment 
will be boon 
to all 
NAFTA;  
Congress 
warns 
environmental 
concerns must 
be addressed 
By May brackets were 
removed around investor 
rights and ISDS, indicating 
Mexico and Canada were 
unsuccessful in reforming 
U.S. BIT provisions 
Market 
access for 
FDI 
Limit sectoral 
exceptions to 
investment  
obligations 
Talks are contentious; U.S. 
bargains for high threshold 
for Canada’s FDI screen 
while Mexico demands FDI 
screen also 
Investor 
rights and 
FDI in 
financial 
services 
Financial 
services 
lobby 
threatens to 
erode 
Congressional 
support for 
NAFTA 
without 
Mexican 
concessions  
USTR and 
Treasury hold 
meetings with 
financial 
services lobby 
and must 
placate the 
lobby’s 
demands 
No 
permanent 
caps 
acceptable to 
U.S. 
industry, 
Mexico joins 
Canada in 
insisting 
reforms to 
U.S. banking 
laws Glass-
Steagall 
Reforms to 
Glass-
Steagall not 
possible 
under 
NAFTA 
framework 
III.D.1. Investor rights and investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) 
 97 
 
By the end of May, Mexico and Canada had conceded to all of the U.S. BIT provisions 
and talks had progressed to negotiating which sectors would be exempt from the investment 
chapter provisions. Mexico secured the most exceptions (89) although many were transitional 
and to be phased out over time, followed by the U.S. (50) and Canada (48). Notably, all three 
parties exempted government provided social services, telecommunications services, and 
maritime and transportation sectors. Canada fought to protect their culture industries from 
foreign investment while Mexico barred foreign investment in oil, gas, and petroleum. In 
addition, Canada was persistent in maintaining investment screening of takeovers valued above 
Can$150 million, and Mexico responded by also calling for an equivalent mechanism. The U.S. 
rejected both, except for national security reasons, as in U.S. legislation. However, by August, 
the U.S. conceded to both Canada and Mexico on permitting investment screening so as to 
conclude the NAFTA, and the right to review investment acquisitions was carved out of the 
dispute settlement coverage.110  
 
Investment-related labor and environmental concerns 
The leaked draft text from the Dallas Jamboree was fuel to fire for opposition to the 
NAFTA. A coalition of environmental groups, which included some fast track supporters, 
presented the USTR with a list of demands. USTR Carla Hills “appeared uninterested” until a 
number of Congressmen testified that the NAFTA would not make it past Congress unless 
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environmental concerns were met.111 Hills responded in her testimony to Congress in September, 
1992,  
“Mexico will not become a pollution haven because it costs more for our 
companies to move to Mexico than it does to comply with our U.S. environmental 
standards. We did not negotiate this agreement to permit Mexico to enforce our 
environmental laws or any of our other laws any more than we are going to 
enforce theirs.”112 
That is, the USTR concluded that the NAFTA would not turn Mexico into a “pollution 
haven” because, “environmental compliance costs play a minimal role in relocation decisions 
because they represent a small share of total costs for most industries.”113 The USTR even 
claimed the contrary, the “NAFTA encourages environmentally sound investments” and “will 
enhance environmental protection.”114 Therefore, to placate Congress, the USTR would “green 
the text” including the investment chapter, but the environmental provisions were framed as 
moral obligations and not legally enforceable provisions.   
Similarly, the USTR concluded that neither Mexico’s low wages nor poor labor 
conditions would attract U.S. FDI, because, “The total cost of production is what matters in 
relocation decisions, not wages alone.”115 To the contrary, the USTR sold the investment 
provisions to Congress as a “win-win” agreement for all parties, because, “U.S investments 
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generate increased U.S. exports.”116 In August, 1992, the USTR press release on the investment 
chapter explained that, “Integrated production in North America will make U.S. firms more 
competitive against European and Japanese producers,” and the elimination of performance 
requirements in Mexico “will increase the demand for inputs sourced from the United States.”117 
Therefore, the USTR argued that the investment provisions will encourage job growth.  
In May, 1992, at the request of the USTR, the U.S. International Trade Commission 
surveyed and evaluated the various economic analyses of NAFTA. The subsequent report found 
that:  
“[T]here is a surprising degree of unanimity in the results regarding the 
aggregate effects of NAFTA. All three countries are expected to gain from a 
NAFTA. These independent studies found that NAFTA would increase U.S. 
growth, jobs, and wages. They found that NAFTA would increase U.S. real GDP 
by up to 0.5 percent per year once it is fully implemented. They projected 
aggregate U.S. employment increases ranging from under 0.1 percent to 2.5 
percent. The studies further project aggregate increases in U.S. real wages of 
between 0.1 percent to 0.3 percent.”118 
The President and the USTR announced these findings to Congress and the public. In so 
doing, the USTR rejected the concerns of labor representatives in all three countries. 
Simultaneously, the USTR’s negotiation of the investment chapter was strongly endorsed119 by 
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the Investment Policy Advisory Committee for Trade, the advisory committee that interfaces the 
USTR with private sector perspectives. 
 
III.D.2. Investor rights and FDI in financial services 
In May, there was a deadlock in the financial services working group. At the Dallas 
jamboree, Mexico had abandoned its fight for permanent caps on foreign ownership but insisted 
on permanent caps on foreign market share in financial services and they refused to give more 
market access. By May, Mexico had offered to “modify its demands” for a permanent cap on the 
foreign market share in the financial sector.120 The U.S. negotiators consulted with financial 
services corporate representatives and they were “furious.”121 The USTR and the Treasury then 
got “hit with a lobbying barrage.”122 The U.S. financial services industry feared that such an 
agreement would set “dangerous precedent” for future financial services negotiations with other 
states. The major financial services lobbies wrote to USTR, 
“The extent of liberalization in financial services will determine our ability 
to support the final NAFTA agreement….Financial industry commitment to the 
Mexican market will be undermined by any form of permanent cap even if used 
for ‘safeguard purposes.’ These proposed restrictions are unacceptable in terms of 
U.S. liberalization goals”123.  
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The Treasury responded to Mexico that the U.S. financial services industry rejected the 
Mexican proposal as “inadequate” and countered with a proposal that featured no permanent 
caps within “some reasonable transition period”124. The standoff continued through June, as 
Mexico was seeking tradeoff concessions with the U.S. and Canada. Mexico argued that the U.S. 
cannot truly offer national treatment due to interstate banking laws and Glass Steagall and 
Mexico joined Canada in demanding changes to Glass-Steagall. However, Mexico indicated that 
it was willing to modify its demand of a permanent 12 percent cap on foreign share of the 
financial services market for safe guards blocking further expansion.125  
USTR Carla Hills and Treasury Secretary Nick Brady met with the financial services 
lobby, where the lobby group demanded an improved deal or they would not offer financial 
support to the pro-NAFTA lobby, which would make passing the NAFTA in the congress very 
difficult.126 Hills and Brady returned to the Mexican negotiators with the ultimatum, and the 
Mexicans understood that they could not get the NAFTA without the five largest banks in the 
U.S. Mexico issued a new proposal with no permanent caps, but with a lengthy transition period 
and for safeguards that would prevent rapid increases of foreign ownership. This new proposal 
would be the basis of the final agreement and in July the U.S. and Mexico had reached a deal. 
The USTR presented the agreement to the public and Congress as unprecedented support to U.S. 
comparative advantages in financial services.127 
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Canada still continued its demand for changes to U.S. interstate banking laws and Glass-
Steagall.128 The U.S. responded that repealing Glass-Steagall would require permission from the 
Federal Reserve and it would not consider the demand, but foreign firms will be afforded same 
rights as domestic firms. By the conclusion of negotiations the following issues between U.S. 
and Canada remained unresolved: U.S. restrictions on interstate banking and Glass-Steagall 
restrictions on affiliations between banks and securities firms.129 Those unresolved issues were 
deferred for future negotiations, except for inclusion of hortatory language in the final 
agreement. 
 
Financial regulation and the “balance of payments” exception 
The final agreement ventured into uncharted legal territory by seeking a tradeoff between 
allowing for freer flows of capital and financial services while maintaining a “reasonable” level 
of financial and monetary security. To this end, the liberalization of financial services could only 
become viable by relying on exceptions to free trade principles (Schefer 1999: 402). The U.S. 
Treasury inserted an emergency provision in the case of “balance of payments” crises in which 
massive cross-border capital flows may destabilize a country’s financial system and/or exchange 
rate (which was immediately put to the test during the 1995 Mexican Peso crisis, discussed in the 
next chapter).130 The “balance of payments” exception can be broadly characterized as language 
on capital controls, which allow exceptions to a country’s investment chapter obligations under 
the “transfers” provision to allow for the absolute free movement of capital. However, the 
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provisions of the “balance of payments” exception are highly conditional, in which they must: 
only take specific forms under specific conditions; be implemented under the supervision of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF); be temporary; be non-discriminatory; and meet an 
ambiguous standard “to not be more burdensome than necessary.”131 The USTR’s private sector 
advisory committee strongly endorsed the provision, 
“The provisions on transfers substantially meet the ACTPN's objective to 
allow such transfers to be completely without restriction. The qualification 
provided to address any possible balance of payments problem is reasonable, and 
the conditions under which it may be invoked are clearly defined and limited.”132  
That the balance of payments exception is ambiguous, vague, and highly conditional, 
means that the NAFTA safeguards to financial stability are weak. Simultaneously, by applying 
free trade principles to financial services, the agreement was intended to increase the mobility of 
capital, which, according to free market principles, would increase economic growth. 
 
IV. Polanyi’s “double movement” and NAFTA negotiations 
In the NAFTA investment and financial services negotiations, U.S. political 
actors represented all three of the ideal types of trade policy positions. U.S. MNCs, the 
Bush and Clinton administrations, and bipartisan groups in Congress supported “free 
trade” policies (market-based governance). Labor unions, environmental organizations, 
consumer groups, and many Congressional Democrats supported “socialist” trade 
                                                          
131 Ibid. 
132 “Report of the Investment Policy Advisory Committee for Trade on the North American Free 
Trade Agreement”. September, 1992. Washington, D.C.: Executive Office of the President, 
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative 
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policies (subjecting markets to democratic control). Libertarian politicians and some labor unions 
supported the “nationalist” trade policies (prioritizing national interests over multinational 
interests). The Clinton administration’s embrace of the core text of the NAFTA and subsequent 
implementation of the NAFTA was a big victory for the “free trade” actors over the “socialist” 
and “nationalist” groups. The NAFTA had passed Congress because for at least three reasons, 
the “free traders” had made a strong case for the necessity of the NAFTA in the context of 
inevitable globalization, U.S. MNCs had made generous donations to the lawmakers for their 
votes, and because the “socialist” and “nationalist” actors had less influence in Congress.  
 
“Free trade” actors in NAFTA investment negotiations 
The 1988 Omnibus Act mandated that the USTR negotiate trade and investment 
agreements to “restore the trade balance” (reduce the trade deficit) with an aggressive export 
strategy, which was a central purpose of the NAFTA. Since manufacturing imports from Mexico 
contained greater U.S. content than similar imports from Asia, manufacturing industries were 
competitively restructuring into Mexico as a low-wage export platform, notably, the auto, 
textiles, and information technology industries. In addition, the NAFTA investment and services 
chapters (including financial services) were designed to increase U.S. service exports in the 
region and set a model for future agreements in other regions. According to the USTR’s private 
sector advisors, the NAFTA investment chapter would encourage intra-regional investment in 
manufacturing and services and in so doing facilitate firm-level economies of scale to “compete 
more effectively in world markets.”133 The private sector argued to the Bush administration, 
“The United States cannot afford to sit on the sidelines while our major trading partners, Europe 
                                                          
133 Ibid. 
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and Japan, develop strategic alliances to enhance their own competitiveness.”134 The 
Bush administration sold the private sector’s plan to the public as an engine of job growth 
because more globally competitive industries implied more exports and jobs, “U.S 
investments generate increased U.S. exports.”135 The Bush administration proudly 
displayed the 1992 ITC report surveying all relevant and authoritative studies and 
predicted that the NAFTA would increase GDP, employment, and wages in all three 
countries.136 
As U.S. financial services negotiators sought freedom of commerce for U.S. 
financial institutions they simultaneously deregulated trade and investment in financial 
services. This became evident in the conflict between Mexican regulators and U.S. 
financial services firms, who eventually threatened to sink the NAFTA in Congress. 
Mexico eventually conceded to accept ISDS because the USTR and the U.S. business 
community insisted that ISDS was necessary for Mexico to attract U.S. capital, signifying 
Mexico’s official break with the Calvo Doctrine. The USTR successfully reregulated 
Mexico and Canada using the NAFTA investment and financial services chapters to 
support the interests of U.S. MNCs in name of “market efficiency.” 
 
“Socialist” actors in NAFTA investment negotiations 
The USTR’s overall objective in the NAFTA investment and financial services 
agreements was to support the efficiency, competitiveness, and market shares of U.S. 
                                                          
134 Ibid. 
135 “Investment: the North American Free Trade Agreement”. August, 1992. Washington, D.C.: Office of the U.S. 
Trade Representative. 
136 “White House Fact Sheet: The North American Free Trade Agreement”. August 12, 1992. Washington, D.C.: 
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industries and therefore U.S. jobs. This objective became codified as broad multinational 
investor rights enforceable by ISDS. However, throughout negotiations, the core 
proposals of the USTR and U.S. MNCs faced diverse social and political resistance. In 
many instances, multinational investor rights and ISDS conflicted with a range of 
regulatory areas, including, labor, environment, and financial regulation. Labor unions 
warned that the lack of enforceable (investment-related) labor regulations in Mexico would 
depress working conditions in the U.S. While the Bush administration opposed enforceable 
investment-related environmental provisions because other countries should not have the right to 
enforce U.S. environmental laws. In contrast, environmental organizations argued that investor 
rights and ISDS gave multinational investors the right to undermine environmental laws, as 
demonstrated by the GATT ruling that forbade the U.S.’ environmental ban on imports of 
Mexican tuna. 
 
“Nationalist” actors in NAFTA investment negotiations 
Perhaps the most well-known “nationalist” politician was Ross Perot, who ran a 
relatively successful third party campaign in the 1992 Presidential elections. During a debate, 
Perot famously derided the NAFTA,  
“We have got to stop sending jobs overseas. It’s pretty simple: If you're 
paying $12, $13, $14 an hour for factory workers and you can move your factory 
South of the border, pay a dollar an hour for labor,...have no health care – that’s 
the most expensive single element in making a car - have no environmental 
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controls, no pollution controls and no retirement, and you don’t care about 
anything but making money, there will be a giant sucking sound going south.”137 
Perot’s argument was that NAFTA would enable Mexico to “suck” manufacturing 
investment away from the U.S., thereby putting downward pressure on employment and wages 
in the U.S. Some U.S. labor unions shared Perot’s sentiments. They did not support the NAFTA 
along nationalistic lines and advocated protectionist policies (Kay 2004). However, they only 
influenced a small minority in Congress and President Bush alienated the “nationalists” during 
the 1992 elections. 
 
                                                          
137 “The 1992 Campaign: Transcript of 2d TV Debate Between Bush, Clinton and Perot.” The New York Times. 16 
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Chapter Four: U.S. Effects of the NAFTA Investment Agreements 
I. Introduction 
II. Regulatory effects 
III. Income effects 
IV. Feedbacks between regulatory and income effects 
V. Clarifying U.S. trade policy positions 
 
“…But as Steven P. Jobs of Apple spoke, President Obama interrupted with an inquiry of his 
own: what would it take to make iPhones in the United States?...Mr. Jobs’s reply was 
unambiguous. ‘Those jobs aren’t coming back,’ he said…”138  
 
“If a single industrial sector might be called the cradle of international commercial arbitration, it 
would be the energy business. Especially oil and gas.”139 
 
I. Introduction 
In this chapter I review the NAFTA investment and financial services chapters’ regulatory 
effects and income effects. I divide the chapter into three parts. First, I examine the regulatory 
effects of the NAFTA investment chapter by identifying trends in the investor-state dispute 
settlement (ISDS) case law and jurisprudence. Second, I will synthesize studies about the 
NAFTA investment chapter income effects of the agreement, including, industry, financial 
                                                          
138 “How the U.S. Lost Out on iPhone Work,” by Charles Duhigg and Keith Bradsherjan, The 
New York Times, January 21, 2012. 
139 “Energy sector driving major growth in international arbitration,” by Anthony Davis, Lexpert, 
Feb 1, 2014. 
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system, labor, and environmental effects. I will supplement these literature reviews with relevant 
data. Third, I will review U.S. investment policy debates to see if there are feedbacks between 
the regulatory and income effects.  
 
II. Regulatory effects of the NAFTA investment chapter 
As of January 1, 2016, the U.S. Department of State reports 49 concluded 
NAFTA ISDS cases, 17 claims against the U.S., 18 claims against Canada, and 14 claims 
against Mexico. Canada has paid $172.7 million in awards; Mexico has paid $204.2 
million in awards; the U.S. has not lost a case. In this section, I identify two trends in the 
NAFTA ISDS case law, (1) varying tribunal interpretations of the same provisions, and 
(2) conflicts with public interest legislation. Next, I examine the regulatory effects of 
these trends, which amount to an undermining of state sovereignty to regulate 
multinational investors. 
 
II.A. NAFTA investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) trends 
II.A.1. Uneven implementation 
While Canada and Mexico have nearly lost as many cases as won under the NAFTA 
ISDS, the U.S. has not lost a single case (see Appendix Two). In fact, under every FTA and BIT 
that the U.S. is party to, the U.S. has not lost one ISDS case. ISDS proponents hold this up as 
evidence that ISDS merely functions to export U.S. legal standards while the claims of ISDS 
opponents are unfounded; ISDS opponents warn that the U.S. does not have any ISDS 
agreements with any of the large capital-exporting states so it has not faced many challenges and 
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that trade politics condition tribunals’ decision making. As Rep. Doggett testified before the 
Subcommittee on Trade,  
“…the fact that the U.S. has yet to have a ruling against it, I think has to 
be considered against the backdrop of the fact that the trade lawyers who are the 
arbitrators in these panels are well aware of what the impact would be if the U.S. 
did lose a major decision.”140  
Tribunals have three members, one is appointed by the claimant, one is appointed by the 
defendant, and the third is agreed upon by both parties; in general, most arbitrators have legal 
background in relevant trade and investment law.141 The partiality of tribunals has been 
frequently questioned.142 In one famous instance, Judge Abner Mikva, a former Congressman 
and retired DC circuit court judge, was the U.S.-appointed arbitrator in Loewen v. United States 
(2003) filed under NAFTA ISDS. After the U.S. appointed Judge Mikva, he recounted a meeting 
with U.S. Department of Justice officials in a candid recording. The officials told him, “You 
know, Judge, if we lose this case we could lose NAFTA.” Judge Mikva replied, “Well, if you 
want to put pressure on me, then that does it.”143 In fact, Mikva revealed that he was the 
dissenting opinion as the other two arbitrators were intent on finding against the U.S. The 
Loewen case was later dismissed on a legal technicality.  
                                                          
140 Cited in Hearing before the Committee of Ways and Means, US House of Representatives on 
“Investment Protection in US Trade and Investment Agreements,” One Hundred Eleventh 
Congress, First Session, May 14, 2009. 
141 “Selection and Appointment of Tribunal Members - ICSID Convention Arbitration,” 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, The World Bank. 
142 “Moral Hazard in International Dispute Resolution,” Professor Jan Paulsson, Inaugural 
Lecture as Holder of the Michael R. Klein Distinguished Scholar Chair, University of Miami 
School of Law, 29 April 2010. 
143 Judge Abner Mikva, Audiotape: Symposium on Environmental Law and the Judiciary, Pace 
Law School, December 6-8, 2004. 
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Certainly, one piece of anecdotal evidence hardly demonstrates that all ISDS tribunals are 
politicized. However, two studies of international commercial arbitrations found that dissenting 
opinions were almost invariably (in more than 95% of the cases) written by the arbitrator 
nominated by the losing party, and these same results are replicated for ISDS cases (Redfern 
2003; Romero 2005). In other words, in the vast majority of ISDS cases, arbitrators find in favor 
of the party that appointed them. As explained by investment law expert Jan Paulsson, “The 
problem is that the inevitability of such calculations proves that unilateral appointments are 
inconsistent with the fundamental premise of arbitration: mutual confidence in arbitrators.”144 In 
the context of the uneven implementation of the NAFTA ISDS, at stake is that the bias of the 
arbitrators becomes colored by U.S. trade politics.  
The original drafters of the U.S. Model BIT had never considered that the U.S. could be a 
respondent to an ISDS case because the BIT program was designed for developing countries that 
were not capital-exporters (Vandevelde 2009: 285). Years later, business lobbies and supportive 
Congress members frequently justify ISDS by arguing that it functions to “raise legal 
standards”145 in developing countries and ISDS is “…aimed mainly at prospective trading 
partners.”146 In fact, the USTR explained that the original purpose of ISDS was to “de-politicize” 
conflicts between U.S. firms and developing countries by shifting capital disputes to the 
                                                          
144 “Moral Hazard in International Dispute Resolution,” Professor Jan Paulsson, Inaugural 
Lecture as Holder of the Michael R. Klein Distinguished Scholar Chair, University of Miami 
School of Law, 29 April 2010. 
145 Committee of Ways and Means, US House of Representatives on “Investment Protection in 
US Trade and Investment Agreements,” One Hundred Eleventh Congress, First Session, May 14, 
2009. 
146 “A Spring Thaw in US Trade Policy,” Goldman Sachs, US Economics Analyst: Issue No: 
15/17, April 24, 2015. 
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jurisdiction of third-party arbitrators at the World Bank. However, the uneven implementation of 
the NAFTA ISDS suggests that investment disputes are just as politicized as ever.  
 
II.A.2. Varying tribunal interpretations of the same provisions 
In the NAFTA ISDS case law, the two most cited provisions have been the ‘minimum 
standard of treatment’ and ‘expropriation’ articles. These two articles have also been the most 
controversial because they each contain vague language, which has led to varying interpretations 
of the same provisions and uncertainty over future tribunals. The ‘minimum standard of 
treatment’ provision is illustrative of the conflict.  
The main provision of the ‘minimum standard of treatment’ article is ‘fair and equitable 
treatment and full protection and security’ of foreign investments. After the NAFTA came into 
force, the article was immediately problematic as companies assumed liberal interpretations of 
the provision ‘fair and equitable treatment’ and brought claims against all three governments. 
This led the NAFTA Free Trade Commission to issue an Interpretative Note (2001) of the 
provision, which tied the definition of “fair and equitable treatment” to “customary international 
law.”147 Appendix Three provides an account of this decision. This revision scaled back the 
strength of the ‘minimum standard of treatment’ article. However, the language remained 
sufficiently vague such that it can be interpreted both broadly and narrowly. Investors have 
claimed that ‘customary international law’ is an evolutionary concept that can change with legal 
norms, while states have argued that ‘customary international law’ is limited to several specific 
situations, notably, the denial of justice and due process. 
                                                          
147 NAFTA Free Trade Commission, ‘Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions,’ 
31 July 2001. 
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This conflict became illustrated in Glamis vs. The United States (2009),148 in 
which Glamis Gold, a Canadian mining company, brought claims against the U.S. by 
arguing that ‘fair and equitable treatment’ means that governments must maintain stable 
and predictable regulatory environments to protect investors’ expectations. In other 
words, once an investment contract is made with a government an investor has an 
expectation of the regulatory environment for that investment, and governments breach 
‘fair and equitable treatment’ when they make regulatory changes that later (negatively) 
affect the investment. In defense, the State Department argued149 that a change in the law 
does not violate ‘fair and equitable treatment’ because under the 2001 Interpretative Note 
it is not a denial of justice for the law to change. Glamis contested that there are plenty of 
NAFTA tribunal rulings demonstrating that the standard of ‘fair and equitable treatment’ 
can evolve and past tribunals have decided that the provision should assure a stable 
regulatory environment, which means the government has a duty not to change the law.  
The ‘minimum standard of treatment’ was cited in 29 of the 35 decided NAFTA 
cases. In a number of these 29 cases, arbitral tribunals have applied an ‘evolutionary’ 
approach to ‘fair and equitable treatment’ that is based on the decisions of past tribunals, 
as argued by Glamis. This demonstrates a fundamental ambiguity in the interpretations of 
‘minimum standard of treatment.’ Beginning with the 2004 Model BIT, the U.S. also tied 
the ‘expropriations’ article to ‘customary international law,’ and this has done little to 
constrain tribunals from making broad interpretations of the ‘expropriations’ article.150  
                                                          
148 Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. The United States of America. 
149 U.S. Counter-Memorial, Glamis Gold Ltd., v. United States ofAmerica, September 19, 2006, 
at p. 220. 
150 See award for Occidental Petroleum Corporation and Occidental Exploration and Production 
Company v. The Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11. 
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II.A.3. Conflicts with public interest legislation 
As MNCs increasingly utilized ISDS they have challenged a range of public 
interest laws. In the NAFTA ISDS cases, environmental legislation is by far the most 
targeted.151 These results are similar on a global scale, by 2012, out of the 450 total 
worldwide ISDS cases, environmental policies had been most at risk of ISDS claims, especially 
from the oil, gas, and mining sectors.152 In fact, in all ISDS cases, oil, gas and mining sectors 
account for 25% of all claims.153 In 2014 alone, energy and mining companies brought half of 
ISDS claims. A handful of NAFTA cases are illustrative. Among the most well-known is Lone 
Pine Resources Inc. v. Government of Canada,154 in which the Canadian state of Quebec 
instituted a moratorium on shale gas exploration and development, including fracking. Lone 
Pine, a U.S. oil and gas firm, immediately brought an ISDS claim citing ‘minimum standard of 
treatment’ and ‘expropriation’ charging that Canada ‘acted with no cognizable public purpose,’ 
and violated their ‘valuable right to mine for oil and gas under the St. Lawrence River.’ The 
tribunal found in favor of Lone Pine and awarded the company $118.9 million USD. In a more 
recent NAFTA case, after years of public opposition to TransCanada’s proposed Keystone XL 
oil pipeline, which would funnel Canadian oil sands crude to the U.S. Gulf coast, President 
                                                          
151 Scott Sinclair, ‘NAFTA Chapter 11 Investor-State Disputes to January 1, 2015,’ Canadian 
Centre for Policy Alternatives (2015). 
152 Sierra Club, ‘Trading Away Our Climate? How Investment Rules Threaten the 
Environment and Climate Protection’, 12 November 2012. 
153 Anthony Davis, ‘Energy sector driving major growth in international arbitration’, 
Lexpert, 1 February 2014. 
154 Lone Pine Resources Inc. v. The Government of Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/15/2. 
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Obama determined that the pipeline was not in the national interest and denied its 
construction. In June, 2016, TransCanada brought a NAFTA ISDS claim amounting to 
$15 billion USD.155  
States have won about half of all decided NAFTA cases, and the tribunals have dismissed 
a number of claims targeting environmental legislation. Notably, in Methanex v. United 
the tribunal dismissed Methanex’s claims against California in 2004 on jurisdictional grounds. 
The tribunal ruled in favor of the U.S. that California’s public health ban on methanol was a 
measure of general application and therefore been not related to the company Methanex. This 
ruling affirmed that states do retain policy space for environmental laws. On the other hand, 
outside of the NAFTA, by 2012 there were 274 decided ISDS cases and nearly 60% were 
either settled or were decided in favor of the investor.157 In these cases MNCs have 
challenged not only environmental measures but a range of other public interest laws, 
including labor, public health, and financial regulations. Moreover, the rate of new ISDS 
cases has been increasing dramatically - while fewer than 50 cases were filed in the first 
three decades of the ISDS system, there were at least 50 cases each year from 2011-2015 
(with 70 in 2015). 
Public interest groups have argued that the effect of ISDS has been a ‘regulatory 
chill’ on proposed legislation, in which governments modify, amend, or withdraw 
legislation due to the threat of ISDS. In North America, in the mid-1990s, Canada sought 
to introduce plain packaging regulations and U.S. tobacco multinational Phillip Morris 
                                                          
155 However, TransCanada cancelled their ISDS case against the U.S. after the Trump 
administration overturned Obama’s denial of the pipeline. 
156 Methanex Corporation v. United States of America. 
157 See Sierra Club, above n 20. 
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along with Carla Hills, former USTR who negotiated the NAFTA, threatened Canada with an 
ISDS challenge. Subsequently, Canada abandoned its plain packaging proposal and opted for a 
larger size of the health warning label on packages.158 In sum, ISDS makes governments 
accountable before investors and the case law demonstrates that ISDS produces fundamental 
conflicts between private and public interests. 
 
II.B. Regulatory effects of NAFTA ISDS  
The NAFTA investor protections and ISDS can foreclose possibilities of governments 
implementing new regulations even when regulatory norms evolve. In so doing, ISDS embodies 
a trade-off between the rights of multinational investors and sovereignty to regulate them. For 
example, the NAFTA ISDS directly and indirectly undermined state sovereignty with respect to 
climate change regulations and emergency financial measures. 
 
II.B.1. Direct undermining of state sovereignty: climate change regulations 
In 1977, a senior scientist at U.S. oil giant Exxon Mobile concluded in a company report, 
‘…the most likely manner in which mankind is influencing the global climate is through carbon 
dioxide release from the burning of fossil fuels.’159 In 2015, investigative journalists found that 
Exxon Mobile has decades of internal documents showing that its own scientists and executives 
knew that burning fossil fuels contributes to global warming and that the executives suppressed 
the findings.160 Publicly, Exxon Mobile denied global warming in their effort to fight off 
                                                          
158 See Sinclair, above n 19, at 37. 
159 Neela Banerjee, Lisa Song and David Hasemyer, ‘Exxon’s Own Research Confirmed Fossil 
Fuels' Role in Global Warming Decades Ago,’ Inside Climate News, 16 September 2015. 
160 Ibid. 
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government regulations. Simultaneously, Exxon Mobile had used the NAFTA ISDS as a 
deregulatory tool. In 2015, Exxon Mobile won $17.3 million USD from the government of 
Canada against a ‘performance requirement’ that required Exxon Mobile to help finance 
petroleum-focused research and development in Newfoundland and Labrador.161 This case 
complemented other NAFTA ISDS cases in which U.S. oil company Lone Pine had successfully 
won a case against a ban on fracking in Canada, and TransCanada’s $15 billion dollar 
claim against the U.S. for the Obama administration’s denial of the Keystone XL 
pipeline.  
International consensus has been shifting to accept human-caused global warming 
as a fact, and regulatory norms have also evolved to reflect this, which Exxon Mobile 
well understood. Therefore, the fossil fuel industry’s explicit use of ISDS as a 
deregulatory tool curtails state sovereignty to implement climate change regulations. In 
other international investment agreements, the fossil fuel and mining industries are by far 
the most active in bringing ISDS cases against governments, particularly developing 
countries.  
 
II.B.2. Indirect undermining of state sovereignty: emergency financial regulations 
The NAFTA investment chapter’s ‘transfers’ article obliges the free movement of 
capital. The only exception is the ‘balance of payments’ provision that allows states to 
regulate the cross-border movement of capital during crises, which can only be 
implemented under highly specific conditions (a policy mix known as ‘capital controls’). 
                                                          
161 Mobil Investments Canada Inc. and Murphy Oil Corporation v. Canada, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/07/4. 
 118 
 
In both the 1995 Mexican Peso crisis and the 2008 global financial crisis, Mexican policymakers 
did not attempt to implement the NAFTA balance of payments exception. However, since the 
2008 global financial crisis, many developing countries in Latin America and Asia have 
underscored capital controls as fundamental to development policy.162 In 2012, the IMF 
announced a ‘new institutional view,’ which claims that the free movement of capital rests on 
weak economic theory, and it has ‘heightened macroeconomic volatility and vulnerability to 
crises.’163 The IMF’s new institutional stance calls for situational capital controls (i.e. capital 
controls on a case-by-case basis). 
The debates and merits of capital controls notwithstanding, both the U.S. and Mexican 
policymakers’ commitment to the free movement of capital removed capital controls as a policy 
option for confronting economic crises in the region. This steadfast commitment to the free 
movement of capital is institutionalized in the NAFTA investment and financial services 
chapters. As explained by the U.S. negotiators of those chapters, their purpose was to ‘lock-in’ 
Mexico’s commitment to the free movement of capital in case of future political shifts away 
from free trade doctrine in Mexico.164 Therefore, the NAFTA’s stringent restrictions on capital 
controls reflects pre-2008 regulatory norms as international policy consensus has shifted towards 
supporting certain regulations on capital movements. 
                                                          
162 Kevin P. Gallagher, Ruling Capital: Emerging Markets and the Reregulation of Cross-Border 
Finance, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014). 
163 International Monetary Fund, ‘The Liberalization and Management of Capital Flows: An 
Institutional View,’ (Washington DC: International Monetary Fund, 2012) 12. 
164 Olin Wethington, Financial Market Liberalization: The NAFTA Framework, (Minnesota: 
West Publishing Company, 1994) 5-12. 
 119 
 
There has only been one NAFTA ISDS case ruling on financial regulations, 
Fireman’s Fund v. United Mexican States (2003).165 Following the 1995 Mexican Peso 
crisis, the Mexican Central Bank had assisted Mexican financial institutions with Peso-
denominated debt instruments but had denied the same treatment to the Fireman Fund, a 
U.S. insurance company, which then claimed it to be a violation of the NAFTA’s 
‘national treatment’ provision. In the tribunal’s ruling, the arbitrators had never 
questioned the right of investors to challenge a government policy in response to 
financial crisis. In fact, the tribunal ruled that ISDS arbitrators can determine the 
‘reasonableness’ of emergency financial regulations. Moreover, the tribunal interpretation 
stated that investors can challenge emergency financial regulations during crises as 
expropriations. In 2006, under a European BIT, an ISDS tribunal awarded a foreign bank 
$236 million because the government did not provide the foreign bank with the same 
bail-out as national banks.166 In short, although Mexican policymakers do not support the 
use of capital controls, the NAFTA provisions foreclose the possibility of their 
implementation while ISDS leaves open the possibility for investors to challenge capital 
controls and other emergency financial measures. 
 
III. Income effects of NAFTA investment chapter 
In this section I survey the first-order income effects of the NAFTA investment 
chapter, and then introduce some second-order income effects. I mostly focus on the 
                                                          
165 Fireman's Fund Insurance Company v. The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. 
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U.S.-Mexico investment relationship for two reasons, (1) considering the U.S.-Canada 
relationship, it is impossible to separate the effect of the NAFTA investment chapter from 
previous bilateral investment agreements, and (2) the U.S. BIT program was originally 
designed for contract with developing countries, focusing on the U.S.-Mexico 
relationship will highlight the effects of investment agreements between the U.S. and 
developing countries. 
 
III.A. Increased regional economies of scale 
The immediate income effect of the NAFTA investment chapter was to facilitate 
economies of scale for regional MNCs. In a meticulous survey of the assets and sales of Fortune 
500 companies during the early 2000s, economists Alan Rugman and Chang Hoon Oh found that 
most MNCs operate regionally rather than globally.167 That is, the vast majority of U.S., 
European, and Asian MNCs both produce and sell on a home region basis. Rugman and Hoon 
Oh conclude that MNCs tend to dominate in their home region while marginally investing and 
operating in other regions. For example, there are many European and Japanese MNCs investing 
in North America, but the ‘home’ U.S. MNCs have most of the market share in North America, 
and there are similar patterns in Europe and Asia.168 The NAFTA facilitated regional economies 
of scale for U.S. MNCs while European and Asian MNCs contested the North American market. 
Following the implementation of the NAFTA, U.S. FDI to Mexico has been concentrated in 
manufacturing, followed by financial services and mining. 
 
                                                          
167 Alan Rugman and Chang Hoon Oh, ‘Friedman's Follies: Insights on the 
Globalization/Regionalization Debate,’ Business and Politics, Vol. 10, No. 2 (2008). 
168 Ibid at 13. 
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Figure Two: U.S. FDI Stocks in Mexico by Sector 
 
 
IV.A.1. Regional economies of scale in manufacturing 
U.S. trade policymakers negotiating the NAFTA investment chapter had two goals - to maintain 
the global competitiveness of U.S. MNCs and to support jobs in the U.S. The USTR’s main 
private sector advisory committee explained, ‘With a NAFTA that allows companies to plan long 
term investments…costs can be reduced and economies of scale achieved, allowing North 
American products to compete more effectively in world markets.’169 The U.S. sought to 
integrate production with Mexico such that U.S. industries would better compete with East Asia, 
particularly in autos, electronics, and textiles. The NAFTA investment chapter provided the legal 
underpinning to this trade strategy as U.S. FDI entered Mexico. U.S. imports from Mexico 
                                                          
169 Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, ‘Report of the Investment Policy Advisory 
Committee for Trade on the North American Free Trade Agreement, (Washington, D.C.: 
Executive Office of the President), September 1992. 
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contained much higher U.S. content than competing imports from East Asia, therefore, by 
importing from Mexico (rather than East Asia) domestic manufacturing could be sustained. Prior 
to the NAFTA, Mexican goods imports contained roughly 5 percent U.S. content, twenty years 
later, one report estimated that figure climbed to 40 percent, demonstrating the success of the 
NAFTA.170 Conversely, U.S. imports from China are estimated to have only 4 percent U.S. 
content.171  
The NAFTA investment chapter facilitated globally competitive regional value chains in 
autos and transportation equipment, information technology, and textiles and apparel. These 
value chains enabled the U.S. and Mexico to co-produce for export to the world. The NAFTA 
trade strategy was relatively successful from the NAFTA entering into force in 1994 until 2001, 
as North America’s annual shares of world merchandise exports outpaced those of East Asia 
during that time. During that same period, all three NAFTA countries experienced growth in 
GDP, employment, and productivity. However, after China joined the WTO in 2001, 
competition from East Asia, led by China, either caused a disarticulation of North American 
supply chains or undercut their competitiveness.172 
 
                                                          
170 M. Angeles Villareal and Ian F. Fergusson, ‘NAFTA at 20: Overview and trade effects,’ 
Congressional Research Service (Washington, DC), 21 February 2013, 15. 
171 Ibid at 15. 
172 See Enrique Dussel Peters & Kevin Gallagher, above n 42; See Michèle Rioux, Mathieu Ares, 
& Ping Huang, above n 41. 
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Figure Three: North America vs. East Asia, Shares of Total World Merchandise Exports
 
Competition from China notwithstanding, vertically integrated production with 
Mexico benefited U.S. firms. Economists Theodore H. Moran and Lindsay Oldenski 
analyzed confidential firm-level data from U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis on the 
international activities of U.S. MNCs between the years 1990 and 2009. They found that 
U.S. MNCs that have offshored to Mexico have become more globally competitive and 
in turn they have increased their investment and employment in the U.S.173 Their findings 
are consistent with other studies that observe that U.S. outward FDI has helped U.S. firms 
to achieve globally competitive economies of scale and in turn expand domestic 
operations and employment.174  
                                                          
173 Theodore H. Moran and Lindsay Oldenski, ‘How US Investments in Mexico Have Increased 
Investment and Jobs at Home,’ in ‘NAFTA 20 Years Later,’ PIIE Briefing No. 14-3 (Washington 
DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics), November 2014. 
174 Mihir A. Desai, C. Fritz Foley, James R. Hines, ‘Domestic Effects of the Foreign Activities of 
U.S. Multinationals,’ American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, Vol. 1, No. 1 (2009); Lee 
Branstetter, ‘Facts and Fallacies about US FDI in China (with apologies to Rob Feenstra),’ in R. 
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
3
2
0
1
4
2
0
1
5
2
0
1
6
Author's Compilation from World Trade Organization
Shares of World Merchandise Exports
NAFTA China and ASEAN
 124 
 
Information technology (IT) value chains 
By 2011, the NAFTA had facilitated the emergence of the IT sector as a key source of 
dynamism for North America, IT manufacturing accounted for 18% of trilateral trade in North 
America ($179 billion) (Gallagher & Zarsky 2007; Rioux et. al. 2015). However, since the 1990s 
the industry had undergone profound changes. In 2001, Mexico was the largest supplier of IT 
goods to the U.S. and had 15.7% market share, yet by 2010 Mexico’s share of the U.S. market 
shrank to 15%; in that same time period China increased its share of the U.S. IT import market 
from 13.4% (2001) to 49.5% (2011).175  
The central motivation of Mexico in the NAFTA was to attract manufacturing FDI and 
Mexican policymakers identified information technology as a key sector for export to the U.S. 
(Gallagher & Zarsky 2007). Following NAFTA, the plan was successful as a handful of the 
“global flagships” of the IT industry quickly established manufacturing operations in 
Guadalajara, Mexico, including Hewlett-Packard and IBM. Several of the large contracting 
manufacturing firms followed the flagships to Guadalajara, and in turn, they contracted the 
manufacturing of parts to suppliers throughout East Asia. In 2000-1, the bursting of technology 
bubble produced a crisis of overcapacity in the IT industry just as China was joining the WTO. 
Every multinational IT firm that relocated from Guadalajara headed for China. Analysts Kevin 
Gallagher and Lyuba Zarsky observed, “With its large domestic market, low wages, and 
significant IT manufacturing capacities (built up over 20 years by state-led development 
policies), China became the production platform du jour” (2007: 8). Between 2000 and 2011, 
Chinese exports of IT goods to NAFTA grew by 360 percent, reaching nearly $154 billion; in the 
                                                          
F & S. W. (eds) China's Growing Role in World Trade (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2010). 
175 Rioux et. al. 2015: 269. 
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same time period U.S. exports to NAFTA grew by 14 percent, Mexico’s grew by 59 percent, and 
Canada’s decreased by 56 percent.176 Moreover, the U.S. market share of IT goods in Canada and 
Mexico shrank while to China’s grew. These trends demonstrate that China’s vast gains in trade 
in IT goods were at the expense of North America.  
By the 1990s, China had emerged as the core of MNCs location strategy for two reasons - 
China had a large and growing internal market and it was a low-cost export platform (Gallagher 
& Zarsky 2007: 112). Global flagships of the IT industry, and their contracting manufacturers, 
would base their supply chain in China for final assembly of finished goods and importing parts 
and components to China from East Asia and to a lesser extent the U.S. and Europe. A famous 
example is the production of iPhones in Foxconn assembly plants in China. The extent and 
sophistication of China-East Asia supply chains were unparalleled in the world and became a key 
source of growth and dynamism for the East Asian countries, particularly supply chains in 
electrical machinery and semiconductor devices (Prema-chandra 2010: 15). However, not only 
did Chinese IT manufacturing assume comparative advantage in the low-value added assembly 
stages, but China has moved up the value chain at unprecedented speeds. Beginning in the 1980s, 
China had begun to develop its IT sector with careful industrial policy. Chinese policymakers 
implemented a strategy to develop its domestic firms while inviting the global flagship IT firms 
to establish joint partnerships with Chinese firms. In exchange for market access, China required 
the TNCs to transfer technology, establish R&D centers, source to local firms, and train Chinese 
employees (Gallagher & Zarsky 2007: 112). In so doing, Chinese IT firms have assumed diverse 
points of the value chain, laying the foundation for China’s rapid ascent to become the world’s 
largest IT exporter by 2004. While the NAFTA investment chapter forbids requiring firms to 
                                                          
176 Rioux et. al. 2015: 267. 
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establish joint ventures with technology transfers and R&D, the WTO permitted China the policy 
space to do so and China used it to the max. 
 
Textile and apparel value chains 
The NAFTA rules of origin, investment chapter, and reduction of related tariffs led to the 
development of a vertically integrated North American textile-apparel chain that flourished 
briefly in the late 1990s, particularly in Mexico. Rules of origin oblige a certain amount of North 
American content in the final good, thereby protecting against import competition. Mexico’s 
textile and clothing chain is highly integrated with the U.S. for use of both inputs and export of 
the finished goods. In fact, the sector uses a high number imported inputs from the U.S. and uses 
the highest U.S. value added in its exports, far more than China and the rest of world.177 
However, following 2000, China, India, Bangladesh and Pakistan substantially increased their 
share of global production and trade while the U.S. experienced a steady decline in textile 
production and trade.  
The end of the Multifibre Arrangement in 2005 further led developing countries (largely 
China) to increase their shares of global textile and apparel production, deteriorating the NAFTA 
region’s textile and clothing value chain. Since 2005, in Mexico’s textile and clothing sector, 
value added as a proportion of the total value of output has been lower than pre-NAFTA levels 
and fell by more than a quarter from 2000 to 2010.178 Therefore, beginning in 2000 as North 
America’s textile and clothing value chain faced increasing import competition from across the 
Pacific, it disintegrated the NAFTA supply chain. From 1990 to 2000, Mexico’s textile and 
                                                          
177 Peters & Gallagher 2013b: 98. 
178  Peters & Gallagher 2013b: 97. 
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clothing exports to the U.S. grew by an average annual rate of 30.7 percent, from 2000 to 2010 it 
contracted by 4.4 percent per year. In that same period, U.S. textile and clothing imports from 
China grew from 12 percent of total textile and clothing imports to 42 percent (Peters & 
Gallagher 2013b: 98). Simultaneously, textile and clothing manufacture as a share of U.S. GDP 
and employment sharply contracted.  
 
Automotive value chains 
Prior to the NAFTA, the North American auto industry produced vehicles for their 
respective domestic markets, due to transportation costs, tariffs, and regulatory constraints. The 
NAFTA led to a highly complex and integrated automotive production supply chain.179 The 
North American automotive chain that emerged was facilitated by the NAFTA auto rules of 
origin, investment chapter, and tariff reductions, thereby protecting the sector from competition 
from Asian and Chinese firms in both absolute and relative terms. Between 2000 and 2010, 
Mexico’s auto sector has received over $10 billion in FDI as an export platform to the U.S. and 
U.S. auto firms are by far Mexico’s largest producers and exporters, the “big three” (General 
Motors, Chrysler and Ford) accounted more than 60 percent of exports prior to NAFTA and 52.4 
percent in 2009.180 By 2011, Mexico had surpassed Canada and Japan as the leading supplier of 
automotive goods to the U.S., accounting for 26 percent ($64.4 billion) of total U.S. motor 
vehicle and auto parts imports. While the post-NAFTA restructuring of the auto industry 
                                                          
179 Between 1993 and 2013, Mexico increased its trade in auto parts with the U.S. by 189 percent 
in exports and 389 percent in imports; Canada’s trade in auto parts with the U.S. grew by 46 
percent in exports and 31 percent in imports (Villarreal & Fergusson 2013: 16). In the same time 
period, Mexico’s exports of vehicles to the U.S. grew by 2300 percent and their imports by 984 
percent; Canada’s exports of vehicles to the U.S. grew by 220 percent and it imports by 67 
percent (Villarreal & Fergusson 2013: 16). 
180  Peters & Gallagher 2013b: 98. 
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produced a U.S. trade deficit with Mexico in automotive production, Mexico’s low-wage export 
platform has allowed automakers to amortize the large fixed costs of capital-intensive production 
facilities in the U.S., helping to sustain the entire North American industry.181 However, Chinese 
automotive production has been growing at unprecedented clips, suggesting competition in the 
near future.  
While the North American automotive value chain has been a symbol of the success of 
NAFTA as a competitive integration plan, Mexican producers have begun to significantly import 
Chinese auto parts into their supply chain. In 2005, Chinese auto parts were 3.2 percent of 
Mexico’s total imported auto parts, by 2009, that figure had climbed to nearly 10 percent.182 By 
2010, China was the world’s top exporter of tires and tubes. Moreover, China has quickly risen 
to be the largest automotive producer in the world. In the early 1990s, China accounted for less 
than 1 percent of global automotive output, by 2009 China accounted for 23.5 percent of global 
output becoming the world’s top producer.183 China has not yet begun to export cars on any 
significant scale because China’s auto sector has been producing for China’s internal market. 
However, as the pace of China’s domestic consumption slows, it is likely that China will seek to 
increase automotive exports. 
 
III.A.2. Regional economies of scale in financial services 
In response to the Mexican Peso crisis in 1995, Mexican policymakers opened financial 
services to foreign investment before the NAFTA liberalization schedule came into force. The 
                                                          
181 “NAFTA May Have Saved Many Autoworkers’ Jobs” by Eduardo Porter, New York Times, 
March 29, 2016. 
182 Peters & Gallagher 2013b: 99. 
183 Peters & Gallagher 2013b: 99. 
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IMF and the World Bank encouraged the private recapitalization of the Mexican banking 
system by foreign banks because it would be foundational to a ‘sound and stable’ 
financial system.184 As a result, by 1997, Mexico raised the ceiling on foreign investment 
from 30 to 49 percent and entirely repealed restrictions on foreign ownership of financial 
institutions in 1999, fully opening Mexico to FDI in financial services. Mexico’s banking 
system quickly became dominated by foreign banks. Between 1999 and 2002, foreign 
bank market share jumped from 20 to 82 percent, mostly by cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions from the U.S., Canada, and Spain.185  
As Mexico’s banks became foreign owned they adopted foreign bank lending, 
borrowing, and risk management practices. International banks have used 
communications and information technology to create new financial markets and 
introduce new financial products, notably, household and consumption loans and 
financial market mediation.186 U.S. financial services FDI transplanted these same 
banking practices into Mexico. Just as the widgets produced for export by Mexican 
maquiladoras were ‘Made in Mexico,’ the household loans and derivatives that originated 
from foreign banks in Mexico were ‘Made in the USA.’ 
The NAFTA investment and financial services chapter opened Mexico to foreign 
banks which facilitated economies of scale in the regional financial services industry, 
                                                          
184 Paulo dos Santos, ‘A Policy Wrapped in “Analysis”—The World Bank’s Case for Foreign 
Banks,’ in K. B., B. F. & E. V. (eds), The Political Economy of Development: The World Bank, 
Neoliberalism and Development Research, (London: Pluto, 2012). 
185 Stephen H. Haber and Aldo Musacchio, ‘These Are the Good Old Days: Foreign Entry and 
the Mexican Banking System,’ NBER Working Paper: No. 18713 (2013). 
186 Costas Lapavitsas and Paulo dos Santos, ‘Globalization and Contemporary Banking: On the 
Impact of New Technology,’ Contributions to Political Economy, Vol. 27, No. 1, 2008. 
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contributing to the consolidation of the global banking industry (i.e. ‘too big to fail’).187 Foreign 
bank operations and trading with developing countries have become key sources of bank 
profitability. Appendix One provides an overview of U.S. bank operations in Mexico. According 
to the Bureau of Economic Analysis, in 1999, the U.S. exported to Mexico $19.514 billion in 
financial services, which steadily expanded until a two year plateau in 2008 at over $60 billion, 
then continued to climb to $87.774 billion by 2014. In 2014, Mexico accounted for nearly a 
quarter of total U.S. financial services exports to Latin America. In 2007, U.S. financial services 
affiliates in Mexico generated $6.989 billion in services supplied, and by 2014 that figure grew 
to $11.985 billion. However, these figures are underestimates due to Mexico’s hub in the global 
trillion dollar narcotics trade and the extensive money laundering activities of foreign banks in 
Mexico on account of the drug cartels.188 
 
III.A.3. Mining and fossil fuels 
Mexico is one of the world’s leading producers of silver, copper, gold, and zinc. In terms 
of mining investment attraction, Mexico ranks fourth in the world and first in Latin America.189 
Mexico’s mining sector is largely dependent upon FDI and majority comes from Canadian firms 
followed by U.S. investors.190 Scale dynamics in mining and fossil fuel extraction are 
complicated by fluctuations in the prices of the commodities. However, mining is typically a first 
                                                          
187 Ibid. 
188 If illicit drugs were counted among official statistics they could be among Mexico’s top five 
exports to the U.S.; international banks including HSBC and Wachovia have been found money 
laundering billions of dollars for Mexican drug cartels, providing significant liquidity and 
revenue for the banking system that is unaccounted (See: Rajeev Syal, ‘Drug money saved banks 
in global crisis, claims UN advisor,’ The Guardian, 13 December 2009). 
189 Deloitte & Touche LLP, ‘Mining in Mexico,’ 2012. 
190 ProMexico, ‘Mexico Mining,’ ProMexico: Inversion Y Comercio (2015). 
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step in manufacturing value chains, and the Mexican market has enabled regional MNCs 
and investors to achieve economies of scale.  
During NAFTA negotiations, Mexico made its energy sector off limits to FDI and 
so that the state-owned oil company could retain a monopoly and Mexico could use its 
revenue to finance the budget. In response to a mix of political and economic conditions, 
Mexican President Enrique Pena Nieto opened the energy sector to private investment in 
2014 to boost investment, exploration, and productivity in the sector. Although U.S. FDI 
in Mexico’s fossil fuels is only beginning, U.S. oil and gas companies have been large 
investors in Canada’s abundant oil and gas, facilitating regional economies of scale for 
U.S. MNCs in fossil fuel extraction.  
III.A.4. Regional economies of scale and increased productivity growth 
There is a large and growing body of literature documenting that trade and 
investment liberalization increases productivity growth. Economists Jan De Loecker and 
Pinelopi Goldberg conducted a review of literature on this relationship and concluded, 
‘…there is one robust finding that emerges from this literature: globalization improves 
industry performance.’191 However, there no consensus on the causal relationship 
between trade and productivity. A 2015 report by the White House pointed to several 
different channels, notably, that trade and investment liberalization facilitates firm-level 
economies of scale which then increases firm productivity growth.192 The White House 
report then goes on to cite a number of studies in which ‘…the common mechanism is 
                                                          
191 Jan De Loecker & Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg, ‘Firm Performance in a Global Market,’ 
Annual Review of Economics Vol. 6, No. 1 (2014). 
192 The White House, ‘The Economic Benefits of U.S. Trade,’ May 2015, at 8. 
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that exporting induces investments in technology.’193 For example, in the auto industry, Mexico’s 
low-wage export platform has allowed U.S. automakers to amortize their investments in capital-
intensive production facilities in the U.S., thereby sustaining the entire North American auto 
industry.194 Similarly, the development of information technology has made service industries 
more productive and allowed the increased offshoring of services.195 In so doing, U.S. outward 
FDI in both manufacturing and services has increased productivity growth for U.S. firms in those 
sectors. The NAFTA investment chapter directly and indirectly facilitated economies of scale, 
which increased firm-level productivity growth and contributed to the dynamism of U.S. MNCs. 
 
IV.B. Second-order income effects 
The NAFTA investment chapter not only facilitated the global competitiveness of U.S. 
MNCs but it had second-order income effects. They include: (1) intensified regional financial 
instability, (2) heightened job polarization in the U.S. and Mexico, and (3) amplified regional 
environmental damage. These income effects are relevant to regional economies of scale 
inasmuch as they shift costs from the private sector to the public sector. Due to the scope of this 
paper, I summarize them below. 
 
IV.B.1. Intensified regional financial instability 
The NAFTA investment chapter ‘transfers’ article obliges the absolute free movement of 
capital. This provision, in tandem with other deregulatory provisions in the investment and 
                                                          
193 Ibid at 8. 
194 Eduardo Porter, ‘NAFTA May Have Saved Many Autoworkers’ Jobs,’ The New York 
Times,  29 March 2016. 
195 Bradford Jensen, Global Trade in Services: Fear, Facts, and Offshoring, (Washington 
DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2011). 
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financial services chapters, facilitated regional financial integration. However, these 
deregulations have a costly trade-off with financial instability.196 Financial crises redistributed 
income from the private to public sector by three channels: the direct social costs of bank bail-
outs from governments as multinational banks ‘socialized’ their losses; increased financial 
instability leading to credit crunches followed by recessions which impose far greater societal 
costs then the direct cost of bail-outs;197 the free movement of capital as the main channel 
by which financial crises spread internationally.198 Each of these occurred in North 
America during the 1995 Mexican Peso crisis and especially the 2008 global financial 
crisis.199 While the NAFTA was certainly not the cause of these crises, the NAFTA 
removed policy options for preventing and responding to them.200 This underscores how 
financial integration has a costly trade-off with financial stability. 
 
The NAFTA and the 1995 Mexican Peso Crisis 
Immediately after the NAFTA came into force Mexico fell into a severe and 
unprecedented balance of payments crisis leading Mexico to face a default on its sovereign debt. 
The connection between the 1995 peso crisis to the NAFTA is subject to debate, however, 
Mexican authorities attributed the causes of the currency crisis to unprecedented and rapid 
(unilateral) liberalization of the Mexican financial sector. The U.S. and the IMF put together a 
                                                          
196 José Antonio Ocampo, Shari Spiegel, and Joseph E. Stiglitz (editors), ‘Capital Account 
Liberalization and Development,’ (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
197 Anton Korinek & Jonathan Kreamer, ‘The Redistributive Effects of Financial Deregulation,’ 
Journal of Monetary Economics: Vol. 68: S55-S67 (2014). 
198 See IMF, above n 31. 
199 Jose Sidaoui, Manuel Ramos-Francia, & Manuel Gabriel Cuadra, ‘The global financial crisis 
and policy response in Mexico,’ BIS papers no. 54 (2011). 
200 Notwithstanding Banco de Mexico’s lack of interest in using capital controls during crises. 
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“historic financial rescue package” of roughly $50 billion (Hufbauer & Schott 2005:10). 
However, a condition of the bailout was that Mexico had to use $29 billion U.S. dollars to pay 
the investors of exotic, peso-denominated Mexican government bonds (Felix 2001: 13). For the 
purposes of context, the value of U.S.’ entire manufacturing FDI stock in Mexico was $10.58 
billion in the same year as the U.S. and IMF bail-out. Michel Camdessus, the IMF’s Managing 
Director, explained this peculiar loan condition in a candid television interview, “…the main 
reason for attaching this condition to the bailout was to keep Mexico from imposing capital 
controls to halt the flight to dollars” (cited in Felix 2001: 13). Camdessus explained that if 
Mexico had implemented capital controls during its balance of payments crisis it would set 
precedent for other developing countries to do so, which was counter the capital liberalization 
goals of the IMF. Mexico’s decision not to implement capital controls in response to the 1995 
Peso crisis had demonstrated its commitment to the NAFTA goals of financial integration.  
 
The NAFTA and the 2008 global financial crisis 
In Mexico, the 2007/8 solvency crisis of U.S. banks was magnified by the exposure of 
Mexican corporations to foreign currency through complex derivatives instruments (Sidaoui et al 
2010: 286). Mexican corporations had speculated on complex derivatives instruments in which 
they were betting against a large and abrupt peso depreciation, which consequently brought a 
high degree of risk to their balance sheets. In 2008, quick and voluminous capital flight from 
Mexico triggered a dramatic Peso depreciation and corporations incurred significant losses 
which had to be met with U.S. dollars (Sidaoui et al 2010: 286). Banco de Mexico observed that 
corporate losses incurred by derivatives instruments caused “widespread disruption” in domestic 
financial markets and destabilizing demand for dollars. In response Banco de Mexico had to rely 
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on financing from (1) emergency “dollar swap lines” (bail-out loan) with the U.S. Central Bank 
($30 billion USD), (2) an emergency IMF loan ($47 billion USD), and (3) drawing down 
Mexico’s U.S. dollar reserves (over $90 billion USD). When these emergency measures are 
summed ($167 billion USD), they amount to 18.66% of Mexico’s entire GDP in 2009 ($894.95 
billion USD). In short, the risks posed by financial integration have been detrimental to financial 
stability in Mexico which has imposed massive costs on Mexico and required emergency bail-
outs from the U.S. and IMF. 
 
II.B. Effects on employment and jobs in the U.S. 
Isolating the effects of trade and investment with Mexico on U.S. labor and jobs has been 
at best an inexact science and at worst a politicized adventure in creative accounting. The effects 
of trade with Mexico on the U.S. employment have been very small in relation to the larger 
macro trends of the vast U.S. economy, nonetheless, any effects have assumed a symbolic 
significance in trade policy debates as these topics are central to the justifications and 
motivations of the proponents and opponents of U.S. trade policy. I present a literature review of 
recent claims of the NAFTA proponents and opponents in Annex Four. Some of the evidence is 
more plausible than others and this section is a critical analysis of the strengths and weaknesses 
of recent literature. 
 
Effects on employment 
To my knowledge, all recent studies find that trade and investment with Mexico has 
produced a net job loss in the U.S. Net job loss is the sum of jobs lost by import competition and 
offshoring plus jobs gained by exports. A study produced by the Economic Policy Institute 
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estimates that between 1994 and 2010 nearly 683,000 U.S. net jobs were lost due to US trade 
deficits with Mexico (about 40,200 jobs per year) (Scott 2011). A contrasting study from the 
Peterson Institute for International Economics reports that from 2009 to 2013, the U.S. net job 
loss by trade with Mexico was roughly 15,000 annually (Hufbauer et. al. 2014). While NAFTA 
opponents identify the trade deficit as the source of job loss, NAFTA proponents contest that 
there has been no empirical correlation between unemployment and the trade balance (Hufbauer 
et. al. 2014). However, contrary to the official unemployment rate, by different unemployment 
metrics there is a correlation with the trade deficit. Contrasting the trade deficit with the male 
labor force participation rate, both demonstrate clear secular declines (notwithstanding the 
dramatic uptick in the trade deficit in 2008 as result of the collapse in spending during the global 
financial crisis). Including females, the general labor force participation rate follows the same 
secular decline but begins after 2000, and the ratio of full-time employed to working-age 
population follows the same trend. Therefore, by different unemployment metrics there is a 
correlation between the trade deficit and unemployment, but of course correlation is not 
causation. 
Economists Theodore H. Moran and Lindsay Oldenski find that U.S. MNCs that have 
offshored to Mexico have become more competitive globally and in turn they have increased 
their investment and employment in the U.S. (2014). Moran and Oldenski analyzed confidential 
firm-level data from U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis on the international activities of U.S. 
MNCs between the years 1990 and 2009. Their findings are consistent with other studies that 
observe that U.S. outward FDI has helped U.S. firms to achieve globally competitive economies 
of scale and in turn expand domestic operations and employment. Moran and Oldenski conclude, 
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“…any fall in U.S. employment by [U.S. MNCs] is not due to offshoring to Mexico, since this 
offshoring exerts a net positive force on the domestic operations of U.S. firms” (2014: 41).  
Contrary to these conclusions, it does not follow that a firm’s employment gains at the 
micro-level produces job gains at the aggregate, macro-level. Moran and Oldenski (2014) do not 
consider the likely macro outcome in which firm-level economies of scale produce greater 
concentration in the industry leading to a fall in aggregate employment in the industry, as has 
been the secular trend in manufacturing. A range of studies have found that during the NAFTA 
time period U.S. MNCs have become more concentrated leading to industry consolidation 
(Acemoglu & Hildebrand 2017; Autor et. al. 2017a; Autor et. al. 2017b). In the same time 
period, manufacturing employment has suffered secular declines, in the information technology 
sector alone from 2001 to 2015 employment halved and fell by over 1 million jobs. Therefore, it 
is problematic to conclude that firm-level employment gains produce aggregate employment 
gains in an industry or country, and to the contrary it may result in aggregate losses.201  
 
                                                          
201 Moreover, the economies of scale by (U.S.) MNCs can come at the expense of domestic firms 
in the FDI host country, a topic seldom addressed by U.S.-based analysts. In a case study of U.S. 
FDI into Mexico’s IT sector, Gallagher and Zarsky found, “Rapid MNC-led growth came at the 
expense of Mexico’s domestic IT firms, which were virtually wiped out” (2007: 9). 
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Figure Four: Total U.S. Manufacturing Employment by Sector
 
Lastly, the data used in Moran and Oldenski’s study (2014) considers the years 1990 to 
2009, a time horizon in which interest rates were secularly declining, firms were increasing their 
leverage, and regional economic growth was led by the debt-fueled American consumer. Without 
data from the post-2009 period, the study is omitting a time frame of debt deflation and 
deleveraging in which firms may have been simultaneously offshoring and contracting domestic 
operations, such as in the auto industry after receiving a bail-out in 2008. Therefore, it is 
inconclusive that from 1990 to 2009 offshoring was the only variable associated with the 
observed firm-level employment gains in domestic operations. 
 
Effects on worker income 
Despite the relatively small net job loss from trade with Mexico, NAFTA proponents 
claim that for each job lost the U.S. economy makes efficiency gains by importing products more 
cheaply, thereby lowering prices and giving firms and consumers greater purchasing power. 
Hufbauer et. al. (2014) estimate that from 2009 to 2013, for each net job lost to Mexico the U.S. 
200.0
700.0
1200.0
1700.0
2200.0
2700.0
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
3
2
0
1
4
2
0
1
5
2
0
1
6
Source: BEA
Total U.S. Manufacturing Employment by Sector 
(Thousands)
US textile and apparel employment
US auto employment
US electronics manufacturing employment
 139 
 
economy gained “several hundred thousand dollars” (2014: 13). However, NAFTA proponents 
do not address the distribution of gains from trade, generally relegating the discussion to political 
debates in Congress over displaced workers. Given the well-documented trends towards growing 
income inequality, there is ambiguous evidence that gains from trade are enjoyed by all. A recent 
study from Public Citizen (2014) finds that displaced workers experience downward social 
mobility leading to increased income inequality, rarely addressed by NAFTA proponents. 
Moreover, the income gains from cheaper Mexican imports do not equal the income loss of 
downwardly mobile displaced workers, leaving them in worse condition (cited in Public Citizen 
2014: 10).  
A number of studies find that jobs gained by exports are typically higher-skilled and 
better paying jobs than were displaced by trade, which is not generally addressed by NAFTA 
opponents. The pattern that emerges is that trade and investment with Mexico has been 
contributing to the well-established employment polarization trends in the U.S. (Kalleberg 2013). 
Employment polarization is the relative contraction of middle-skill occupational shares of total 
occupations. NAFTA proponents find that jobs gained by exports are higher-skilled and better 
paid; NAFTA opponents observe that displaced workers gain new employment in lower-skilled 
and lower income jobs. In fact, recent studies find that offshoring takes the shape of employment 
polarization (Oldenski 2014; Vallizadeh 2015). Using the same firm-level BEA data from the 
Moran and Oldenski (2014) study, Oldenski finds that offshoring takes the shape of job 
polarization by expanding high-skill jobs and a contracting middle-skill jobs (2014). Offshoring 
to Mexico has contributed to job polarization leading to increased income inequality as high-skill 
U.S. workers benefit and displaced middle-skill workers experience job and/or income loss.  
 
 140 
 
Effects on labor unions and wages 
The NAFTA investment chapter contained no language relating to labor standards, and 
there is little to no evidence that the NAFTA has supported any enforcement of existing labor 
standards, including child labor, not to mention an improvement in labor conditions as promised 
by the labor side agreement. In fact, beginning with the NAFTA negotiations there is no 
evidence that U.S. or Canadian officials approached Mexico about improving labor standards or 
enforceability of existing standards (Luce & Turner 2012). Since then, the AFL-CIO reports that 
despite some “modest” victories via the labor side agreement, the lack of an enforcement 
mechanism of the labor side agreement has led countries to stop responding to violations and 
complaints (2014). It is impossible to measure the extent to which the general lack of 
enforcement of labor standards has attracted FDI to Mexico. However, there is diverse and 
widespread evidence that the suppression of labor rights in Mexico has been key to supporting 
Mexico’s low-wage exports in maquiladoras and mining (AFL-CIO 2014). 
NAFTA opponents argue that the treaty has reduced U.S. wages and undermined labor 
unions inasmuch as it enabled firms to threaten workers with offshoring during wage bargaining 
sessions. A Cornell University study commissioned by the NAFTA Labor Commission found 
that since NAFTA, as many as 62 percent of U.S. union drives faced employer threats to relocate 
abroad, and the factory shut-down rate following successful union certifications tripled (cited in 
“Public Citizen” 2014: 11). The report found that companies made explicit threats to relocate to 
Mexico in more than 10 percent of the cases, and in other cases there were implicit threats, such 
as “given NAFTA we may need to reconsider our options,” or handing out statistics to workers 
on the wage differentials between U.S. and Mexican autoworkers (cited in Hufbauer et. al. 2014: 
17).  
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However, many economists tend to dismiss qualitative evidence as “anecdotal,” 
particularly NAFTA proponents (Hufbauer et. al. 2014: 17). Using aggregate industry-level data, 
Autor et. al. (2013) found that import competition from China had a “modest negative effect” on 
U.S. manufacturing wages but import competition from Mexico had no effect. However, there is 
little consensus on the relative causes of wage stagnation – technological change, trade and 
offshoring, declining productivity growth rates, and the myriad of factors causing de-
unionization. Since wage stagnation is such an empirically contentious topic, it is problematic to 
try to isolate the effect of trade with Mexico on manufacturing wages from these other (potential) 
causes, although there is zero evidence that it supports wage growth. Therefore, import 
competition from Mexico either has either no effect or negative effects on wages.  
  
Increased industry consolidation and automation 
Considerations of the link between globalization and increased levels of automation are 
largely absent in studies on the income effects of the NAFTA (and other agreements). 
Proponents of U.S. trade policy argue that automation has had a much greater effect on job 
polarization than globalization (Autor 2013), while opponents of U.S. trade policy tend to be 
skeptical of this conclusion for a variety of reasons (Schmitt et. al. 2013). Similarly, President 
Obama and USTR Froman repeatedly argued that automation has a far more significant effect on 
total employment than offshoring and import competition. In so doing, they conceptually 
separated offshoring and automation as mutually exclusive processes (for one example see The 
White House 2014). However, there is growing evidence that globalization causes increased 
automation.  
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There is a large and growing body of literature documenting that trade and investment 
liberalization increases productivity growth. A recent review of literature on this relationship by 
De Loecker and Goldberg (2014) concluded, “…there is one robust finding that emerges from 
this literature: globalization improves industry performance.” However, there no consensus on 
the causes of how trade and investment enhances productivity. A report released by The White 
House (2015) pointed to several different channels, notably, that trade and investment 
liberalization facilitates firm-level economies of scale which then increases firm productivity 
growth. The White House report then goes on to cite a number of studies in which “…the 
common mechanism is that exporting induces investments in technology” (2015: 8). For 
example, in the auto industry, Mexico’s low-wage export platform has allowed U.S. automakers 
to amortize their investments in capital-intensive production facilities in the U.S., which 
increases automation in the industry. Similarly, the development of information technology has 
made service industries more productive and allowed the increased offshoring of services 
(Jensen 2011). In so doing, offshoring and automation are complementary processes in both 
manufacturing and services. Moreover, The White House report asserted that, “(1) trade 
stimulates innovation directly, and (2) trade alters the incentives to innovate” (2015: 11). In 
short, the NAFTA investment and financial services directly and indirectly facilitated economies 
of scale and increased automation, and automation has also been demonstrated to be a cause of 
growing income inequality (Brynjolfsson & McAfee 2014; Autor 2013). 
 
II.C. Environmental Impact 
The NAFTA investment chapter provides that no Party may lower environmental 
standards to attract investment and that nothing in the agreement prevents a Party from 
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implementing environmental legislation, although that language is unenforceable. This section 
surveys literature that assessed outcomes of these provisions. Analyst Kevin P. Gallagher (2009) 
found that contrary to the fears of environmentalists and public interest groups during 
negotiations, “NAFTA did not result in Mexico becoming a ‘pollution haven’ for dirty U.S. 
firms seeking weaker environmental regulations” (2009: 6). Similarly, analysts Elizabeth Cole 
and Prescott Ensign concluded that U.S. manufacturing FDI into Mexico has generally been in 
the lower polluting industries, and in certain cases U.S. FDI had brought cleaner technology to 
Mexico (2005). Ironically, after NAFTA was enacted the amount of dirty industry decreased 
more in Mexico than in the United States.  
There is little evidence that Mexico became a “pollution haven” for FDI because low-
wage manufacturing industries are typically less pollution-intensive than capital-intensive 
manufacturing. Since NAFTA, capital-intensive and heavy polluting manufacturing industries 
have actually decreased in Mexico, including cement, pulp and paper, and base metals 
production.202 For these capital-intensive enterprises, the costs of environmental regulation are 
relatively small in deciding production location as there are far larger costs for relocation. 
Moreover, many capital-intensive and pollution-heavy industries must be physically close to 
their markets, further dis-incentivizing plant relocation. Conversely, lower-polluting 
manufacturing industries have low costs of environmental regulation which are also small 
relative to the gains from low-wage labor.203   
However, since NAFTA, environmental conditions have especially worsened in Mexico 
and there is evidence of NAFTA-inspired environmental degradation in the U.S. and Canada 
                                                          
202 Gallagher 2004: 2. 
203 Cole and Ensign 2005. 
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(Gallagher 2009; Karpilow et. al. 2014). Although the majority of U.S. and Canadian FDI to 
Mexico was not motivated by low environmental standards, there is evidence that many foreign 
firms and domestic firms have not complied with Mexico’s low environmental standards in 
addition to lax enforcement of these standards. In a World Bank survey of over 200 firms in 
Mexico, foreign firms were no more likely than domestic firms to comply with Mexican 
environmental law.204 Rather, Mexico’s poor environment record has been caused by the 
Mexican government’s lack of commitment to environmental protection in the post-NAFTA 
period (Schatan & Carillo 2006). Further, the NAFTA environmental side agreement does not 
have a legally binding dispute mechanism and lacks the authority to confront these problems. 
During NAFTA negotiations, as U.S. public interest groups, environmentalists, and some 
members of Congress began to pressure Mexican officials on Mexico’s environmental record, 
Mexico doubled spending on environmental protection and initiated an industrial environmental 
inspection program. However, immediately after NAFTA took effect and the 1995 Mexican Peso 
Crisis set in, the environmental budget was cut drastically. According to Mexican government 
statistics, since 1994 real spending on environmental protection declined by roughly $200 
million, or 45 percent, and coincidently the number of industrial environmental inspections had 
also decreased by 45 percent over the same period.205 Since NAFTA was enacted, as 
manufacturing and mining FDI have multiplied hazardous and toxic output, government real 
spending on environmental enforcement and inspection have all declined (Schatan & Carillo 
2006).  
                                                          
204 Cited in Gallagher 2004: 3. 
205 Ibid. 
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According to Mexican government statistics, increased pollution costs 10 percent of 
Mexican GDP to clean up which not only surpasses Mexican GDP growth but is not a 
sustainable path to development (Gallagher 2009). Gallagher concludes, “Costly degradation is 
occurring because the proper mechanisms were not put in place to help Mexico manage its 
economic growth in an environmentally sustainable manner” (2004: 3). In sum, while the 
NAFTA did not cause Mexico to become a “pollution haven,” the NAFTA lacks an enforcement 
mechanism for environmental protection while supporting Mexico’s export-led growth model 
that is by no means environmentally sustainable. 
 
V. Feedbacks between the Income and Regulatory Effects of the NAFTA Investment Chapter 
Figure Five illustrates the feedbacks between the income and regulatory effects of 
the NAFTA investment chapter. The regulatory effects curtailed state sovereignty to 
regulate regional MNCs, which established regulatory advantages for MNCS (providing 
the legal underpinning to corporate trade and investment strategy; mitigating social and 
political risks to FDI; institutionalizing market access and deregulations). In turn, the 
NAFTA investor protections had two income effects – they facilitated economies of scale 
for U.S. MNCs but also shifted costs from the private to public sectors.  
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Figure Five: Feedbacks Between Regulatory and Income Effects of the NAFTA Investment 
Agreements
 
 
V.A. Feedback one: U.S. investor protections establish regulatory advantages for U.S. MNCs 
V.A.1. Legal underpinning to corporate strategies 
The NAFTA investment chapter, and its interactions with the other key chapters in the 
NAFTA, provided the legal foundation to U.S. MNCs’ trade and investment strategy. The 
NAFTA investment chapter has substantive interconnections with the other chapters in the 
agreement, notably, intellectual property, services, and tariffs. The NAFTA’s strong intellectual 
property rights chapter allowed U.S. MNCs to offshore production to Mexico while retaining the 
most profitable inputs to the value chain, and it established long and strong patent monopolies, 
both of which guaranteed market outcomes for U.S. MNCs. Simultaneously, the inclusion of 
intellectual property in the definition of ‘investment’ provided U.S. MNCs with additional 
protection of their regional market shares. The financial services and services chapters, which 
incorporated key sections of the investment chapter, provided deregulations that reduced costs of 
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cross-border transactions for regional firms, thereby bolstering regional economies of 
scale. This ‘trade-investment-intellectual property-services nexus’ provides the legal 
underpinning of international supply chains, trade in services, and financial integration.206 
In turn, U.S. MNCs established regional economies of scale that would not only secure 
their market position in North America but would make them globally competitive in 
export markets around the world.  
 
V.A.2. Mitigating political and social risks 
The NAFTA investment chapter enhanced an investment-friendly climate in 
Mexico by mitigating/eliminating regulations that were perceived to be ‘barriers’ or 
restrictions to investment, establishing transparent and predictable rules, and reducing 
political and social risks to multinational investors. The contentious history of investment 
disputes, ranging from gunboat diplomacy to controversial ISDS cases, demonstrates that 
MNCs investing in developing countries are exposed to a variety of social and political 
risks. In U.S.-Mexico relations alone, beginning with the Mexican revolution in the early 
twentieth century, there is a provocative history of Mexican authorities expropriating 
U.S. investments in oil, agriculture, banking, and mining. Beyond expropriation, many 
countries in the global south have histories of nationalist or socialist policies that have 
negatively impacted the value of U.S. investments in those countries, such as requiring 
MNCs to hire domestically, transfer technology, invest in research and development, 
                                                          
206 Deborah K. Elms & Patrick Low (editors), ‘Global Value Chains in a Changing World,’ 
Fung Global Institute (FGI), Nanyang Technological University (NTU) and World Trade 
Organization (WTO) (2013). 
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among others. U.S. MNCs depend upon investment law to mitigate the social and political risks 
of investing and operating in developing countries. 
 
V.A.3. Institutionalizing market access and deregulations 
Beginning with the NAFTA investment chapter, U.S. MNCs began to use investment law 
for regulatory advantages in foreign markets, as opposed to using investor protections only to 
mitigate risks. Regional MNCs explicitly used the NAFTA ISDS to strengthen their market 
position and reduce costs. Several NAFTA ISDS cases demonstrate that as regulatory norms 
evolve in a country, MNCs use ISDS as a political tool to lock-in a favorable regulatory 
environment.  
Governments around the world have increasingly linked the fossil fuel industry to global 
warming and oil spills and regulatory norms have evolved to address these public issues. Yet the 
oil and gas industry has won billions of dollars in successful ISDS cases, thus weakening climate 
change and fossil fuel regulations in those countries, including the NAFTA cases cited above. 
Pharmaceutical MNCs have used ISDS to extend patent monopolies on medicines even though 
many countries have laws recognizing that patent laws evolve over time. In one NAFTA ISDS 
case, U.S. pharmaceutical company Eli Lilly and Company initiated an ISDS suit after Canada 
invalidated Eli Lilly’s monopoly patent rights for an attention deficit hyperactivity disorder 
(ADHD) drug.207 Tobacco has become a local public health issue all over the world as smoking 
has increased cancer rates which has strained state budgets, motivating governments to regulate 
tobacco companies, marketing, and products. In turn, tobacco companies have explicitly used 
                                                          
207 Eli Lilly and Company v. The Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, ICSID Case No. 
UNCT/14/2. 
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ISDS as a deregulatory tool.208 Similarly, international regulatory norms on the free 
movement of capital have been shifting and evolving for at least the last hundred years, 
yet the NAFTA investment chapter cemented a stringent and limiting approach to capital 
controls that domestic lawmakers could not change even if they wanted to.  
For some industries, such as fossil fuels, mining, and tobacco, ISDS is an 
indispensable tool for foreign market access and deregulations in those markets. In so 
doing, ISDS-inspired deregulations shifts costs from the private to public sectors. For 
example, deregulations of the fossil fuel and mining industries shift the costs of their 
carbon-emissions and pollution to local publics. In another example, deregulations of 
tobacco benefits the market share of tobacco MNCs while increasing public health 
expenditures for states.  
 
V.B. Feedback two: U.S. MNCs motivate the content of U.S. investment policy and law 
V.B.1. Conflicts between U.S. MNCs and regulators 
The 2004 U.S. Model BIT revised the 1994 Model BIT, which had replicated the 
NAFTA investment chapter. The central revisions curtailed investor rights in two 
controversial areas, the ‘minimum standard of treatment’ and ‘indirect expropriation’ 
articles. In 2001, the U.S. was a defendant under these two provisions. Methanex, a 
Canadian firm that produces hazardous gas methanol, brought claims against the State of 
California seeking $970 million in damages for a ban on a fuel additive on the grounds 
that California denied Methanex the ‘minimum standard of treatment’ and effectively 
                                                          
208 Philip Morris Asia Limited v. The Commonwealth of Australia, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 
2012-12; See Scott Sinclair, above n 19, at 37. 
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expropriated their investment by diminishing their market share. Although the U.S. had won the 
case, Canada and Mexico had lost cases under the same provisions, and the USTR and State 
Department claimed that in those cases the tribunal panels had adopted too expansive 
interpretations of the two provisions. The governments of NAFTA Parties issued an 
Interpretative Note that tied the legal interpretation of two articles to ‘customary international 
law,’ norms that have been ‘crystallized’ in international law through repeated decisions over 
centuries. The 2004 Model BIT included this Interpretative Note and therefore the U.S. had 
weakened investor protections in its official investment policy, contrary to the interests of U.S. 
MNCs. 
In 2009, during the Obama administration’s review of the 2004 Model BIT, corporate 
lobbyists across economic sectors advocated for a return to the NAFTA model. The Obama 
administration denied this reform and opted to maintain the approach taken in the 2004 Model 
BIT. They reasoned that the 2004 Model BIT had struck the appropriate balance between the 
rights of multinational investors against the rights of state regulators. Therefore, policymakers do 
not always favor multinational interests. However, the 2004 Model BIT did not prevent tribunals 
from ruling in favor of broad interpretations of the two articles. In fact, the vaguely worded 
articles provided tribunals with the autonomy to interpret the provisions on both a broad and 
narrow basis. In so doing, even though the 2004 Model BIT scaled back investor rights from the 
1994 NAFTA model, it still afforded strong investor protections.  
 
V.B.2. Coherence between U.S. MNCs and regulators 
As the Obama administration reviewed the U.S. Model BIT, U.S. business groups united in their 
position, ‘U.S. investors are at a competitive disadvantage compared to many of their key 
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competitors from countries that already have strong BITs with countries in key growth markets 
such as China, India and Russia.’209 In the context of growing global competition, prominent 
business lobbyist Linda Menghetti explained to Congress, ‘…strong investment protections are 
vital and squarely within America’s economic and national interest.’210 In the same 
Congressional Hearing, Congressman John Larson was just as forthcoming, ‘…for U.S. foreign 
investors in other jurisdictions, we want to obtain greater substantive rights for our investors than 
domestic investors may have in those countries. That is sort of the value of the BIT.’211  
MNCs rely on FDI for global competitiveness, and in turn, their enhanced market 
position allows them to expand domestic investment and employment. As MNCs realize 
larger economies of scale, they become vital sources of jobs, growth, and exports for 
states. In addition, MNCs are the main actors in the import and export of goods, services, 
and capital. For these reasons, among others, Congress is highly sensitive to the trade 
policy needs and concerns of U.S. MNCs. In so doing, U.S. MNCs have the structural 
political power to motivate the content of U.S. trade law and policy. As the Obama 
administration mulled proposals from labor unions and environmental groups to weaken 
investor protections, business lobbyists warned, ‘An approach to [weaken investor rights] 
would reverse decades of U.S. support for strong and binding international rules that 
largely benefit the U.S. and its investors.’212 The 2012 U.S. Model BIT included nearly 
                                                          
209 Inside U.S. Trade, ‘Text: Letter on BIT,’ Inside U.S. Trade, Vol. 28, No. 3, 22 January  
2010. 
210 Testimony before the Subcommittee on Trade of the House of Representatives 
Committee on Ways and Means: Investment Protection in U.S. Trade and Investment 
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212 See Linda Menghetti, above n 77. 
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every proposal from U.S. business lobbies and reject all of the proposals from labor unions, 
environmental groups, and consumer advocacy groups.213 
 
V. Conclusion: clarifying U.S. trade policy positions 
Figure Six: Two Policy Positions in U.S. International Investment Law 
 
Highlighting the feedbacks between the income and regulatory effects of the NAFTA 
investment chapter serves to clarify trade policy positions. U.S. MNCs and sympathetic U.S. 
politicians emphasize that the regulatory effects only affect other countries and facilitate the 
global competitiveness of U.S. MNCs, so they favor strong investor protections. Conversely, 
labor, environmental, public health, consumer advocacy,214 libertarian groups,215 and sympathetic 
politicians argue that strong investor protections undermine shift costs from the private to public 
sector. Therefore, these groups support weaker investor protections. 
                                                          
213 The competing proposals from various stakeholders for the 2012 U.S. Model BIT were 
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The purpose of Obama administration’s revision of the 2004 U.S. Model BIT was to 
ensure that it had the appropriate balance between investors and regulators. In this interagency 
process, politicians favored one of two policy positions - proposals for strong investor 
protections and proposals for weaker investor protections. Politicians that supported strong 
investor protections endorsed the 2004 Model BIT. They dismissed concerns about ISDS 
because the U.S. has not lost a case and therefore ISDS is directed at the U.S.’ trading partners. 
They emphasized the need for economies of scale for MNCs because MNCs create well-paying 
jobs and they are the main actors in the import and export of goods, services, and capital. In so 
doing, the private interests of U.S. MNCs became the public national interest as politicians 
endorsed proposals from U.S. MNCs in the 2012 Model BIT. This was a bipartisan policy 
position because it included the Obama administration, the ‘New Democrat’ coalition in 
Congress, and the majority of Congressional Republicans. 
Conversely, politicians that advocated reform in the 2012 Model BIT sought to 
weaken investor protections. These politicians represented stakeholder groups from 
across the political spectrum, including, libertarian organizations, labor unions, 
environmental groups, and consumer advocacy groups. They asserted that ISDS 
undermined the U.S. Constitution and democratic processes domestically and abroad. 
MNCs had used ISDS to challenge a range of public values, such as climate change and 
public health legislation and financial regulations. Many of these stakeholder groups 
sought to reverse trends that have shifted costs from the private to public sectors, which is 
against the interests of U.S. MNCS. Thea Lee, Policy Director of the AFL-CIO, pleaded 
during a Congressional hearing, ‘…it is important that we clarify that the interests of the 
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U.S. are not entirely synonymous with the interests of U.S. multinational corporations.’216 
Proposals to weaken investor protections were advanced by the majority of 
Congressional Democrats, a handful of libertarian Republicans, and bipartisan groups at 
every level of state government. 
  
                                                          
216 Testimony before the Subcommittee on Trade of the House of Representatives Committee on 
Ways and Means: Investment Protection in U.S. Trade and Investment Agreements. One 
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Chapter Five: Negotiating the TPP Investment and Financial Services Chapters 
I. Introduction 
II. U.S. trade policy in the TPP 
III. TPP negotiations in investment (Chapter 9) and financial services (Chapter 11)  
IV. The “double movement” and the TPP investment and financial services chapters 
  
“In our era, the economic and security realms are absolutely integrated.” 
 -U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, 2015, describing the national security significance of the 
TPP to a room full of analysts and policymakers at an Atlantic Council event  
 
“…it is important that we clarify that the interests of the U.S. are not entirely synonymous with 
the interests of U.S. multinational corporations.”  
- Thea Lee, AFL-CIO Policy Director, 2009, during a Senate Hearing imploring for substantive 
reforms to U.S. negotiating positions in trade and investment agreements including the TPP 
 
I. Introduction 
In a departure from past U.S. trade policy, the Obama administration’s annual policy 
reports did not address the U.S. trade deficit. Rather, the USTR’s stated objective is to increase 
exports and jobs, which has been the official purpose of the TPP since its inception. However, 
domestic and international political actors disagreed with the USTR on how to use the TPP to 
achieve that goal, which entered the domestic and international TPP negotiations with varying 
degrees of success. In process tracing of the investment negotiations, my dependent variables are 
the TPP investment and financial services chapters, and my independent variables are the USTR, 
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domestic political actors, and other country negotiating teams. While the “free trade” actors in 
the U.S., the USTR and U.S. MNCs, were politically insulated from competing domestic interest 
groups to write the TPP, “socialist” and “nationalist” political actors ultimately defeated the TPP 
in the U.S., dealing a significant setback to the “free traders.” 
 
II. U.S. Trade Policy in the TPP 
II.A. Origins of the TPP 
Way station to the FTAAP? 
Although the TPP has an open accession clause for future members, TPP negotiators only 
sought to include other members of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).217 The 
story of the TPP began with the APEC. The first APEC ministerial meeting was called by 
Australian Prime Minister Hawke in 1989, and it included trade ministers from 12 Pacific Rim 
countries.218 The stimulus for the meeting was a common recognition of “increasing 
interdependence” across the Asia Pacific, and the founding purpose of APEC was not to 
establish a trade negotiating forum but a political institution to promote trade and investment in 
the region.219 Moreover, the leaders agreed that it was “desirable” to expand APEC’s 
                                                          
217 Unites States Trade Representative, Press Release, June, 2010, “TPP question and answer: 
Colombia and TPP” 
218 Ministers from Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, 
Malaysia, New Zealand, The Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and the United States gathered in 
Canberra, Australia on 6-7 November, 1989. 
219 APEC, “First Ministerial Meeting (Canberra, Australia, Nov 6–7, 1989) Chairman's Summary 
Statement,” 1989. The original objectives of APEC were to deepen trans-Pacific integration by 
strengthening the multilateral trading system and providing a forum for consultations and 
voluntary cooperation and liberalization. 
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membership, in particular by including the “Three Chinas” (PRC, Hong Kong, Taiwan) which 
were “essential” to the region.220 
In 1993, immediately after President Clinton signed the NAFTA, the U.S. hosted the first 
heads of state meeting of APEC, which included an expanded membership of 17 countries221 
including the “Three Chinas.” In Congressional testimonies, officials from the Clinton 
administration explained that the Asia Pacific was the fastest growing region in the world, 
“critical” to the future of the U.S., and therefore strengthening APEC was “necessary.” 222 The 
U.S.’ goal was to reduce trade barriers across the Pacific, as the U.S. had large and growing trade 
deficits with East Asia. The following year, APEC leaders adopted the lofty goal of “complete” 
trade and investment liberalization in the entire region by the year 2020. 
Towards the end of regional trade and investment liberalization, in 1997, APEC agreed to 
a formal, voluntary sectoral liberalization program. Only two years later it became evident that 
voluntary liberalization was a “non-starter” and trade ministers would leave the issues to be 
addressed in the new WTO Doha Round (Kim et al 2011). However, the Doha Round was 
essentially dead on arrival due to irreconcilable differences in agriculture and the negotiations 
entirely collapsed by 2006. As the Doha Round faltered, APEC’s Business Advisory Council 
began promoting an APEC-wide FTA as the “only means” that APEC could realize “complete” 
liberalization, called the Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific (FTAAP).223 In the 2006 APEC 
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223 Cited in Bergstein 2007. 
 158 
 
meeting in Vietnam, President Bush urged other APEC members to “seriously consider” 
negotiating the FTAAP and to “further studies on ways and means to promote” the initiative. 
However, the FTAAP faced instant obstacles. In 2007, a U.S. Chamber of Commerce 
spokesperson mulled, 
“Negotiating an FTAAP is a long-term (15-20 year) proposition, and it 
won’t be easy to pull off. On the U.S. side, anti-trade and especially anti-China 
sentiment is an obvious impediment. In Asia, it isn’t certain that China and Japan 
will be willing to negotiate a high standard FTA that includes most, if not all, 
economic sectors.”224 
The TPP was the USTR’s first step towards the FTAAP.225 If the FTAAP was the “Plan 
B” to the failed WTO Doha Round, then the TPP was the “Plan B” to the slug-paced FTAAP. 
 
TPP Begins 
The TPP grew out of a much smaller FTA originally called the Trans-Pacific Strategic 
Economic Partnership Agreement, which began on the sidelines of an APEC meeting in 2002 
between Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore.226 The goal was to create a “high standard” trade 
agreement “which would have the potential to grow into a larger strategic agreement” within 
APEC, and the agreement had an open accession clause for future members.227 The legal 
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language of this FTA was based on the U.S.’ FTAs with Singapore and Chile so as to harmonize 
trade law and minimize difficulty for MNCs.228 Since it was based on U.S. FTAs it was a 
“compressive, high standard” agreement that went well beyond WTO commitments, which 
contrasted the numerous, “low standard” Asian FTAs that focus mainly on tariff reductions. 
Brunei joined later in the negotiations and the agreement was signed in 2005 except for the 
investment and financial services chapters, in which negotiations were contentious and were left 
for future conclusion (Elms 2015: 2). With the WTO Doha Round deadlocked and with the 
FTAAP a distant prospect, the USTR announced that it would join the investment and financial 
services negotiations of the small FTA.229 The U.S.’ original motivation was to “…further 
regional economic integration with like-minded countries committed to high-standard [trade] 
agreements.”230 Immediately after the USTR’s announcement, Australia, Peru and Vietnam also 
joined the talks and the name of the agreement was shortened to the Trans-Pacific Partnership. 
 
II.B. Trade Policy Contexts 
II.B.1. Rule-making in a global economy 
Aftermath of the Doha Round 
As the WTO Doha Round faltered, WTO Director-General, Pascal Lamy, mulled over 
the state of the global trading system in a speech in Australia in 2012.231 He reasoned, “This is no 
longer the world of the twentieth century dominated by the U.S. pillar on one side and the 
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European pillar on the other.”232 Rather, he observed, the twenty-first century is a “multipolar 
world” in which major developing countries “are no longer policy takers.”233 The major 
developing countries, notably China, created new supply and demand pulls and had been able to 
translate their rapid economic growth into increasing geopolitical leverage in a range of 
international institutions. The Obama administrations trade policy was in large measure a 
confrontation with the opportunities and challenges associated with the rise of major developing 
economies, especially China. With the aim of revitalizing the Doha Round, the Obama 
administration pursued other major deals concurrent to the TPP.234 
In 2008, the U.S. and China began dialogue for a BIT, as U.S. business lobbies coveted 
investment opportunities in China, valuing it as a $250 billion dollar market (USCBC 2012). 
USTR Kirk commented on the U.S.-China BIT, “We firmly believe that China can contribute 
even more to global prosperity, if it opens its market with the same dedication that has 
characterized its pursuit of entry into other countries’ markets over the past decade.”235 In late 
2011, the U.S. and the EU committed to reignite dialogue on investment policy that ended in 
2008, largely to address China’s unprecedented rise to become a capital exporter and to craft a 
set of rules “to deal with the expected increase in [FDI] from China.”236 By 2013, this dialogue 
had expanded into negotiations for the U.S.-EU FTA (Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
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Partnership, T-TIP), underscoring the USTR’s wrenching concern about creating trade and 
investment rules that address China’s competitive challenges to U.S. industries. A spokesman 
from the Transatlantic Business Coalition implored Congress, 
“If…[the USTR and EU]…can agree on common standards, these will 
become global standards for our products around the world rather than China’s. 
This will give us an enormous competitive advantage. The biggest potential 
benefit of T-TIP is, therefore, in the area of regulation.”237 
 
Declining U.S. market shares in East Asia 
East Asia has been home to the world’s fastest growing markets, and not only in China. 
According to the U.S.-ASEAN Business Council, while the ten ASEAN countries may be small 
markets, cumulatively, the ASEAN region would be a market size comparable to China or 
India.238 However, despite the importance of East Asian markets to the U.S., the U.S. was 
experiencing declining trade and market shares throughout the region, which made the USTR 
increasingly uneasy. Initially inspired by the Asian financial crisis (1997), East Asian countries 
pursued FTAs intra-regionally and then extra-regionally, although not with the U.S. In 2000, 
there were 3 Asian FTAs, by 2011 there were more than 50 with 80 more under negotiation.239 
China was the principle actor in regional FTAs by initiating or being invited to nearly all the 
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agreements. China rose to become a global leader in world trade by importing parts and 
components from the ASEAN countries for final assembly into finished goods for export to the 
U.S. and EU. China piloted two mega-regional FTAs that were centered on the ASEAN, the first 
was the “ASEAN plus three” proposal (ASEAN plus China, Japan, and Korea), however, those 
negotiations stalled due to differences between China and Japan. In response, talks moved 
forward for the “ASEAN plus six” agreement (ASEAN plus China, Japan, Korea, India, 
Australia, New Zealand) which eventually materialized into the Regional Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership (RCEP) with formal negotiations beginning in 2012. Although East Asia 
has been dependent upon exporting to the U.S. market, the U.S. was not invited to any regional 
FTAs, except for bilateral FTAs with Australia, Singapore, and (more recently) Korea.  
Simultaneously, many East Asian countries signed FTAs with U.S. competitors, 
including the EU. The consequences were detrimental to the U.S. – the U.S. share of total 
regional trade in East Asia was eroding while there were rising shares of intra-regional trade and 
extra-regional trade with U.S. competitors.240 U.S. policymakers and business analysts were 
becoming increasingly anxious “solely from the static discriminatory effects” of ASEAN-centric 
integration.241 Apart from trade, nearly all East Asian countries maintained highly protective 
investment regimes, especially in service sectors. In addition, many expanding domestic markets 
were uncompetitive for U.S. companies seeking to invest there because of the monopolies of 
state-owned enterprises.242 Speaking to the Council on Foreign Relations, USTR Froman 
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presented the dilemma, “Washington must make a decision: either lead on global trade or be left 
on the sidelines. There really is no choice.”243 
 
ASEAN is the “fulcrum” of East Asian integration 
In 2009, the new Obama administration cancelled their involvement in all TPP 
negotiations for the year to allow for an interagency review of trade policy. The Singapore 
Minister of Trade and Industry responded that East Asian integration would continue without the 
U.S.244 He explained that negotiations were moving forward for the “ASEAN plus three” and the 
“ASEAN plus six” and that if TPP talks continue to delay then the “ASEAN plus” model would 
be the building block toward the FTAAP.245 In contrast, USTR Kirk argued that in 2008, as the 
U.S. joined the TPP the other bigger economies of APEC began to “rethink their approach to 
FTAAP,” with the TPP as a building block rather than the “ASEAN plus” model.246 As the 
“ASEAN plus six” institutionalized into the RCEP, the U.S.-led TPP and the China-led RCEP 
became competing visions of trade and investment rules for East Asia. President Obama 
summarized the U.S. perspective, “If we do not help to shape the rules so that our businesses and 
our workers can compete in those markets, then China will set up rules that advantage Chinese 
workers and Chinese businesses.”247 
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Secretary of State Clinton explicitly identified the ASEAN as the “fulcrum” for East 
Asia’s emerging economic architecture.248 Obama used trips and speeches to urge ASEAN 
countries to join the TPP while the USTR and U.S. business community established “Trade and 
Investment Framework Agreements” with ASEAN countries to facilitate and encourage their 
entrance into the TPP.249 Malaysia joined the TPP in spring, 2010, and became the fourth 
ASEAN member in the TPP, alongside Brunei, Singapore, and Vietnam. However, policymakers 
understood that any U.S. trade and investment agreements in the region, including the TPP, 
would require overcoming fierce domestic political and social resistance. 
 
II.B.2. Domestic Political Context 
Negotiating without Congressional negotiating objectives  
In 2011 the Obama administration introduced legislation to Congress to implement three 
FTAs negotiated by the Bush administration with South Korea, Panama, and Colombia. The 
official U.S. ITC study on the three FTAs found that they would increase the U.S. trade deficit 
and the ensuing Congressional battle over the passage of the agreements demonstrated waning 
popular support for trade and deep divisions in Congress over the issues. The agreements would 
narrowly pass Congress, which had a Republican majority at the time, however, about two-thirds 
of all House Democrats and a growing minority of Republicans voted against the FTAs.250 As 
trade politics raised hostilities in Congress, the USTR planned to not pursue Trade Promotion 
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Authority (TPA, formerly called “fast-track” authority) until the later stages of the TPP 
negotiations.251 Since TPA is the means that Congress provides negotiating objectives to the 
USTR, Congress was sharply divided and many frequently appealed to the administration for 
TPA legislation. Ranking Sen. Hatch was a particularly outspoken critic of the administration,  
“…TPA is not something the President asks for after an agreement is 
negotiated. TPA establishes the foundation upon which trade agreement 
negotiations and meaningful consultation take place…Federal Register notices 
and staff-level meetings are not a substitute for TPA. Moreover, many of the 
elements of the current TPP negotiation do not reflect congressional 
directives.”252 
USTR Kirk and Ranking House Rep. Levin responded that the USTR did not need 
negotiating objectives from Congress if Congress and stakeholders would be consulted and 
engaged in developing the negotiating objectives.253  
 
“Stakeholder engagement” replaces Congressionally mandated negotiating objectives  
The USTR embarked on an unprecedented campaign to engage with a broad range of 
stakeholders throughout the country via briefings, advisory meetings, comments in federal 
register notices, and face-to-face stakeholder events. Beginning in the sixth round in Singapore, 
negotiators began to schedule stakeholder meetings parallel to negotiating rounds, formalizing 
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the stakeholder outreach program.254 At the meetings, registered stakeholders had an opportunity 
to make presentations to officials during negotiating rounds and some delegations met privately 
with negotiators. However, stakeholders and Congress members became increasingly frustrated 
with the USTR’s engagement and stakeholder efforts because the USTR would not divulge its 
specific negotiating objectives or strategies in a range of key issues.  
The USTR responded that at the beginning of negotiations the TPP members had signed a 
confidentiality agreement, “The understanding calls for each government to disseminate its 
negotiating proposals, as well as those it receives from its TPP partners, solely to government 
officials and individuals who are part of the government’s domestic trade advisory process.”255 
Throughout the negotiations, Congress members and stakeholders frequently called upon the 
USTR for greater quantity and quality of consultations, higher levels of transparency, access to 
draft texts and the development of negotiating positions, and Congress members repeatedly 
introduced (unsuccessful) legislation demanding access to these materials.  Concurrently, more 
than 600 representatives from U.S. MNCs were named official U.S. trade advisors with access to 
the texts and talks.256 Through leaks from the negotiations, a broad range of Congress members 
and stakeholders discovered that their proposals were “virtually ignored” by the USTR, further 
straining the creditability of stakeholder outreach as a viable replacement to TPA. As 
negotiations progressed, the USTR shortened the length of stakeholder meetings and in 2013 
they discontinued stakeholder meetings altogether as negotiators stopped holding formal 
                                                          
254  Elms 2015: 13. 
255 “Fact Sheet: Transparency and the Trans-Pacific Partnership,” Office of the United States 
Trade Representative, Press Release, June, 2012. 
256 “Trans-Pacific Trade Talks in Malaysia Underscore Secrecy of Negotiations, Problems With 
Potential Deal,” Dec. 7, 2011, Statement of Lori Wallach, Director, Public Citizen’s Global 
Trade Watch 
 167 
 
negotiating rounds and instead referred to meetings as “check-in sessions” (Elms 2015). Later, as 
negotiations began to face conclusion, the Obama administration sought TPA from Congress.257 
There is no evidence that the TPA process or legislation influenced the USTR’s negotiating 
objectives in the investment and financial services chapters. The process of the USTR’s 
development of negotiating objectives and an account of the passage TPA is presented in Annex 
Five. 
 
II.C. U.S. Objectives in TPP 
As mandated by TPA, the U.S. ITC had to model and report the potential effects of the 
TPP before Congress votes to implement it as law. The report was released in May, 2016 and it 
projected that in the U.S. the TPP would have trivial income effects although mostly net gains, 
“By year 2047, U.S. real GDP would expand by $67 billion, or by 0.18 percent.”258 The TPP had 
never been primarily about realizing “gains from trade,” rather, its purpose reflects a set of 
broader political and economic objectives. The Obama administration negotiated the TPP 
without Congressional mandate and then pushed it through a hostile Congress because the TPP is 
part of their comprehensive strategy for trade and security in Asia, and their objectives in the 
TPP reflect a combination of industrial strategy, trade strategy, and foreign policy.  
Table 9: Synthesis of U.S. Objectives in the TPP 
Industrial Strategy Trade Strategy Foreign Policy 
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 Expand U.S. exports and 
support jobs while 
countering exclusive, 
Asian regionalism  
 Competitive 
liberalization: expand 
TPP membership; 
encourage liberalization 
in China; leverage WTO 
outcomes   
 Use TPP to realize 
FTAAP; revitalize the 
WTO Doha Round  
 Establish norms in trade- 
and investment-related 
transnational governance  
 Strengthen partnerships 
with other countries 
 Spur broad-based 
economic development 
 Compliment and support 
the “Asia pivot” military 
and security strategy 
 Establish mechanisms for 
cooperation and resolving 
frictions 
 Demonstrate that the U.S. 
is a Pacific power 
committed to the region 
TPP as U.S. industrial strategy 
The Bush administration joined the TPP because they were seeking to increase trade and 
investment links with the world’s fastest growing regions in Asia so as to expand U.S. exports 
and support jobs. Then the 2008 global financial crisis led to an unprecedented “jobless 
recovery” and the Obama administration made job creation a top priority.259 U.S. policymakers 
and their advisors argued that 95 percent of the U.S.’ potential customers were abroad, and 
therefore, exports would be central to the country’s economic recovery.260 To the end of 
increasing exports, the USTR uses FTAs to establish technical regulations and market access 
rules that support the global competitiveness of U.S. industries (U.S. MNCs). The objectives of 
the TPP are an industrial strategy inasmuch as the TPP will (1) establish a legal foundation to 
trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific that advantages U.S. commercial interests, and (2) will 
expand TPP membership to as much of APEC as possible, or at least stimulate new Asian trade 
and investment negotiations with the U.S., including the U.S.-China BIT.  
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The first component of the U.S. industrial strategy in the TPP is to establish “WTO-plus” 
standards in the Asia-Pacific, which function to support and facilitate U.S.-led industries (U.S. 
MNCs) that are capital-intensive and/or rely upon high intellectual property content economic 
activities. “WTO-plus” agreements are FTAs that go beyond WTO commitments; the TPP goes 
beyond the scope of past U.S. FTAs by incorporating new “twenty-first century” issues, 
especially vis-à-vis pan-Pacific trade and investment. The TPP sets precedent for the most 
relevant “twenty-first century” issues, including, a range of new intellectual property areas, 
regulations on state-owned enterprises, digital economy rules, and enforceable labor and 
environmental standards.261 The USTR integrated these new issues into the existing U.S. FTA 
template so as to support the competitiveness of U.S. MNCs in the Asia-Pacific. In fact, 
according to Deputy USTR Marantis, the USTR developed many of the TPP’s new regulations 
on state-owned enterprises and intellectual property for future negotiations with China262 (which 
is also true for sections of the investment and financial services chapters). Simultaneously, 
establishing FTAs with the Asia-Pacific will serve to boost U.S. trade shares in the region during 
a time of declining U.S. trade shares and increasing Asian regionalism. 
The second component of the U.S. industrial strategy in the TPP is the U.S. trade strategy 
of “competitive liberalization,” in which U.S. trade policymakers use regional FTAs with 
developing countries to encourage third party developing countries to adopt and/or negotiate 
market-oriented policies so as to compete for U.S. capital and import markets. Most 
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significantly, “competitive liberalization” can leverage outcomes in WTO negotiations, which is 
timely considering the stalemate of the Doha Round. In the TPP, the U.S. “competitive 
liberalization” strategy is to encourage other APEC members to either join the TPP or negotiate 
the FTAAP so as to compete for transnational capital and import markets. With respect to China, 
U.S. negotiators aimed to use the TPP to encourage domestic reforms in China in the direction of 
TPP obligations.263  
 
The TPP as U.S. trade strategy 
While working to win support for TPA, USTR Froman detailed the Obama 
administration’s trade strategy in his talk “The Strategic Logic of Trade” at the Council on 
Foreign Relations in June, 2016. The main goal of the Obama administration’s trade strategy was 
to revitalize the WTO Doha Round, and to this end they had three objectives – (1) “establishing 
and enforcing the rules of the road,” (2) “strengthening U.S. partnerships with other countries,” 
and (3) “spurring broad-based economic development.”264 The trade strategy of “establishing the 
rules of the road” is in large measure addressing China’s competitive challenges in a range of 
multilateral forums. From the perspective of the USTR, the TPP is the vehicle by which the U.S. 
could establish its role in the emerging “economic architecture” of the Asia-Pacific that would 
otherwise be dominated by China.265 To that end, the TPP establishes a far-reaching set of trade- 
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related and investment-related regulations that reflect U.S. “values and interests” (discussed in 
Chapter 1, Section II.C.).  
USTR Froman explained that the TPP will strengthen U.S. partnerships with countries in 
Asia in the context of mounting military and security challenges in the region. He reasoned, “For 
many of the countries that would be party to the TPP, the economic benefits of the agreement are 
sweetened by the expectations that the U.S. will become more deeply embedded in the 
region.”266 That is, increasing U.S. commercials ties with Asia strengthens U.S. political 
partnerships in Asia which is especially important given recent security developments in the 
region. Lastly, according to USTR Froman, the TPP strives for broad-based, inclusive economic 
growth and development to both grow markets for U.S. exports and promote political and social 
stability.267 And above all, the USTR planned to use the TPP as a pathway to opening 
negotiations for an FTAAP with an ultimate goal of revitalizing the WTO Doha Round. 
 
TPP as U.S. foreign policy 
Beginning in 2011, the Obama administration folded the TPP into their broader “Asia 
pivot”268 strategy, which is a diplomatic and security strategy in the Asia-Pacific. Beginning with 
President Obama’s original announcement of the Asia pivot strategy in 2011269 through its later 
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formulations,270 the Asia pivot has three motivations, to advance (1) security, (2) prosperity, and 
(3) democracy in the Asia-Pacific. The security component271 of the Asia pivot is to address the 
range of military and security challenges in the Asia-Pacific, including, escalating military 
tensions between the U.S. and China in the South China Sea, North Korea’s nuclear 
proliferation, cyber-security, counter-terrorism, among others. As the U.S. developed the Asia 
pivot objectives and implemented the strategy, the TPP co-evolved to become the “prosperity” 
component, or the vehicle to advance the economic and social objectives of the strategy. 
Officials from the Obama administration have consistently described the TPP and the Asia pivot 
as mutually reinforcing. From the military perspective, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel 
commented on the relationship between TPP and the Asia pivot, “Security is a critical foundation 
of prosperity. Trade cannot flourish in waters that are contested by force.”272 From the trade 
perspective, USTR Froman offered, “At a time when there are unresolved territorial and 
maritime disputes, TPP can reinforce our presence in the region and our interest in establishing 
methods of cooperation and mechanisms for resolving frictions.”273 To that end, the international 
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governance regulations and dispute resolution mechanisms contained in the TPP will serve to 
strengthen the multilateral goals of the Asia pivot. 
 
U.S. negotiating objectives in the TPP investment and financial services chapters 
Since the development of the U.S. BIT program in the Cold War, the U.S. had well 
developed negotiating objectives for investment and financial services agreements, broadly, to 
facilitate and protect the free flow of private capital balanced against the need for public purpose 
regulations. Since there is a high degree of consistency between the NAFTA and the TPP 
investment and financial services chapters, the U.S.’ negotiating objectives in the NAFTA 
chapters largely apply to the TPP chapters (Chapter 2, Section II.B. and II.C.). These negotiating 
objectives advance the overall TPP objectives by promoting intra-TPP commerce, enhancing 
U.S. commercial ties and partnerships in the region, and providing essential infrastructure to an 
increasingly digital global economy. 
 
III.A. 2010: TPP negotiations formally begin while Congress attempts to pressure the USTR 
The USTR joined the TPP talks in the twilight of the Bush administration and with the 
uncertainties of incoming President-elect Obama as he had made campaign promises for trade 
policy reform. In 2009, the new Obama administration suspended all trade negotiations to 
conduct an interagency review of trade and investment policy. The President avoided making 
any formal commitments to the TPP throughout the year, largely because the new administration 
was concerned that none of the larger Asian countries were members of the TPP. In October, 
Secretary of State Clinton encouraged Japan’s membership in the TPP during a meeting with her 
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Japanese counterpart.274 Japan was holding domestic, “high-level consultations” to which the 
Obama administration responded with “substantial gratification.”275 They agreed to begin 
bilateral consultations during Japan’s internal review process, in which the USTR reaffirmed that 
Japan had to be willing to put all sectors on the negotiating table, including very politically 
sensitive agricultural industries.276 During the President’s trip to Japan in early November, 2009, 
he officially announced that the U.S. will join the TPP with its current the seven members (Japan 
would join in 2012) and then expand to more countries. TPP negotiations formally began in 2010 
and there were four negotiating rounds that year. Malaysia expressed interest in joining in the fall 
and the TPP members unanimously approved. Deputy USTR Marantis explained the U.S. 
approach to new members, “We will consider and welcome new negotiating partners based on 
their readiness and ability to bring commercial value, balance, and ambition to the 
negotiations.”277 Also in 2010, Canada and Mexico informally communicated interest in 
membership.  
 
III.A.1. 2010 Investment and financial services negotiations 
There is little public information about the three negotiating rounds in 2008 between the 
U.S., New Zealand, Singapore, Chile, and Brunei. However, according to trade policy advisors, 
the investment chapter was negotiated from the 2004 U.S. Model BIT and the financial services 
chapter was based on the same chapter from the U.S.-Korea FTA signed in 2007, which is 
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confirmed by the high degree of consistency between the financial services chapters of the TPP 
and the U.S.-Korea FTA. In February 2009, the Obama administration announced that they 
would “review the implementation of our FTAs and BITs to ensure that they advance the public 
interest.”278 During this interagency review process the U.S. suspended trade and investment 
negotiations, including the TPP and the U.S-China BIT (which also began in 2008). In spring, 
2009, the USTR and the Department of State co-led a review of the 2004 Model BIT, which 
would determine U.S. negotiating positions in the TPP. 
The purpose of the review of the 2004 Model BIT was two-fold, first, it was to ensure 
that U.S. trade and investment policy struck the right “balance” between advancing U.S. 
commercial interests abroad while ensuring necessary regulatory space domestically, and second, 
it was to update the 2004 Model BIT with new issues especially vis-a-vis trade and investment 
with Asia.279 The Obama administration’s new Model BIT (2012) would serve as the basis for 
negotiations in both the TPP and the U.S.-China BIT. Therefore, the positions that the U.S. 
assumed in the TPP investment and financial services negotiations were also developed as 
negotiating positions for the vitally important U.S.-China BIT, which helps to explain the U.S.’ 
policy orientation in the TPP. 
 
Table 10: TPP 2010 negotiations formally begin while Congress attempts to pressure the USTR 
Negotiating 
issues in 
investment 
and 
financial 
services 
 
Domestic interactions with the USTR 
 
TPP negotiators 
Labor unions, 
NGOs, civil 
society 
organizations 
Business 
lobbies, private 
sector trade 
policy advisors 
 
Congress 
P-4 (Chile, 
Brunei, 
New 
Australia, 
Peru, 
Vietnam, 
Malaysia 
Mexico, 
Canada, 
Japan 
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Zealand, 
Singapore) 
(not yet 
members) 
Investor 
rights and 
investor-
state 
dispute 
settlement 
(ISDS) 
Scale back 
investor rights 
to support 
public purpose 
regulations; 
broad 
exceptions for 
labor and 
environmental 
regulations; 
reform/eliminate 
ISDS 
Investor rights 
must be as 
strong or 
stronger than 
competitors’ 
BIT; any 
exceptions are 
disadvantageous 
to the U.S.; 
ISDS is a 
priority 
Democrat-
controlled 
Congress 
pressures 
USTR for 
reforms 
reflecting 
the 
concerns/ 
interests 
of unions 
and public 
interest 
groups; 
others 
advocate 
little 
change to 
trade 
policy to 
support 
jobs 
New Zealand and 
Australia demand 
exclusion from ISDS 
 
Canada 
expresses 
interest in 
joining 
TPP; 
Japan 
holds 
internal 
review 
about 
joining 
TPP 
Financial 
regulations 
and capital 
controls 
TPP needs to 
ensure policy 
space to regulate 
during financial 
crisis 
Weakening 
existing 
investor 
protections is 
bad for U.S. 
economy 
Not available 
 
III.A.2. Investor rights and investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) 
Investor rights 
In 2009, the State Department established a Subcommittee to make recommendations for 
a new Model BIT. The Subcommittee was co-chaired by Alan Larson, Senior Advisor at 
Covington & Burling and also the former undersecretary at the State Department, and Thea Lee, 
AFL-CIO Policy Director. The Subcommittee fiercely debated in four main areas of the Model 
BIT and these conflicts quickly entered TPP policy discussions, including: (1) investor rights and 
investor-state dispute settlement, (2) investment-related labor and environmental concerns, (3) 
regulations addressing state-owned enterprises, and (4) capital controls and financial 
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regulations.280 Broadly, Subcommittee members representing the private sector argued for either 
no changes to the 2004 Model BIT or a strengthening of investor rights and ISDS to support U.S. 
firms, employment, and national interests; they were opposed by dissenting Subcommittee 
members who argued for substantive reforms to investor rights and ISDS to provide for greater 
policy space for public purpose regulations, including, labor, environmental, and consumer 
protections. The Subcommittee’s final report contained little consensus, conflicting 
recommendations, and multiple dissenting views, and the final report was submitted to Secretary 
of State Clinton in October, 2009.281 
The Obama administration had planned to conclude the review of the Model BIT by the 
end of 2009 but it would not be officially concluded until 2012. However, by January, 2010, 
interagency discussions between the State Department and the USTR had “largely been 
completed,” although there remained “significant areas” of dispute.282 The most problematic 
complication to the conclusion of the review of the new Model BIT was that in 2009 the 
Democrats had assumed majority control of both the House and the Senate for the first time since 
1995. Democrats had been far more responsive to the critics of U.S. trade and investment policy 
and they were demanding that the Obama administration make substantive changes to investor 
rights and ISDS in the Model BIT. In summer of 2009, House Democrats introduced a bill283 to 
provide guidance to the Obama administrations’ trade and investment policy review and it 
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contain the same or similar amendments that were presented by the dissenting members of the 
Subcommittee review. Although the bill was ultimately unsuccessful, it had the support of the 
majority of House Democrats including nine committee chairs and a handful of House 
Republicans.284 Consequently, by November, 2010, the Obama administration decided to wait 
until after mid-term elections to further consultations over the BIT with a new, incoming 
Congress.285 
The 2010 conflicts over the content of the Model BIT were readily imported into 
domestic TPP discussions. When the Obama administration committed to the TPP, House 
Democrats warned that the White House would need to make reforms to trade and investment 
policy to ultimately win their support for the TPP. House Democrats explained in a letter to the 
President,  
“For these negotiations to yield an agreement that could enjoy broad 
support, it will be critical that you work in cooperation with congressional trade 
reform advocates to transform the Bush TPP initiative into an opportunity to 
develop a new forward-looking American trade agreement model.”286  
Among specific reforms, the House Trade Working group in Congress demanded the 
exclusion of ISDS from the TPP,287 and House Democrats were bolstered by support from labor 
unions and public interest groups. In January, 2010, the AFL-CIO submitted written 
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comments288 on the TPP to the Obama administration, calling for reforms to investment and 
financial services policy, while environmental groups urged for a significant reduction to the 
scope of ISDS or to replace it with a state-to-state dispute mechanism.289 In response, the U.S. 
Business Coalition for the TPP urged that the USTR and the other TPP negotiating partners 
agree to a “standstill” in which negotiators would not adopt new trade or investment restrictions 
that would limit, weaken, or provide exceptions to an investor rights and investment market 
access.290 They argued that any such provisions would “undermine the ability of the TPP to serve 
as a new model for trade expansion to support global economic recovery and will constrain any 
final agreement’s ability to benefit our nation’s farmers, industries, workers and consumers.”291  
 
Investor-state dispute settlement 
U.S. business interests in the TPP quickly found resistance not just from domestic 
coalitions but from groups abroad and other negotiating teams. As TPP negotiating progressed in 
2010, Australia and New Zealand negotiators demanded their exclusion from ISDS.292 ISDS was 
excluded from the Australia-U.S. FTA due to adamant objections from Australia while the U.S. 
business community had a certain comfort level with the strength of Australia’s judicial 
system.293 Publicly, the Australian government announced “severe reservations” about ISDS in 
                                                          
288 “AFL Urges USTR to Use TPP Agreement to Establish New Trade Template”, Inside U.S. 
Trade, Vol. 28, No. 4, January 29, 2010. 
289 “U.S. Environmental Groups Urge Inclusion of Lacey Act Language in TPP”, Inside U.S. 
Trade, Vol. 28, No. 22, June 4, 2010. 
290 “Letter to USTR Kirk from the U.S. Business Coalition for TPP,” June 14, 2010 
291 Ibid. 
292 “Australian, New Zealand Groups Demand Exclusion of Investor-State From TPP,” Inside 
U.S. Trade, Vol. 28, No. 48, December 10, 2010. 
293 Testimony of Robert Stumberg, Hearing before the Committee of Ways and Means, US 
House of Representatives on “Investment Protection in US Trade and Investment Agreements,” 
One Hundred Eleventh Congress, First Session, May 14, 2009. 
 180 
 
the TPP and that it would seek exclusion from ISDS in the TPP.294 In New Zealand, Prime 
Minister John Key stated the inclusion of ISDS in the TPP was “far-fetched” and that his 
government would support Australia's position.295 Australia, New Zealand, and Singapore 
presented their position papers on investment during the fourth round of negotiations in October, 
2010.296 Their negotiating positions were bolstered and motivated by Australian and New 
Zealand labor unions and advocacy groups that had launched a campaign calling on their 
governments to reject certain investment provisions and ISDS. A U.S. business representative 
responded that ISDS would be important for all countries in the TPP due to the existing, 
overlapping FTAs between members that already include ISDS, which would leave some 
investors at a disadvantage. For example, if the U.S. were to exclude Australia from ISDS, U.S. 
investors would be at a disadvantage to Singaporean investors who would be able to access ISDS 
under the Singapore-Australia FTA.297 Moreover, the business representative argued that ISDS 
would be “beneficial” for TPP members because it supports FDI and therefore higher paying 
jobs.  
 
Investment regulations for state-owned enterprises 
While the major U.S. business forums united and focused on their opposition to proposals 
from the critics of trade and investment policy, there was a small dispute over the extent to which 
the U.S. Model BIT should include disciplines on state-owned enterprises, which would also 
affect the content of the TPP investment chapter. A prominent business group, the U.S. Chamber 
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of Commerce, was lobbying the Obama administration to insert more substantive regulations on 
state-owned enterprises into the U.S. Model BIT for negotiations with China. However, The U.S-
China Business Council, which represents many of the same U.S. MNCs, argued against the 
Chamber’s proposal.298 The Chamber advocated for new competition and intellectual property 
regulations that would support the “offensive” interests of U.S. MNCs operating in Asian 
markets dominated by state-owned enterprises, notably China. The Chamber argued that the U.S. 
should assume a tough negotiating stance on the issue as a trade strategy. The U.S.-China 
Business Council contested that new provisions on state-owned enterprises would potentially 
undermine negotiations and the far-reaching effects of the Model BIT far exceed any 
“incremental” benefits of new regulations on state-owned enterprises. On the other hand, as 
China was rapidly becoming a capital-exporter, labor groups were advocating for new language 
regulating foreign state-owned enterprises investing in the U.S. In January, 2010, the AFL-CIO 
submitted to the Administration, “…investment rights can no longer be viewed in the main as a 
package of rights to protect outward bound investment. Any agreement must ensure that State-
owned enterprises are not permitted to gain an unfair advantage when acquiring U.S. assets.”299  
 
Investment-related labor and environmental concerns 
A big obstacle to the conclusion of the review of the U.S. Model BIT was the content of 
the language on labor and environmental protections.300 AFL-CIO Policy Director Thea Lee 
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proposed to Congress that FTAs combine tariff reductions and investment protections which 
removes the costs and risks of FDI thereby facilitating and accelerating the offshoring of jobs, 
“precisely because, for the most part, there has been no commensurate set of [labor and 
environmental] obligations.”301 Lee and her colleagues on the Subcommittee proposed two 
revisions to the Model BIT, (1) establish an enforceable legal obligations for labor and 
environmental protections, and (2) establish broad exceptions to investor rights and ISDS for 
labor and environmental measures.302 These proposals were vehemently denounced by business 
representatives in the Subcommittee who described the proposals as neither feasible nor 
appropriate. Business lobbyist Linda Menghetti pointed to the fact that the “vast majority” of 
outward U.S. FDI is to high-wage countries for the purpose of market access. Menghetti 
supported a statement from Ranking Congressman Brady who emphasized that “about 95 
percent” of the output of U.S. subsidiaries abroad stays outside the U.S. while only “about 5 to 7 
percent” comes back to the U.S., which undermines the claims of labor unions that FDI is mainly 
offshoring.303 Moreover, the U.S. business community fiercely opposed labor and environmental 
exceptions to investor rights, arguing that they “…would allow a government to justify 
discriminatory or otherwise unfair conduct on such grounds will harm U.S. investors, costing 
U.S. jobs and undermining U.S. innovation.”304 They appealed that strengthening investment-
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related labor and environmental protections would grant global competitors new economic 
opportunities and advantages that would not be available to U.S. investors.305 
The debate entered TPP negotiations as the House Trade Working Group urged the 
USTR to go beyond the May 10 agreement in TPP negotiations, including, by establishing strong 
and enforceable provisions linking investment to labor and environmental standards.306 The 
USTR responded to Congress that they were still considering the issue as they developed U.S. 
objectives in the TPP.307 Some USTR officials were concerned that it would be “very difficult” 
to negotiate “far-reaching” labor and environmental standards with low-income developing 
countries participating in the TPP, such as Vietnam or Brunei.308 Indeed, in 2010 bilateral 
consultations with the U.S., Vietnam had sought “greater flexibility” for poor countries in the 
TPP, particularly for labor and environmental standards.309 The U.S. responded that it would not 
favor a “two-tier agreement” with different standards for different countries.310 Throughout 
2010, the USTR refused to make any commitments on the issue in their consultations with 
Congress. 
 
III.A.3. Capital controls and financial regulations 
The 2009 review of the Model BIT was occurring as policymakers were grappling with 
aftermath of the global financial crisis in 2008 and its possible long-term effects. The transfers 
                                                          
305 Ibid. 
306 “House Trade Group Urges USTR To Go Beyond May 10 Deal In TPP Talks,” Inside U.S. 
Trade, Vol. 28, No. 2, January 15, 2010. 
307 Ibid. 
308 Ibid. 
309 “Vietnamese Official: Full TPP Participation Depends On How Talks Unfold,” Inside U.S. 
Trade, Vol. 28, No. 18, May 7, 2010. 
310 Ibid. 
 184 
 
provision of the Model BIT obligates states to allow capital to cross borders “free and without 
delay.” 311 The Subcommittee “conducted extensive discussions” on the free transfers policy and 
debated the merits of including language that would grant governments policy space for “capital 
controls,” an emergency regulation on cross-border flows of capital. Some Subcommittee 
members were concerned that the free transfers policy does not provide developing countries 
with the policy space necessary to confront massive and destabilizing capital inflows and 
outflows before or after a financial crisis.312 Opposing this recommendation, other Subcommittee 
members advocated that the transfer provision not be weakened and that the existing exceptions 
provision313 “already provides extensive flexibility” for governments to address financial 
instability and crisis. The Subcommittee was unable to come to consensus on policy 
recommendations for free transfers and capital controls.  
In TPP negotiations, throughout 2010 all sides of the debate reiterated their positions in 
stakeholder events, public comments, positions papers, letters, and Congressional testimonies.314 
While the Democratic majority in Congress demanded315 that the USTR provide governments 
with broad regulatory power over multinational banks and the cross-border provision of financial 
services, key USTR representatives attended private events in New York City hosted by financial 
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services lobbies concerned about the Obama administration’s trade agenda and the TPP.316 There 
is no evidence that in 2010 the USTR’s policy diverged from the 2004 Model BIT with respect 
to the free movement of capital. 
 
III.A.4. Market access for FDI and financial services FDI 
The market access negotiations, including sectoral exceptions to investment obligations 
called “non-conforming measures,” are less central to the focus of this research project and 
summaries of these talks are in Annex Six. 
 
III.B. 2011: USTR officially supports key business proposals 
Negotiating rounds five through ten took place in 2011. At the 2011 APEC meeting, 
Canada, Japan, Mexico publically expressed interest in joining. Administration officials issued 
three Federal Register notices requesting public comments on the possible inclusion of Japan, 
Canada and Mexico in the TPP talks. TPP investment negotiations were progressing relatively 
slowly compared to the rest of the agreement as the USTR still had not tabled proposals for key 
issues until the fifth round in late February in Chile.317 While the original TPP investment draft 
was based on the 2004 U.S. Model BIT, the Obama administration had been drafting new 
provisions during their on-going review of the Model BIT. 
  
Table 11: TPP 2011 negotiations, USTR officially supports key business proposals 
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Negotiating 
issues in 
investment 
and 
financial 
services 
 
Domestic interactions with the USTR 
 
TPP negotiators 
Labor unions, 
NGOs, civil 
society 
organizations 
Business 
lobbies, 
private sector 
trade policy 
advisors 
Congress P-4 
(Chile, 
Brunei, 
New 
Zealand, 
Singapore
) 
Australia, 
Peru, 
Vietnam, 
Malaysia 
Mexic
o, 
Canad
a, 
Japan 
Investor 
rights and 
investor-
state 
dispute 
settlement 
(ISDS) 
Unsuccessfully 
lobbied for 
disciplines on 
State-owned 
enterprises; 
continues calls 
for investor 
reforms 
Successfully 
lobbied for 
disciplines 
on State-
owned 
enterprises 
and no broad 
exceptions to 
provisions 
Deep 
divisions 
over the 
issues as 
Obama 
administra
tion 
narrowly 
passes 
FTAs with 
South 
Korea, 
Panama, 
Colombia 
U.S.-dominated 
negotiating process 
confines States to 
merely reacting to U.S. 
proposals; Australia 
links refusal of ISDS to 
tobacco company 
targeting public health 
laws, NZ support wanes 
Prepar
ing to 
join 
negoti
ations 
Financial 
regulations 
and capital 
controls 
Unsuccessfully 
lobbied for 
capital 
controls/financ
ial regulations 
Successfully 
lobbied for 
past 
BIT/FTA 
provisions 
Not available 
Market 
access for 
FDI 
Wary of 
offshoring 
Seeking 
highest 
commercial 
value 
Reciprocal 
market 
access is 
necessary 
USTR rejects offers 
from Singapore and 
Vietnam  
 
III.B.1. Investor rights and investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) 
Investment regulations for state-owned enterprises 
From the onset of TPP negotiations, the U.S. had determined that addressing state-owned 
enterprises was a “twenty-first century trade issue” and set aside a separate chapter in the 
agreement for competition policy with state-owned enterprises. Simultaneously, in the 
investment chapter negotiations, the USTR tabled the new disciplines on state-owned enterprises 
that were being drafted for the new Model BIT (which were also prepared for negotiations with 
China). At the February round, the USTR introduced the two new provisions, which was the first 
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time that TPP countries had the opportunity to discuss the new disciplines with the USTR.318 The 
first of the two provisions was a clarification that the TPP investment provisions would apply to 
state-owned enterprises.319 However, the proposal did not completely meet the standards of the 
U.S. business lobbies which had advocated for an expansion of the “fair and equitable treatment” 
provision to address policies that favor domestic companies.320 The USTR chose not to expand 
the “fair and equitable treatment” provision due to its problematic history in opening the U.S. to 
ISDS cases.  
The second new provision concerning state-owned enterprises was a ban on regulations 
requiring the use of particular intellectual property. During the October round in Lima, Peru, the 
USTR press release shared that the investment chapter would include new language to address 
“…the increasingly common problem of ‘indigenous innovation’ measures that disadvantage 
U.S. technology by forcing U.S. investors to favor another country’s domestic technology.”321 
The new provision would ban regulations mandating that investors use domestic technology 
and/or intellectual property, and it would ban regulations that would oblige a company to carry 
out research and development in a host country as a condition for investment in that country.322 It 
would address the growing amount of indigenous innovation policies in the Asia-Pacific that 
function to favor domestic state-owned enterprises by controlling foreign investors’ use of 
intellectual property, thereby disadvantaging U.S. companies. 
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As negotiations progressed in 2011 and the Obama administration further considered TPP 
disciplines on state-owned enterprises they would reject Democrats’ and labor union’s 
investment proposals on state-owned enterprises, including, “affirmative obligations” that 
foreign state-owned enterprises operate “solely of a commercial nature,” a prohibition on state-
owned enterprises that receive loans or financing not available in the marketplace, and an FDI 
screening mechanism.323 The U.S. Treasury Department was concerned that “overly broad” SOE 
language would open up the U.S. to challenges, such as the Treasury’s 2008 bail-out of U.S. 
financial institutions and auto makers.324 Reaction within the business community was mixed but 
many concurred with the Treasury that inserting new disciplines against state-owned enterprises 
could lead to unanticipated and detrimental effects on U.S. companies.325 
 
Investment-related labor and environmental concerns 
The USTR’s focus on drafting separate labor and environmental chapter signifies that by 
2011 the USTR had relegated all labor and environmental concerns to their respective chapters. 
USTR Ambassador Marantis explained to Congress that proposed broad exceptions to investor 
rights for labor and environmental regulations “…would undermine support among the TPP’s 
strongest advocates. And, in the end, I am afraid it could seriously jeopardize congressional 
approval of a final deal.”326 The USTR openly admitted it would have to concede to the business 
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community’s positions in order to get the TPP through Congress. Conversely, a USTR’s 2011 
press release offered, “The investment text will protect the rights of the TPP countries to regulate 
in the public interest.”327 
 
Investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) 
Throughout 2011, Australia continued to hold the line in its rejection of ISDS while New 
Zealand supported the Australian delegation but not to the same extent.328 Australian Prime 
Minister Julia Gillard released a policy document in April, 2011 stating the government would 
discontinue negotiating ISDS and that it opposes measures that would give greater rights to 
foreign firms, or would limit the government’s ability to regulate.329Australia explicitly linked its 
opposition to ISDS to tobacco companies using ISDS to target public health regulations. In early 
2010, U.S. tobacco company Philip Morris had lobbied the USTR to use the TPP to limit 
regulations on tobacco marketing, arguing that Australia’s plain packaging regulations would be 
“tantamount to expropriation” and therefore urged the USTR to pursue ISDS.330 Then in June, 
2011, relying on the Australia-Hong Kong BIT, Philip Morris served the government of 
Australia with a notice of an ISDS claim for “damages [amounting] to billions of dollars.”331 The 
Australian government immediately announced that it would no longer support the inclusion of 
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ISDS in any agreement, citing Philip Morris’ attempts to “limit [Australia’s] capacity to put 
health warnings or plain packaging requirements on tobacco products.”332 
The USTR faced a dilemma – due to a federal law called the Doggett amendment the 
USTR and other federal agencies cannot seek any weakening of tobacco regulations in another 
country.333 U.S. legal experts argued that if the USTR opposed Australia’s cigarette law then it 
would violate the Doggett amendment. As a solution, some members of Congress wrote to 
USTR Kirk to exclude tobacco altogether from the TPP, a proposal that business fiercely 
opposed as undesirable precedent.334 Other members of Congress supported Australia and New 
Zealand’s position, as there is no ISDS in the U.S.-Australia FTA.335 USTR Ambassador 
Marantis favored business interests by contesting to Congressional critics that the U.S. will not 
negotiate any exclusions from ISDS, which would ultimately not be true.336  
 
III.B.2. Capital controls and financial regulation 
As the Obama administration still had not concluded its review of the Model BIT, 
Treasury Secretary Geithner responded to the economist’s concerns about U.S. policy on the free 
movement of capital.337 He acknowledged, “…the experience of the last decades shows that 
large swings in capital flows can create significant policy challenges.” However, Secretary 
                                                          
332 Ibid. 
333 “Sanchez Circulates Letter Urging USTR to Exclude Tobacco from TPP,” Inside U.S. Trade, 
Vol. 29, No. 26, July 1, 2011. 
334 Ibid. 
335 Testimony of USTR Ambassador Marantis in “Hearing on Trans-Pacific Partnership”, 
Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Trade of the Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House 
of Representatives, One Hundred Twelfth Congress, First Session, December 14, 2011. 
336 Ibid. 
337 “Open Letter to Mr. Ricardo Hausmann,” Secretary of the Treasury Timothy Geithner, April 
12, 2011, (available: 
http://www.ase.tufts.edu/gdae/policy_research/Geithner_response_to_capital_controls_letter.pdf) 
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Geithner explained that the Treasury believed that developing countries have “a range of policy 
measures” available to address these challenges and that U.S. FTAs and BITs provide 
policymakers with the policy space to do so. Moreover, he offered that the purpose of the 
“transfers” provision is “…to establish predictable rules to govern trade and investment.”338 By 
the TPP February round in Chile, sources reported that the U.S. proposals had maintained past 
language on transfers and financial services regulations, underscoring that in the Obama 
administration’s support for the business community’s positions.339 Simultaneously, the USTR 
reported that the TPP would “…protect the right of financial regulators to take action to ensure 
the integrity and stability of financial markets, including in the event of a financial crisis.”340 
 
III.C. 2012: TPP membership expands while investment chapter leaked 
Negotiating rounds 11 to 15 were held in 2012 while Mexico and Canada officially 
joined the agreement. By mid2012, the USTR set a dateline for the conclusion of TPP 
negotiations to be October, 2013. In April, 2012, the Obama administration finally concluded is 
overdue review of the Model BIT and released the text. The new 2012 Model BIT contained 
minor revisions to the 2004 Model BIT that generally expanded investor rights, and this reignited 
the conflicts from the 2009 Subcommittee review. In June, a U.S. civil society organization 
published341 a leaked draft of the TPP investment chapter that was scrubbed such that brackets 
revealed areas of disagreement but not the positions of each negotiating team. The June leak 
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exactly reflected the Obama administration’s policy positions in the new 2012 Model BIT. 
However, the leaked draft was heavily bracketed in its core provisions, signifying that the most 
significant sections were still under dispute in negotiations, including the most controversial 
provisions – “indirect expropriation,” ISDS, and “transfers.”  
Table 12: TPP 2012 negotiations, membership expands while investment chapter leaked 
Negotiat
ing 
issues in 
investm
ent and 
financial 
services 
 
Domestic exchanges with the USTR 
 
TPP negotiators 
Labor 
unions, 
NGOs, civil 
society 
organization
s 
Business 
lobbies, 
private sector 
trade policy 
advisors 
Congress P-4 
(Chile, 
Brunei, 
New 
Zealand, 
Singapor
e) 
Australi
a, Peru, 
Vietnam
, 
Malaysi
a 
Mexico, 
Canada, 
Japan 
Investor 
rights 
and 
investor-
state 
dispute 
settleme
nt 
(ISDS) 
Investment 
chapter will 
undermine 
labor and 
environment
al chapters 
No ISDS 
then no TPP; 
import new 
Model BIT 
provisions 
into TPP  
Congress 
remains 
sharply 
divided while 
State 
Legislatures 
side with 
House 
Democrats in 
demanding 
reforms to 
investor 
rights and 
ISDS 
NZ and Peru table 
China’s definition of 
“indirect 
expropriation”; 
Australia continues 
resistance to ISDS 
Canada and 
Mexico 
separately 
intensify 
efforts to 
join, then 
join in 
December; 
Japan 
continues 
domestic 
deliberations 
and bilateral 
consultations 
with U.S. 
Financia
l 
regulatio
ns and 
capital 
controls 
Global 
consensus 
has shifted 
to support 
capital 
controls, 
TPP not 
Changes to 
existing 
language are 
unnecessary 
Language permitting 
capital controls 
supported by all 
countries and only 
opposed by the U.S.  
Market 
access 
for FDI 
Expanding 
ISDS to 
financial 
sector is 
deregulatory 
Deep market 
access and 
ISDS, no 
exceptions  
Vietnam, Malaysia, 
Singapore, Brunei, 
strongly resist U.S. 
market access 
demands 
 
III.C.1. Investor rights and investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) 
“Indirect expropriation” debate 
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The leaked investment chapter revealed a significant divide over the definition of 
“indirect expropriation,” in which Peru, New Zealand, and at least one other country had 
countered the USTR with China’s language on indirect expropriation, as stipulated in each of 
their agreements with China.342 The “indirect expropriation” provision was controversial because 
it would apply to government takings of an “investment” broadly defined to include the value of 
an investment, intellectual property, financial instruments, government permits, money and debt, 
among others. The dissenting countries opposed the U.S. proposal that included broad investor 
rights and advocated China’s language of the investor protection which allows more flexibility 
for regulation. The U.S. approach to “indirect expropriation” puts the burden of proof on the host 
State which must show that regulations were “designed and applied” non-discriminatorily and 
for the public purpose.343 Conversely, the competing proposal344 states that “indirect 
expropriation” only occurs when there is discriminatory and “severe” deprivation, which is more 
difficult for investors to prove. Moreover, this proposal required that “indirect expropriation” 
must be “disproportionate to the public purpose,” which puts far less burden of proof on the host 
state as a government would merely need to show that a regulation is furthering a larger public 
purpose. In dialogue over the leaked chapter, a spokesman for the U.S. business lobby 
denounced China’s definition of “indirect expropriation” and he issued strong support for the 
U.S. proposal.345  
                                                          
342 “Leaked TPP Text Shows Disagreement on Indirect Expropriation Definition,” Inside U.S. 
Trade, Vol. 30, No. 24, July 15, 2012. 
343 TPP Investment Chapter, 2012 Leak, Annex 12-C 
344 TPP Investment Chapter, 2012 Leak, Annex 12-D 
345 “Leaked TPP Text Shows Disagreement on Indirect Expropriation Definition,” Inside U.S. 
Trade, Vol. 30, No. 24, July 15, 2012. 
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Domestically, Public interest lawyer Robert Stumberg proposed to Congress that the U.S. 
should “[n]arrow indirect expropriation so that it does not apply to nondiscriminatory regulations 
as explained in the Methanex award.”346 In 2005, Methanex lost its case against the U.S. because 
the ISDS tribunal ruled that “non-discriminatory” public purpose legislation does not constitute 
expropriation.347 Stumberg’s proposal would have the effect of limiting “indirect expropriation” 
to measures that are discriminatory or serve “illegitimate” public purposes. In contrast, business 
lobby leader Linda Menghetti testified to Congress that proposals to insert clarifying language on 
indirect expropriation would significantly narrow investor rights and “…put in jeopardy 
important U.S. national economic and other policy goals.”348 
 
Investment-related labor and environmental concerns 
While the USTR relegated labor and environmental concerns to separate chapters, labor 
and environmental groups argued that these chapters would be undermined by the investment 
chapter and ISDS. An AFL-CIO senior aide explained that while the USTR drafted the labor 
chapter with “intense” consultations with labor unions, the AFL-CIO was unsure that labor 
would support the final agreement.349 The AFL representative questioned the value of the TPP 
                                                          
346 Ibid. 
347 Methanex Corporation v. United States of America, Final Award of the Tribunal on 
Jurisdiction and Merits, August 3, 2005, at Part IV—Chapter D, para. 7. In pertinent part:  
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348 Testimony of Linda Menghetti, Vice President of the Emergency Committee for American 
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“Investment Protection in US Trade and Investment Agreements,” One Hundred Eleventh 
Congress, First Session, May 14, 2009. 
349 “AFL-CIO Official Sees Labor Progress in TPP, But Questions Value of Deal,” Inside U.S. 
Trade, Vol. 30, No. 5, February 3, 2012.  
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investment chapter to U.S. workers because policymakers and analysts were still unsure of the 
TPP’s effects on offshoring and trade flows.350 Similarly, the environmental group Sierra Club 
publically supported the USTR’s efforts in the environmental chapter, however, they argued that 
ISDS would undermine the environmental chapter by allowing companies to sue governments 
over environmental regulations and therefore environmental organizations would likely not 
support the final TPP.351 Labor and environmental groups derided the “investment and 
environment” provision because it was unenforceable and and “little more than paper 
commitments.”352  
 
Investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) 
The June leak revealed that the U.S. had sought to expand investment and investor rights 
to include not only goods as in past agreements but also intellectual property and services. This 
was achieved by expanding the scope of “performance requirements”353 to include services and 
intellectual property rights (including the language drafted in 2011 for state-owned enterprises). 
Early in 2012, thirty U.S. business lobbies and trade associations confronted Australia’s 
opposition to ISDS in a letter to President Obama.354 The business community had two demands 
of the USTR, first, to not grant countries such large exceptions to the agreement as it would be 
antithetical to a “high-standard” agreement and bad precedent, and second, to ensure that all TPP 
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351 “USTR Acknowledges Objections on Enforceability in TPP Environment Talks,” Inside U.S. 
Trade, Vol. 30, No. 26, June 29, 2012. 
352 “Labor, Environmental Provisions in Model BIT Spark Divergent Reactions,” Inside U.S. 
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members and potential members commit to strong enforcement mechanisms, notably, ISDS. A 
business source commented that the letter was intended to demonstrate that the inclusion of ISDS 
was essential to securing Congressional support for a final TPP deal, and therefore, Australia’s 
exclusion from ISDS would kill the TPP.355 After the letter was published, in an Australian 
Senate meeting, representative of the Australian Prime Minister affirmed that it would not back 
down from its opposition to ISDS.356 In July, The U.S. National Conference of State Legislators 
addressed an open letter to all TPP negotiators calling upon them to abolish ISDS from the TPP 
and they encouraged the Australian delegation to continue to resist ISDS.357  
 
Tobacco and ISDS 
The USTR was working on drafting a tobacco proposal, in large measure a response to 
Australia’s opposition to ISDS to protect public health tobacco regulations. Throughout 2012, 
the USTR repeatedly held back from tabling the proposal due to domestic resistance from 
business lobbies and Congress members from tobacco-producing states. In a May press 
release,358 the USTR announced that the proposal would create a “safe harbor” provision that 
would protect tobacco measures from legal challenges, but would not shield governments from 
ISDS if a tobacco regulation would be tantamount to expropriation.359 The public health 
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357 “An Open Letter From U.S. State Legislators To Negotiators Of The Trans - Pacific 
Partnership Urging The Rejection Of Investor State Dispute Settlement,” The U.S. National 
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community applauded it as a “good first step” while the U.S. business community united in 
opposition, demanding that no products receive special treatment.360 A coalition of the most 
politically influential business lobbies ranging from agriculture to manufacturing and services 
warned the USTR against the exclusion in the TPP of any products as bad precedent. 
Conversely, in July, ASEAN health ministers met to discuss completely removing tobacco from 
the ASEAN FTA and future FTAs, and this proposal was supported by TPP member 
Malaysia.361  
 
III.C.2. Capital controls and financial regulations 
In May, Ranking Congressmen Barney Frank and Sander Levin issued a public letter to 
Timothy Geithner, Secretary of Treasury, referencing a private meeting in which both the Under 
Secretary of Treasury and USTR Kirk gave Rep. Frank “oral assurances” that U.S. trade and 
investment agreements do not limit a country’s use of capital controls vis-à-vis the “prudential 
carve-out” for emergency measures.362 However, Reps. Frank and Levin noted that legal 
language of the provisions simply do not offer a clear assurance that a country may deploy 
capital controls without being in violation of the treaty. Moreover, as international regulatory 
norms had shifted to support the (limited) use of capital controls, the U.S. was now a policy 
outlier. Indeed, after exhaustive research into the 2008 global financial crisis, in November, 
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2012, the IMF announced a “new institutional view” that the free movement of capital rests on 
weak economic theory and it has “heightened macroeconomic volatility and vulnerability to 
crises” (2012: 12). The IMF’s new institutional stance called for situational capital controls (i.e. 
capital controls on a case-by-case basis).  
The letter from Reps. Frank and Levin pressured the Treasury to formulate an official 
interpretation of the legal language related to capital controls in the TPP.363 Instead, Under 
Secretary Brainard responded that any new changes to the provisions would “cast doubt” that 
existing treaties do allow for capital controls, therefore, the Treasury would make no official 
interpretation of the provisions.364 Reps. Frank and Levin rebutted that the official interpretation 
could apply to past agreements as well. Secretary Geithner then responded to Reps. Frank and 
Levin that U.S. trade and investment policy categorically provides space for capital controls in 
the “exceptions” provisions, which allow governments to temporary break from their obligations 
for emergency financial measures.365 
The June leak of the TPP investment chapter confirmed that the Obama administration 
had not amended U.S. policy stance on capital controls and that the USTR was pushing to 
institutionalize the free movement of capital in the TPP against the objections of other countries. 
In the leak, the “transfers” provision and its annexes were bracketed and it included two other 
provisions that were introduced by other countries that would have clearly and explicitly 
permitted the use of capital controls.366 The first proposal, “Measures to Safeguard the Balance 
                                                          
363 Ibid. 
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Inside U.S. Trade, Vol. 30, No. 1, January 4, 2013. 
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of Payments,”367 included language that would unambiguously permit the temporary and non-
discriminatory use of capital controls to safeguard a country’s balance of payments. This 
proposal closely followed the legal language on capital controls in the WTO agreement,368 and 
the U.S. was the only country to oppose the provision.369 Malaysia had taken a particularly hard 
stance on the issue as the Malaysian Trade Minister had mandated to negotiators to ensure that 
no financial services provision impinge upon Malaysia’s policy space to institute capital 
controls. The 1998 Asian financial crisis was devastating to Malaysia and policymakers rejected 
the IMF’s emergency funds in favor of a mix of capital controls. Among Asian regulators and 
academics Malaysia’s emergency capital controls are widely regarded as successful although 
foreign businesses and investors had since “shunned” Malaysia for their policy (Gallagher et. al. 
2013).   
The second proposal that would have permitted capital controls appeared in brackets and 
it applied only to Chile.370 The provision stated that Chile has the right to enforce its capital 
controls law371 in order to ensure currency stability and the functioning of its payments system. 
Similar to Malaysia, for Chile this policy stance was informed by their past experience in 
implementing capital controls from 1990-5 in response to large and destabilizing capital inflows. 
Chilean policymakers concluded that capital controls were the “crucial” tool to building an 
environment conducive to development during a time in which GDP growth was falling in other 
Latin American countries (Gallagher et. al. 2013). During the U.S.-Chile FTA negotiations, 
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although Chile attempted to revise the U.S. provisions to provide for capital controls, they were 
only able to obtain special ISDS procedures that included an additional six-month “cooling off” 
period before investors can file a case over capital controls (Gallagher et. al. 2013).  
 
III.D. 2013: USTR “plays hardball” while ramping up pressure to conclude negotiations 
The USTR had set a self-imposed deadline to conclude negotiations by the end of 2013, 
however, as the year pressed on it became evident that a December conclusion would not be 
possible. In November, an anonymous Chief negotiator had his notes from the Salt Lake City 
round leaked to WikiLeaks. Writing in short-hand form he observed,  
“U.S. exerting great pressure to close as many issues as possible this 
week. However the Chapters that were reviewed by the CNs [Chief Negotiators] 
did not record much progress…One country remarked that up until now there had 
not been any perceivable movement on the part of the U.S. and that is the reason 
for the situation.”372  
Earlier in the year, the U.S. chief negotiator, Barbara Weisel, explained that the USTR 
was working with the U.S. business community in formulating their negotiating priorities.373 
Weisel reasoned, “If we’re going to close the deal this year, we have to prioritize what it is we 
really care about in this agreement.”374 Simultaneously, the stakeholder process was reduced and 
eventually discontinued at the end of the year (Elms 2015: 14).  
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Trade, May 23, 2013. 
374 Ibid. 
 201 
 
 
Table 13: TPP 2013 negotiations, USTR applies pressure to conclude negotiations 
Negotiat
ing 
issues in 
investm
ent and 
financial 
services 
 
Domestic interactions with the USTR 
 
TPP negotiators 
Labor 
unions, 
NGOs, 
civil 
society 
organizati
ons 
Business 
lobbies, 
private sector 
trade policy 
advisors 
Congress P-4 
(Chile, 
Brunei, 
New 
Zealand, 
Singapore
) 
Australia, 
Peru, 
Vietnam, 
Malaysia 
Mexico, 
Canada, 
Japan 
Investor 
rights 
and 
investor-
state 
dispute 
settleme
nt 
(ISDS) 
Unions 
announce 
opposition 
to TPP b/c 
it will lead 
to 
offshoring 
and 
greater 
inequality 
Offshoring in 
high-tech 
manufacturin
g is “over 
with”; last 
U.S. 
footwear 
plants 
threatened 
Bipartisan 
pressure on 
the Obama 
administratio
n for TPA 
bill 
Australia loosens ISDS 
opposition in exchange 
for more market access; 
U.S. and Japan insist on 
broad scope of ISDS, all 
other countries opposed; 
ASEAN countries want 
exclusion from “pre-
establishment” 
provisions 
Japan 
supports 
U.S. 
position 
on ISDS 
Financia
l 
regulatio
ns and 
capital 
controls 
Expanding 
ISDS in 
financial 
services is 
deregulato
ry 
Expand 
investor 
rights and 
ISDS in 
financial 
services  
U.S. position 
“inflexible,” Chile Chief 
Negotiator resigns citing 
U.S. anti-capital controls 
policy among his top 
public concerns in the 
TPP  
Mexico 
and 
Canada 
against 
expanding 
ISDS in 
fin. ser. 
Market 
access 
for FDI 
Wary of 
offshoring 
Deep market 
access 
necessary 
U.S., Australia, New Zealand favor 
narrow exceptions market access, all 
others opposed 
 
III.D.1. Investor rights and investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) 
Application of ISDS to “investment agreements” and “investment authorizations” 
The Chief negotiators’ notes observed, “…The most important issue for the majority of 
members…is the proposal by the U.S. to apply ISDS to Investment Agreements and Investment 
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Authorizations.”375 In U.S. investment law, an “investment agreement” and an “investment 
authorization” cover all major contracts between an investor and a host state, including, natural 
resource exploration and extraction (such as mining, oil, gas, and other hydrocarbon 
exploration/extraction), public utility services (such as electricity and water treatment), and 
public works concessions (such as roads, highways, infrastructure). The same provisions are in 
the investment chapter in U.S.-Korea FTA but they were bracketed in the June, 2012 TPP leak. 
During the Obama administrations’ review of the Model BIT, oil, gas, and mining companies 
and members of Congress underscored the fundamental importance of ISDS to their 
industries.376 Domestically, environmental organizations actively campaigned against ISDS as a 
threat to environmental regulations and especially because the fossil fuel industry was using it as 
a deregulatory tool in the context of global warming and climate change. The Chief negotiator 
indicated that, “The U.S., as in previous rounds, has shown no flexibility on its proposal.”377 
Japan supported the U.S. while other countries objected and made proposals to narrow its scope. 
 
Investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) 
In Australia’s 2013 elections, the incumbent liberal party was replaced by a more 
conservative party which announced that it would negotiate ISDS on a case-by-case basis.378 
Japan joined the talks mid-year after vowing to the U.S. that Japan would be a “constructive” 
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member of negotiations, such as, supporting the U.S.’ position that ISDS unequivocally apply to 
all TPP members, even in the face of Australia’s opposition.379 By the year’s end, the new 
Australian government indicated that it was open to including ISDS in exchange for additional 
market access for Australian agricultural exports.380 Similarly, Malaysia announced that it 
supported ISDS but was seeking longer transition periods and greater carve-outs for its domestic 
industries.381 Vietnam, Malaysia, and Brunei sought to narrow the scope of ISDS by maintaining 
that ISDS only apply to the “post-establishment” phase and not “pre-establishment,” meaning 
that an investor would only be covered by ISDS after they have established an investment in the 
host state. In U.S. investment law, ISDS also applies to the “pre-establishment” phase in which 
ISDS applies to an investor seeking to establish an investment in a host State.382 
 
Tobacco and ISDS 
In September, the USTR and Malaysia simultaneously tabled competing proposals on 
policy space regarding tobacco control measures.383 The USTR was forced to revise its earlier 
proposal after federal agencies criticized it as too weak and business groups described it as 
unnecessary. The USTR cited that tobacco is “unique product” that is “always harmful to human 
health” and the new proposal would preserve the policy space of countries to regulate tobacco 
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without a complete carve-out of tobacco that would create precedent for excluding agricultural 
products.384 The new U.S. proposal reaffirmed the WTO’s commitments to tobacco control 
measures and required that public health officials consult each other before any dispute 
settlement procedures begin, however, tobacco tariffs would be eliminated and tobacco 
companies would maintain investor rights and access to ISDS. Conversely, the Malaysian 
proposal completely carved-out tobacco from the agreement and therefore precluded tobacco 
from any dispute challenges, including ISDS.385 According to Malaysian officials, there was 
“broad” support for their proposal, including from Japan, but negotiators had to return to their 
governments before taking positions.386 However, Malaysia quickly began to soften its stance 
and in December they tabled a revised proposal that removed tobacco tariffs, therefore, trade in 
tobacco would be liberalized.387 
 
Investment-related labor and environmental concerns 
As the AFL-CIO announced388 that it would coordinate an international campaign to stop 
the TPP, a spokesman for General Electric Company denied that the TPP would promote more 
offshoring and to the contrary it would create more jobs in the U.S. General Electric’s 
spokesman made two arguments to the Senate, first, that many capital-intensive U.S. 
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manufacturing industries are heavily dependent upon exports and the TPP was being designed to 
promote such exports, which would support and grow jobs.389 Second, he declared that 
offshoring was “over with” in high-technology manufacturing industries. He reasoned that in 
capital-intensive manufacturing the labor cost is trivial to determining production location, “So 
the international global supply chain that we have constructed allows us to be competitive around 
the world and I think sustain far more jobs in the U.S.”390  
Also in 2013, the U.S. and Vietnam bilaterally negotiated textile production rules and 
market share. The USTR offered to cut textile and apparel tariffs by 50 percent in exchange for a 
rule that would ban the use of textile materials from non-TPP members, although the USTR did 
not consult domestic manufacturers on the proposal.391 The proposal was supported by 15 
Senators representing U.S. footwear importers and it was opposed by The National Council of 
Textile Organizations who argued that roughly 522,000 jobs would be offshored to Vietnam if 
tariffs were cut by just 25 percent.392 By August, New Balance, which maintained footwear 
plants in the U.S., was engaged in a spat with six other name-brand domestic footwear 
companies that had no production facilities in the U.S. New Balance argued that the TPP’s 
elimination of tariffs on footwear would shift investment and market share to plants in lower-cost 
Vietnam thereby threatening New Balance’s U.S. production facilities.393   
 
                                                          
389 “The Trans-Pacific Partnership: Opportunities and Challenges”, Hearing before the 
Committee on Finance, U.S. Senate, One Hundred Thirteenth Congress, First Session, April 24, 
2013. 
390 Ibid. 
391 “U.S., Vietnam to Meet on Textile Rules Ahead of Malaysia TPP Round,” Inside U.S. Trade, 
July 20, 2013. 
392 Ibid. 
393 “New England shoe companies push for elimination of shoe tariffs,” by Kevin Miller, 
Kennebee Journal, August 23, 2013. 
 206 
 
III.E.2. Capital controls and financial regulations 
Investor rights in financial services  
On November 27, Faryar Shirzad, Managing Director at Goldman Sachs, sent an email to 
USTR Froman affirming the importance of broad investor rights for the financial services 
sector.394 In past U.S. FTAs, due to the Treasury’s regulatory concerns, only the “transfers” and 
“expropriation” articles from the investment chapter along with ISDS enforcement applied to 
financial services. In the TPP, the USTR was attempting to expand investor rights and ISDS in 
the financial services sector by also including the controversial “minimum standard of treatment” 
provision with ISDS enforcement.395 In addition to Goldman Sachs, a prominent U.S. financial 
services lobby group wrote an open letter to the USTR advocating for the full inclusion of 
investor rights from the investment chapter and access to ISDS in the TPP financial services 
chapter.396 However, the USTR faced strong opposition to this unprecedented proposal, 
including from Mexico and Canada, which led U.S. financial services institutions to become 
“worried” that the USTR would forgo the initiative in an effort to conclude the deal by the end of 
the year. Mr. Shirzad informally addressed USTR Froman as “Mike” and warned that denying 
the financial services industry the same investor rights enjoyed by other industries would be 
“unfortunate” given the importance of the U.S. financial services industry in generating service 
exports and growing U.S. commercial presence around the world. Shirzad urged,  
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“I wanted to underscore how important it is for the financial services 
industry to get robust commitments on ISDS in the agreement – including on pre-
establishment and the full range of fair treatment ([‘minimum standard of 
treatment,’ ‘national treatment,’ ‘most favored nation’]) provisions. These 
measures are critical to making the TPP a meaningful agreement for our industry 
and, as importantly, they set powerful precedent for the U.S.-China BIT.”397 
Opponents of the proposal to expand investor rights and ISDS in financial services argue 
that the provisions are deregulatory as financial services companies can challenge financial 
regulations, even during financial and economic crises, which could even discourage a 
government from adopting financial regulations in the first place. Historically, U.S. regulators, 
including the Treasury, Federal Reserve and the Securities and Exchange Commission, sought to 
shield themselves from such challenges and opposed expanding the scope of ISDS mechanism to 
include additional types of financial services claims.398  
 
Capital Controls 
The leaked notes of the anonymous Chief Negotiator during the Salt Lake City round 
observed of the financial services negotiations, “The positions are still paralyzed. U.S. shows 
zero flexibility…”399 In February, Rodrigo Contreras, Chile’s Chief Negotiator, suddenly 
resigned from his post. Then in May, before the Lima, Peru round, Contreras published an 
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editorial in Peru’s top newspaper explaining his concerns about the direction of the TPP, namely, 
the U.S.’ demands in intellectual property and their unequivocal rejection of capital controls. He 
argued that the TPP was still a work in progress and a potential opportunity for all members, 
however, institutionalizing the free movement of capital in the TPP would “deprive” developing 
countries of “legitimate tools to safeguard financial stability.” Contreras outlined capital controls 
as fundamental to development policy,  
“It is critical to reject the imposition of a model designed according to 
realities of high-income countries, which are very different from the other 
participating countries. Otherwise, this agreement will become a threat for our 
countries: it will restrict our development options in health and education, in 
biological and cultural diversity, and in the design of public policies and the 
transformation of our economies.”400  
Lastly, Contreras warned that growing social movements would not forgive governments 
that use to trade negotiations to limit the prosperity and well-being of their countries. Earlier that 
year, Treasury Secretary Lew had visited the ASEAN TPP members and among their discussions 
was the Asian countries’ continued to opposition to the U.S. provisions that would limit capital 
controls. To that end, in Singapore, officials stressed to Secretary Lew that the “eventual TPP 
package will have to provide an overall balance of benefits for all participants,” and a lot of 
“tough work” remained before TPP countries could conclude the deal.401 
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III.F. 2014: The Obama administration prepares for TPA while pushing for TPP conclusion 
By 2014, the negotiations had hit two major stumbling blocks, first, that the USTR lacked 
TPA from Congress, and second, the U.S. and Japan had hit an impasse in bilateral market 
access for agriculture and autos. The TPA gave other countries the assurance that any 
agreements with the USTR would not be changed by Congress, and since the USTR lacked TPA 
other negotiators held back their offers. Therefore, beginning in 2014, the Obama administration 
began to actively work with Congress to develop a TPA legislation. However, progress had 
further waned as the U.S. and Japan could not resolve their bilateral market access issues in 
agriculture and autos. This dilemma nearly arrested the entire negotiations as other countries 
conditioned their offers on the outcome of the U.S.-Japan deal.402 
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Financi
al 
regulati
ons and 
capital 
controls 
public sector 
services jobs 
bill with 
alternative 
negotiating 
objectives 
Chile leads opposition to U.S. 
“transfers” policy 
Market 
access 
for FDI 
Restricts 
regulations on 
financial 
products 
Vietnam, Malaysia, and Japan 
make proposal for broad sector 
exceptions to market access, 
especially in financial services, 
rejected by USTR 
III.F.1. Investor rights and investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) 
Application of ISDS to “investment agreements” and “investment authorizations” 
The ASEAN countries continued to reject the broad scope of applying ISDS to 
“investment agreements” and “investment authorizations” for three reasons.403 First, countries 
did not want to expose themselves to ISDS in public-private partnerships, in the case of 
Malaysia, the country was undertaking a series of public-private partnerships infrastructure and 
forestry projects that could potentially be challenged using ISDS under such a provision. Second, 
the ASEAN countries did not want ISDS to apply to government procurement, which was 
politically sensitive in each country and Malaysia had taken a particularly hard stance on the 
issue.404 In fact, in the June, 2012 leak there was a proposed provision that the ISDS “…does not 
apply where there is a dispute between a Party and an investor of a Party related to government 
procurement or the provision of a subsidy or grant.”405 The third reason was the dispute over 
tobacco, discussed below. The ASEAN countries were seeking exceptions or outright carve outs 
in all three areas. Domestically, labor union representatives from affiliates of Public Services 
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International made their case to Senate Finance Committee Democrats in September. Among the 
union’s TPP concerns were that the provisions applying ISDS to public services and in tandem 
with the services and government procurement chapters it would threaten jobs in the public 
services sectors such as public health, education, and law enforcement. They argued that 
privatization of public service sectors opens the door to MNCs guided by the profit motive that 
will devalue wages, labor standards, and jobs.406 
 
Investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) 
The new Australian government had dropped their absolute opposition to ISDS but they 
were seeking greater U.S. market access in exchange.407 In March, the USTR published a “fact 
sheet” on ISDS intended to defend U.S. investment policy from the domestic and foreign 
opposition. The USTR did not directly address criticisms of ISDS but merely sought to 
rhetorically separate “fact from fiction” by claiming that ISDS offers the same protections to 
investors abroad that they enjoy in the U.S. while safeguarding the right of governments to 
implement public purpose regulations, such as “…in the interest of financial stability, 
environmental protection, or public health.”408 The press release asserted that a “core value” 
guiding trade policy is “promoting the rule of law,” and ISDS is one of the cornerstones of this 
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objective.409 Therefore, the USTR was not espousing ISDS for economic merits, but rather, as a 
foreign policy goal to promote the rule of law abroad. 
 
Tobacco and ISDS 
Early in the year, Malaysia’s revised tobacco proposal still had support from other 
members but many members were “reluctant” to give their full support because they did not 
want to make concessions in other areas of the talks.410 Towards the end of the year, the USTR 
had informally discussed with other countries a compromise that would exclude tobacco-related 
disputes from ISDS but would not affect the rest of the TPP, such as state-to-state disputes and 
removing tariffs on tobacco.411 According to Sen. Hatch, the Department of Health and Human 
Services had refused to give away it’s ‘‘policy space’’ in regulating tobacco which helped to 
motivate the USTR to carve out tobacco products from ISDS.412 The USTR’s proposal was 
blasted by a tobacco industry spokesman, “This proposal would unfairly discriminate against a 
single sector by denying access to due process and other basic and fundamental legal 
principles…Worse, it sets a terrible precedent opening the door for other trade partners to begin 
targeting other business sectors for exclusion.”413  
 
Investment-related labor and environmental concerns 
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In December, President Obama addressed the Business Roundtable and outlined his 
administration’s plan to obtain fast track. He mulled that passing fast track would be challenging 
because many Americans “mistakenly” attribute wage stagnation and job loss to trade 
agreements.414 Obama said that the link between trade and wage stagnation is a “half-truth,” and 
he claimed that more jobs have been lost to automation than to offshoring. Therefore, he urged 
Democrats and unions to not “fight a war” on past trade agreements, “Those who oppose these 
trade deals, ironically, are accepting a status quo that is more damaging to American workers.”415 
Obama asserted that there had been offshoring of U.S. manufacturing as a direct result of the 
NAFTA and China entering the WTO, however, the TPP will not promote offshoring since 
companies “can do that now without any real restraints.”416 Moreover, he argued that the TPP 
would boost labor, environmental, and intellectual property standards which would help support 
U.S. jobs. Thea Lee, Policy Director of the AFL-CIO, contorted that unions are not “anti-trade,” 
rather, they made a range of substantive recommendations for the TPP that were “virtually 
ignored” by the Obama administration.417 Union representatives presented studies contesting that 
trade has had a more important effect on jobs and wages than claimed by Obama.418 
 
III.F.2. Capital controls and financial regulations 
In February, after Chile’s elections, representatives of the new Chilean government met 
with USTR Froman and conveyed that they would not give up their right to capital controls, 
                                                          
414 “In Two Speeches, Obama Says He Will Make Case For TPA to Congress,” Inside U.S. 
Trade, December 5, 2014. 
415 Ibid. 
416 Ibid. 
417 Ibid. 
418 Ibid. 
 214 
 
which would go beyond their commitments in the U.S.-Chile FTA.419 Several high ranking 
officials of the new Chilean government had concluded that the costs of the TPP would outweigh 
the benefits because Chile already had FTAs with all of the TPP countries but they were being 
asked to make sensitive concessions in intellectual property rights and capital controls.420 
Similarly, a handful of U.S. Senators led by Sen. Elizabeth Warren addressed USTR Froman 
about their concerns that the TPP would restrict financial regulations in the U.S., “With millions 
of families still struggling to recover from the last financial crisis and the Great Recession that 
followed, we cannot afford a trade deal that undermines the government’s ability to protect the 
American economy.”421 They identified three provisions as problematic for financial regulations 
- ISDS, market access, and capital controls. They noted that ISDS had successfully been used in 
another country to target their emergency financial measures and that the USTR’s proposed 
expansion of the “minimum standard of treatment” provision to the financial sector would have a 
powerful deregulatory effect on the financial services sector. They outlined concerns that market 
access commitments in the financial services sector would undermine the ability of regulators to 
restrict “predatory or toxic financial products - such as particularly risky forms of derivatives” 
because such regulations could be interpreted as a denial of access to the U.S. financial 
markets.422 They opposed the ban on capital controls because it could “…limit Congress’ 
prerogative to enact not only capital controls, but basic reform measures like a financial 
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transactions tax.”423 In conclusion, they pressed the USTR to explain how U.S. trade policy 
would help Congress and regulatory agencies to prevent future financial crises.  
 
III.F. 2015: Obama administration secures TPA then concludes TPP negotiations 
While the USTR pressured Congress for TPA, other TPP negotiators contributed by 
warning Congress that without TPA the TPP would end up “like the Doha stalemate.”424 As TPP 
proponents did not yet have the necessary votes in Congress to secure passage of TPA, major 
U.S. industry groups stepped up lobbying efforts, especially the financial services lobbies. 
Emails between USTR Froman and executives of the big U.S. banks revealed close coordination 
on lobbying efforts to win votes for TPA while scheduling meetings to discuss the content of the 
TPP and T-TIP - “See u thurs, bob” one bank executive signed in his email to USTR Froman.425 
Simultaneously, in January, wikileaks obtained and published a new leaked draft of the 
investment chapter revealing that the USTR had secured unprecedented investor rights, further 
fueling an increasingly diverse domestic opposition to TPA.426 The TPP negotiations were 
concluded on October 5, 2015 and the final text was made public on November 5, 2015.  
 
Table 15: TPP 2015 negotiations, Obama administration secures TPA and TPP concluded 
Negotiating 
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III.F.1. Investor rights and investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) 
Investor rights 
The leaked January draft of the investment chapter revealed which conflicts had been 
settled, which remained, and other developments since the 2012 leak. All brackets around the 
definition of “investment” had been removed, signifying that the ASEAN countries did not 
secure their exceptions to the “pre-establishment” obligations while other countries had dropped 
their proposals to narrow the scope the chapter. The conflict over the indirect expropriation 
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provisions had been resolved, with a removal of the brackets around the U.S. proposal and a 
deletion of the competing proposal, which was language from China’s BITs.427 It is unclear if 
any political trade-offs settled the conflict. In addition, there was a deletion of a footnote 
establishing broad interpretation of “public welfare objectives,” an edit that weakened the public 
purpose carve-out from the investor protection.428 These developments protected the 
“expropriation” provision from the attempts from other countries to block any legal avenues that 
would allow companies to bring “indirect expropriation” claims under ISDS. 
In March, in a NAFTA case involving a U.S. investment in a Canadian quarry, an ISDS 
tribunal ruled that Canada breached its “minimum standard of treatment” obligations awarded 
the U.S. company $101 million USD.429 The governments of the U.S., Canada, and Mexico 
disagreed with the tribunal’s decision, which motivated the USTR to make slight revisions to the 
TPP “minimum standard of treatment” provision. Notably, the USTR introduced new language 
that provided that a government measure that is merely inconsistent with an investor’s 
expectations does not constitute a breach of the “minimum standard of treatment” provision.430 A 
second new provision carved-out government subsidies and grants from the “minimum standard 
of treatment” obligation.431 However, with the release of the final TPP text, legal experts doubted 
the effect of the new provisions because no past findings of a violation of the provision had 
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rested exclusively on the fact that an investor’s expectations were not met, but rather that the 
state acted in an unfair or arbitrary way.432 
 
Application of ISDS to “investment agreements” and “investment authorizations” 
Throughout most of the year the conflict continued over the application of ISDS to 
“investment agreements” and “investment authorizations.” In the June, 2012 leaked draft of the 
TPP investment chapter both terms appeared 12 times and all bracketed, then in the January, 
2015 leak both terms appeared 18 times and all bracketed, and in the final text the terms 
appeared 41 times, signifying that conflict was not resolved until near the end of negotiations and 
most likely at the political level of Chief Negotiators. As the NAFTA did not have such 
provisions, Mexico had emerged as leading the opposition to the U.S. proposal, and especially 
they sought to guard against ISDS claims in the event of breaches to public concessions 
contracts.433 Based on the final text, the USTR had made two major compromises from their 
negotiating position delineated in the 2012 Model BIT. The first compromise was to scale-back 
the definition and scope of “investment agreements” and “investment authorizations.” With 
respect to natural resources, an “investment agreement” would not include public land, water, or 
radio spectrum; with respect to the supply of public services, an “investment agreement” would 
not include correctional, healthcare, education, childcare, or welfare services; the definition of 
“investment authorizations” would not apply to non-discriminatory regulations that address 
competition, the environment, public health, licensing regimes, or investment incentives. The 
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second compromise led to the creation of a new Annex which provides that a state may condition 
a contract for an investment agreement such that disputes could be arbitrated under an alternative 
legal forum to the ISDS procedures. The Annex also contained some country-specific provisions, 
notably, Mexico did not consent to the application of ISDS to oil, gas, petroleum, and a range of 
public infrastructure. In sum, while the USTR began negotiations insisting on the application of 
ISDS to diverse public domain contracts called “investment agreements” and “investment 
authorizations,” to conclude the TPP, the USTR had to narrow the definition of both terms and 
the scope of ISDS as applied to the terms.  
 
Investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) 
While trying to win TPA from many skeptical or critical Congress members, the USTR 
was forced to defend its positions. Throughout 2015, the USTR published fact sheets, question 
and answer sessions, and responses to high-profile critics in Congress, such as Sen. Elizabeth 
Warren. In fact, Ranking Rep. Levin had drafted an alternative TPA bill with substantive 
proposals for reforms to investor rights and ISDS. In March, House Democrats had a private 
meeting with USTR officials concerning the TPP investment chapter in which the USTR 
indicated that it would not change its negotiating positions on the issues.434 Some Congress 
members in attendance responded that the USTR’s unwillingness to compromise on its 
negotiating positions was contrary to the purpose of TPA, in which Congress mandates 
negotiating objectives to the USTR. House Democrat Alan Grayson elaborated, “Now they're 
telling us that major parts ... of these agreements are no longer subject to negotiations, much less 
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guidance through legislation.”435 The USTR stuck to its talking points that stakeholder 
consultation substituted Congressional mandate. Similarly, USTR Froman responded to 
criticisms in the Senate, “The TPP investment rules have been carefully crafted though many 
years of close stakeholder consultation and a public comment process.”436  
In addition to attempting to limit the scope of “investment agreements” and “investment 
authorizations,” TPP countries were seeking carve-outs from ISDS for specific sectors. Australia 
was conditioning its acceptance of ISDS to improved market access for its sugar and dairy 
exports, and by August the U.S. had offered additional market access to Australian sugar.437 In 
addition, as revealed by the January leak, Australia asserted that if it accepted ISDS then it would 
not apply not to tobacco measures and a list of other public health measures.438 Canada sought a 
complete carve-out of its “culture industries” from ISDS.439 By the end of negotiations, Australia 
conceded to ISDS while both Australia and Canada succeeded in securing these carve-outs. The 
January leak also disclosed that Malaysia had been seeking a permanent and complete carve-out 
of government procurement from ISDS.440 Malaysian officials were seeking a high monetary 
threshold above which the government procurement of construction would be open to foreign 
bidders.441 However, by the end of the year, they had only secured a three year transition period 
of isolating government procurement from ISDS.  
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Tobacco and ISDS 
The USTR’s informal tobacco proposal provided a broad exemption from ISDS for 
tobacco-related regulations, and this provoked outrage not just from tobacco companies and 
affected Congress members but also from the business community more generally.442 President 
Obama justified his administration’s position, “The big bugaboo that’s lifted up there is tobacco 
companies suing poorer countries to make sure that anti-smoking legislation is banned, or at least 
tying them up with so much litigation that ultimately smaller countries cave.”443 However, the 
USTR waited until after Congress passed TPA to officially table its tobacco proposal that would 
deny the benefits of ISDS to tobacco companies and products.444 Throughout the year, 
Democratic and Republican Congress members from tobacco producing states, including Senate 
Majority Leader Mitch McConnell, went to bat for the tobacco industries.445 McConnell did not 
withdraw his support for the TPP, but he warned USTR Froman, “…[do] not set a new precedent 
for future U.S. trade negotiations by negatively carving out a specific American agricultural 
commodity — in this case tobacco.”446 However, in TPP negotiations, the USTR “was clear” 
that tobacco had to be treated differently, especially because it was a “salient” issue with a 
“sizeable” bloc of TPP members, including Australia, New Zealand, and Malaysia.447 The 
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USTR’s lead negotiator Barbara Wiesel explained that if the USTR did not compromise on 
tobacco then they would have had to compromise in other areas, such as ISDS.448 The USTR’s 
proposal was accepted by the other TPP negotiators and subsequently some Congress members 
who had supported TPA vowed to not support the final vote for the TPP.449 
 
Investment-related labor and environmental concerns 
The auto rules of origin were among the last conflicts of negotiations and they were 
decided in a political tradeoff with the other remaining issues. In an FTA, product-specific rules 
of origin interact with the investment chapter inasmuch as the investment chapter facilitates 
and/or incentives offshoring. The final rules of origin for autos was set at 45 percent for the TPP 
bloc, meaning that 45 percent of the total content of an automobile must come from TPP 
members in order for the automobile to qualify for the benefits of the agreement, such as tariff 
reductions. While U.S. and Mexican automakers supported the TPP auto rules of origin, U.S. 
labor unions alongside a handful of Congress members lamented the compromise, as in their 
view it was a downgrade from the 62.5 percent auto rules of origin in the NAFTA.450 They 
argued that the new TPP auto rules of origin would result in increased offshoring and/or import 
competition from the Asian TPP members.451 
Simultaneously, U.S. footwear producer New Balance had cut a deal with the Obama 
administration to forgo their opposition to the TPP in exchange for a contract to supply the 
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military with Made-in-the-USA shoes.452 However, according to New Balance, the Obama 
administration reneged on the arrangement which led New Balance to join the textile workers 
union in opposing the TPP. By the end of negotiations, labor unions and sympathetic Congress 
members were warning that the TPP meant further offshoring in both the automobile and textile 
sectors. Alongside long-standing ISDS-related environmental concerns, the TPP’s potential 
effect on the quantity and quality of jobs became a central sticking-point in the 2015 TPA 
debates in Congress. The debates were largely a continuation of the on-going conflicts, however, 
the point of issue was no longer the content of the TPP but rather whether or not Congress should 
pass TPA which would open the door to ratifying the TPP.  
 
III.F.2. Financial regulations and capital controls 
Capital controls 
Whereas the 2012 leak illustrated that TPP countries proposed various forms of capital 
controls to the opposition of the USTR, the January 2015 leak showed that there had been some 
incremental movement on the stalemate. Most notably, in the January 2015 leak there were two 
competing provisions that would govern capital controls.453 The first proposal was based on the 
WTO balance of payments provisions which provide relatively greater policy space for 
implementing capital controls and it replicated the language found in the 2012 leak, which was 
contested by the U.S.; the second was a set of more narrow provisions that was similar to the 
language found in the U.S.-Korea FTA. There were two main differences between the proposals, 
in the first instance the U.S. proposal had a far more limited scope in that it only applied to 
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“movements of capital,” whereas the competing proposal applied to all “transfers or payments,” 
even for goods and services. The second difference was that the U.S. proposal imposed far more 
stringent conditions that a capital control would have to meet in order to qualify as an exception 
to TPP obligations, including, that the measure would not exceed one year and that it would be 
applied as a non-discriminatory tax, among other conditions. Both proposals were bracketed and 
the issue would not be resolved until towards the end of negotiations. However, the leak 
demonstrated that the U.S. had moved from its original negotiating stance to be more accepting 
of capital controls. Ranking Rep. Levin observed that the conflict was now over the extent of 
capital controls, “Other TPP countries have insisted on [capital controls]…The focus is now on 
ensuring that the language in the exception is neither too narrow nor too broad.”454  
The final agreement, “Temporary Safeguard Measures,” 455 was a combination of the two 
proposals although with some significant political compromises. The provisions apply broadly to 
all transfers, however, they are subject to a range of specific conditions and if those conditions 
are met then any capital controls measure must not exceed 18 months. Among those conditions 
are that they must be consistent with the expropriations provision, including: they must not 
interfere with investors’ ability to earn a market rate of return; they must not be used “to avoid 
necessary macroeconomic adjustment”; they are not permitted for payments or transfers relating 
to FDI; states must follow specific procedures for consultations with other TPP members and 
publish a schedule for their removal.456 In sum, while TPP countries secured the right to 
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temporary capital controls, the U.S. attached a curious combination of specificity and ambiguity 
to the necessary conditions that would permit the implementation of capital controls.  
The 2012 leak revealed that Chile was seeking to codify their unrestrained ability to 
implement any capital controls in a separate annex to the investment chapter, including its right 
to implement reserve requirements to capital inflows, which they had successfully implemented 
for five years in the early 1990s. The January, 2015 leak contained some additional provisions, 
notably that the reserve requirement does not exceed 30 percent of the amount transferred and 
must not be imposed for longer than two years. In the final agreement, any references to the 
broad regulatory power of Chile’s monetary authorities was removed, and the phrase 
“Notwithstanding Article 9.9 (Transfers)” was inserted prior to the provision.457 The end result 
was that Chile secured the right to implement a specific form of capital controls (reserve 
requirements on capital inflows) for no more than two years. 
 
Investor rights in financial services 
By the conclusion of negotiations, the USTR had secured an unprecedented expansion of 
ISDS to investors and investments in financial services by incorporating the “minimum standard 
of treatment” provision from the investment chapter into the financial services chapter and then 
making it subject ISDS enforcement. In past FTAs, the U.S. had only incorporated the 
“expropriation” and “transfers” provisions and subjected them to ISDS enforcement in the 
financial services chapters.458 Domestically, the measure was controversial as the “minimum 
standard of treatment” provision has been cited in nearly 90 percent of all ISDS claims and 
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critics argued that expanding this right to financial services firms could “open a Pandora’s box” 
of claims against financial regulations.459 A spokesman from the financial services industry 
contested that the addition of “minimum standard of treatment” would only “slightly” enhance 
investor rights in financial services because the lack of access to the right in the past had not 
stopped many ISDS claims in financial services.460  
In negotiations, the measure was resisted by other countries who eventually proposed a 
range of counter-offers in the form of carve-outs and exceptions. By the end of negotiations, 
Brunei, Chile, Mexico, and Peru had secured a limited carve-out from the new obligation. The 
provision461 granted that “minimum standard of treatment” in financial services would not apply 
to any fact or situation prior to the fifth anniversary of ratification of the TPP in Brunei, Chile, 
and Peru, and the seventh anniversary in Mexico. In so doing, those countries not only secured a 
transition period but also an exception to the obligation for existing conditions that would 
currently constitute a breach of “minimum standard of treatment” in financial services. 
Following the conclusion of negotiations, the USTR’s trade advisory committee on services 
issued their report to the USTR measuring the final text against the industry’s negotiating 
objectives. While the services and finance industries supported the TPP, among their reservations 
on the financial services chapter was the fact that it did not include the “national treatment” and 
“most favored nation” provision from the investment chapter.462 In sum, the USTR expanded 
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investor rights in financial services over domestic regulatory concerns and international 
opposition but not to extent that industry groups had hoped.  
G. New President Trump Withdraws the U.S. from the TPP 
President Obama signs the TPP 
At the end of 2014, USTR Michael Froman announced that trade promotion authority 
(TPA) was necessary to conclude the TPP negotiations. Congress grants TPA to the President to 
allow for an “up or down” vote for an FTA, in return, in the TPA legislation Congress sets the 
negotiation objectives for the President. In past practice, Presidents sought TPA from 
Congress before negotiating an FTA because the TPA contains Congressionally 
mandated negotiating objectives. However, the Obama administration had not sought 
TPA from Congress until the end of TPP negotiations because Congress was hostile to 
the TPP from the start of negotiations. House Democrats had repeatedly introduced TPA 
legislation containing negotiating objectives proposed by labor unions and environmental 
organizations, which were contrary to the USTR’s priorities in the TPP. In May and June 
of 2014, the TPA failed its original votes in the House and Senate as many Congressional 
Democrats were demanding a renewal of Trade Adjustment Assistance and measures 
against currency manipulation as the price for their support for TPA. Trade Adjustment 
Assistance coordinates federal programs aimed at reducing the impact of import 
competition as a result of trade and investment agreements.  
Beginning in 2015, the AFL-CIO in tandem with other unions froze all campaign 
contributions to pressure Congress members to oppose TPA while growing conservative 
opposition to U.S. trade policy led to new political alliances across party lines. Political 
trade-offs were made in favor of a stronger Trade Adjustment Assistance while major 
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corporate lobbies stepped up efforts to win the necessary Congressional votes. Research by 
Maplight, an organization that specializes in measuring campaign contributions, found that 
industry groups gave 8.6 times more money ($197.9 million) to House Representatives who 
voted in favor of TPA than to those who opposed the legislation ($23.1 million) (Stevens 2015). 
By the end of June, 2015, the TPA had been reintroduced to both the House and Senate where it 
narrowly passed and President Obama signed it into law in July. TPA passage enabled the 
conclusion of TPP negotiations in October because it gave TPP members the necessary 
confidence to put forward their final offers because TPA ensured that Congress could not change 
the final deal (Froman 2014).  
In February 2016, the TPP members signed the agreement. For the TPP to become 
implemented as international law, TPP members would have to pass the TPP through their 
respective political ratification processes. In the U.S., this meant Congress would vote on the 
TPP’s implementation. Due to the 2016 Presidential election cycle, this was becoming 
increasingly complicated as the top candidates were campaigning against the TPP. The Obama 
administration did not send the TPP up for vote as Congress was awaiting the results of the 2016 
elections. 
 
The 2016 Presidential Elections 
The first social protest in the U.S. against the TPP was in June 2010, in which advocates 
from the labor, environmental, family farm, consumer, indigenous rights, and among others held 
a gathering outside the TPP’s first U.S. negotiating round. Their banner read, “A New Deal or 
No Deal,” and their message was a call for a new trade agreement model that would prioritize the 
interests of labor, the environment, and the consumer, rather than corporate profits. As 
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negotiations continued, so did the social protests against the TPP. From that moment and 
until Obama signed the TPP in 2016, popular opposition to the TPP gained more and 
more momentum. First thousands, then tens of thousands, then hundreds of thousands, 
and then millions of U.S. citizens signed letters and petitions in opposition to the TPP and 
its corporate-sponsored content. During the fast-track debate in 2015, more than 2,000 
local political organizations signed statements opposing fast-track for the TPP.  
Trade became a hot-button issue on the 2016 Presidential campaign trail. 
Democratic frontrunner Hillary Clinton was challenged by Senator Bernie Sanders, a 
self-described “Democratic Socialist,” who had soared in popularity in only months. 
Sanders’ long track record of opposition to U.S. FTAs and his persistent resistance to the 
TPP throughout negotiations boosted his message and popularity. Sanders actively 
campaigned against the TPP, he argued, “The TPP is a disastrous trade agreement 
designed to protect the interests of the largest [MNCs] at the expense of workers, 
consumers, the environment and the foundations of American democracy” (Sanders 
2016). Sanders promised that as President he would integrate public interests and public 
institutions into trade policy formation, on the principle of democracy. 
Conversely, as Secretary of State, Clinton oversaw the State Department’s 
formation of key trade and investment negotiating objectives for the agreement 
(Department of State 2012) and then she declared the TPP as the “gold standard” of trade 
agreements. Sander’s growing popularity and popular opposition to the TPP seemed to 
have forced Clinton to rethink her trade policy stance. In October 2015, just before the 
first Democratic primary debate, Clinton announced that she had a change of heart on the 
TPP and that the TPP was in need of fundamental changes to earn her support. When 
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Clinton reversed course on the TPP and announced her opposition, it meant that both of the 
Democrat’s frontrunners did not support the TPP. As the TPP needed the Democrats support in 
Congress, this was the key moment in sealing the TPP’s fate.  
Republican frontrunner, reality television star Donald Trump, grew in popularity with the 
majority white working class by pledging to “Make America Great Again.” On trade, he 
promised to withdraw from the TPP and label China a currency manipulator, threatened to 
withdraw from the WTO and NAFTA, and to impose high tariffs on imported Chinese goods and 
goods produced by U.S. MNCs that had offshored production. Trump’s “America first” trade 
policy was one part of a larger package of social protections for the white working class, which 
also entailed empowering them with putative immigration and criminal justice policies. He 
promised xenophobic border walls and controls to protect working class jobs from “illegal 
immigrants” and aggressive security policies to protect working class communities from the “bad 
hombres” to the South and the “radical Islamic terrorists” in the East. Trump’s nationalistic 
rhetoric worked. Trump won the election because he won white working class voters in key 
swing states and counties (Freund & Sidhu 2017; Sasson 2016; Cohn 2016; Tankersley 2016).  
 
The TPP gets Trumped 
After Trump won the election, true to his campaign promise, he withdrew the U.S. from 
the TPP on his first week in office. Congressional Democrats and their constituents refused to 
give Trump credit for the TPP’s 2016 defeat, Senate Minority Leader Charles Schumer 
proclaimed, “TPP was dead long before President Trump took office.” Similarly, Richard 
Trumka, head of the AFL-CIO, attributed the lack of Congressional support for the TPP to “a 
powerful coalition of labor, environmental, consumer, public health and allied groups.” Obama’s 
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USTR Froman responded that the TPP was merely in a state of hibernation because the 
U.S.’ core interests do not change with an administration change. At the April 2017 
APEC meeting in Vietnam, trade ministers from the TPP countries marginalized Trump’s 
new USTR Robert Lighthizer and they pledged to ratify the TPP without the U.S. 
 
V. Conclusion 
Polanyi’s “double movement” and TPP negotiations 
In the TPP investment chapter negotiations, U.S. political actors represented all 
three of the ideal types of trade policy positions. U.S. MNCs, the Obama administration, 
and bipartisan groups in Congress supported “free trade” policies (market-based 
governance). Labor unions, environmental organizations, consumer groups, and many 
Congressional Democrats supported “socialist” trade policies (subjecting markets to 
democratic control). Libertarian, small government, and “Tea Party” Republicans and 
political organizations, along with the Trump administration, supported the “nationalist” 
trade policies (prioritizing national interests over multinational interests). The “free 
trade” actors vigorously promoted the TPP while “socialist” and “nationalist” groups 
denounced the TPP in favor of social protections, and the alliances had crossed 
conventional party lines on both sides of the debate. As negotiations progressed, U.S. 
political actors sharpened their positions as they conflicted and cooperated with groups in 
other countries. With the election of Donald Trump, “socialist” and “nationalist” political 
currents had defeated the “free traders” in the TPP battle.  
 
“Free trade” actors in TPP investment negotiations 
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The “free trade” actors sought strong investor protections and far-reaching applications of 
ISDS with limited exceptions. They promoted their position as “de-politicized,” neutral, market-
based governance for the region. However, the “free trade” groups were in conflict with the 
“socialist” and “nationalist” actors. Therefore, their promotion of market-based governance was 
a political decision rather than a “neutral” economic law. For example, during domestic 
negotiations, U.S. business groups united in their position, “U.S. investors are at a competitive 
disadvantage compared to many of their key competitors from countries that already have strong 
[investment agreements] with countries in key growth markets such as China, India and Russia” 
(Inside U.S. Trade 2010a). Prominent business lobbyist Linda Menghetti explained to Congress, 
“…strong investment protections are vital and squarely within America’s economic and national 
interest” (cited in House 2009). The domestic negotiations over specific provisions revealed the 
USTR’s decision-making process in developing negotiating objectives – they would support 
most of business’ proposals and reject any competing proposals, including those of labor, 
environmental, and consumer groups. Since the Obama administration did not pursue TPA and 
lacked Congressional directives, the USTR was free to reject other policy proposals. 
However, the Obama administration did not entirely represent “free trade” policies. The 
USTR had a more nuanced approach than simply pursuing the expansion of investor protections 
and ISDS in indefinite directions. As the U.S. had been a defendant in numerous ISDS cases, the 
USTR did not support all of business’ proposals. For, example, the “minimum standard of 
treatment” and “expropriation” provisions were less investor-friendly than the proposals 
advanced by U.S. MNCs. However, compared to the investment policies of other countries, U.S. 
investment policy is the among the most pro-investor rights (Alschner & Skougarevskiy 2016).  
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“Socialist” trade actors in TPP investment negotiations 
In negotiations, the U.S.’ proposed multinational investor protections immediately 
conflicted with the priorities of labor unions, environmental organizations, and consumer 
advocacy groups. For this reason, diverse groups in the U.S. called on the Obama 
administration to democratize trade and investment policy. Labor unions had two primary 
concerns in investment negotiations, first, that strong investor protections facilitated 
offshoring of jobs, and second, they attempted to tie investor rights to investor 
obligations to raise labor standards abroad. However, it was sometimes unclear whether 
these demands were “socialist” or “nationalist.” Labor unions who sought to insert 
language into the investment chapter to raise global labor standards were “socialist,” 
while labor leaders who prioritized the interests of U.S. workers over workers in other 
countries were “nationalist.” Environmental organizations also sought to weaken investor 
protections. Their purpose was to prevent multinational investors from using ISDS to 
weaken environmental regulations, notably, the fossil fuel industry’s deliberate use of 
ISDS to dismantle climate change regulations. Similarly, the USTR conceded to a broad 
tobacco exception from ISDS. While the U.S. business community united in opposition 
against product-specific exemptions to ISDS as an unacceptable precedent, the conflict 
represented a growing domestic and international sentiment that MNCs use ISDS to 
undermine public interest legislation, particularly in small or developing countries. The 
heated debate over capital controls starkly contrasted the public and private interest in 
monetary and exchange rate policy. Developing countries, led by Chile, outlined the right 
to capital controls as fundamental to development policy; whereas the USTR was 
opposed to capital controls in order to facilitate flows of private capital and support the 
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commercial interests of U.S. financial services MNCs. U.S. consumer advocacy groups, 
hundreds of leading U.S. economists, and Congressional Democrats supported 
developing countries’ right to capital controls. These groups represented “socialist” trade politics 
as they sought to democratize trade policy formation. 
 
“Nationalist” trade actors in TPP investment negotiations 
Similar to the “socialists,” in all countries “nationalists” tended to be opposed to strong 
investor protections. The developing countries pushed back on the USTR for a combination of 
weaker investor rights and broad exceptions to ISDS, and many of their motivations were to 
benefit domestic industries. For example, Mexico sought broad exceptions to ISDS in the energy 
sector to safeguard national energy firms while Malaysia sought exceptions for government 
procurement to give contracts to national firms. Even the U.S. took such precautions - the USTR 
did not include the proposals from labor unions on state-owned enterprises because the Treasury 
did not want to expose itself to ISDS claims against emergency financial measures, such as 
nationalizing the banks and automakers after the 2008 financial crisis. Libertarian political 
organizations, like the Cato Institute, announced that they opposed ISDS because it undermined 
U.S. sovereignty and democracy. Politicians, notably Donald Trump, opposed the TPP along 
nationalist lines inasmuch as the TPP resembled past U.S. FTAs that allowed MNCs to abandon 
production in the U.S. while allowing other countries to import without reciprocal market access. 
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Chapter Six: The Direction of U.S. International Investment Agreements 
I. Introduction 
II. Comparing the NAFTA and TPP investment and financial services chapters 
III. The TPP’s impact on state sovereignty 
IV. Conclusion: international investment law theory revisited 
 
I. Introduction 
In this chapter, I compare the legal content of the NAFTA and TPP investment 
agreements. Although there are key differences, in the main, the NAFTA and TPP 
investment agreements are highly consistent. I argue that based on this analyses, the TPP 
investment chapter heavily favors “private” interests in the “public-private” divide and it 
categorically limits development policy options for the low-income TPP countries. I 
conclude that although President Trump withdrew the U.S. from the TPP, it is not in the 
Trump administration’s interest to revise the U.S. Model BIT. In the next chapter I will 
discuss the intersection of the U.S. Model BIT with Trump’s “America First” campaign 
promises. 
 
II. Comparing the NAFTA and TPP investment and financial services chapters  
II.A. Differences between the NAFTA and TPP investment and financial services chapters 
“The TPP is not NAFTA” – President Obama 
In broad terms, the NAFTA and TPP investment and financial services chapters 
contain very similar investor protections and investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) 
procedures, however, there are some important and specific differences. International 
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investment law experts Wolfgang Alschner and Dmitriy Skougarevskiy compared the TPP 
investment chapter to over 3000 international investment agreements in force using a method 
that turns text into data to compare similarities and differences between texts (2016). They found 
that the TPP investment chapter was most similar to the investment chapters of the U.S.-
Colombia FTA (81 percent similarity) and the U.S.-Peru FTA (81 percent similarity) (2016). 
Notably, Alschner and Skougarevskiy found that the TPP investment chapter was 70 percent 
similar to the 2012 U.S. Model BIT and 58 percent similar to the NAFTA investment chapter 
(2012).  
Alschner and Skougarevskiy’s methodology is limited in two significant ways. First, their 
methodology omits footnotes and annexes, which contain some of the USTR’s most important 
negotiating concessions. Notably, the exceptions to the application of ISDS to “investment 
agreements,” which cover public-private contracts over natural resources, infrastructure, and 
public services (Annex 9-L), and the annexes covering capital controls (Annex 9-E, 9-F, and 
Exceptions and General Provisions). Second, Alschner and Skougarevskiy’s study does not 
discuss the legal context of the provisions, in which slight changes to the language can have 
strong modifications to the legal interpretation. For example, the central difference between the 
“minimum standard of treatment” articles in the NAFTA and the TPP is that the NAFTA article 
contains the broad language that investments be treated “in accordance with international law,” 
while the TPP article specifies that that investments be treated “in accordance with applicable 
customary international law” (emphasis added). The insertion of only two words, “applicable 
customary,” before “international law” significantly alters the interpretation of the article 
because it limits the scope of which international law is being referenced. The TPP article 
provides for “applicable customary international law,” which is an established body of legal 
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precedents that are centuries old, whereas the NAFTA article merely cites “international 
law” which was interpreted by investors to be any international law. 
President Obama repeatedly addressed the TPP’s critics, “The TPP is not 
NAFTA.” Based on my own analysis, there are three mains sources of differences 
between the NAFTA and TPP investment and financial services chapters: (1) the 
experiences of the U.S. as a defendant under the NAFTA ISDS; (2) evolving commercial 
interests of U.S. MNCs abroad; (3) the USTR’s concessions during TPP negotiations. 
The investment provisions that are contained the NAFTA were originally designed for 
capital-importing states and so the original U.S. drafters did not anticipate the U.S. to be 
an ISDS defendant. However, the early NAFTA cases, especially those brought against 
the U.S., motivated the Department of State to modify core provisions. The most 
significant of these revisions came during the drafting of the 2004 U.S. Model BIT in 
which the Department of State carefully scaled back the strength of two core investor 
protections, the “minimum standard of treatment” and “expropriation” articles. This was 
achieved by the creation of annexes that tied the interpretations of the two provisions to 
“customary international law” that has been established in centuries of international 
arbitrations on the two provisions. The adjustments to these two provisions were the most 
significant changes to the U.S. Model BIT (2004).463  
The commercial interests of the U.S. MNCs have evolved with technology and 
the growing commercial and political importance of Asian markets. To support the 
interests of U.S. MNCs, both the 2012 U.S. Model BIT and the TPP contain expanded 
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investor protections that were not conceivable in the 1990s. Comparing the NAFTA and TPP 
investment and financial services chapters, the TPP’s most significant expansion of investor 
rights include: expanded “performance requirements” aimed at state-owned enterprises banning 
transfers of technology and intellectual property; application of ISDS to “investment 
agreements” and “investment authorizations”; application of ISDS to the WTO intellectual 
property rules (TRIPS); the application of the “minimum standard of treatment” article to the 
financial services sector. The strengthening of these U.S. investor protections were in large 
measure developed for future negotiations with China, particularly regulations on intellectual 
property and state-owned enterprises (which are further developed in the TPP intellectual 
property and state-owned enterprises chapters).  
Lastly, other key differences between the NAFTA and TPP investment and financial 
services chapters emerged from the concessions that the USTR made during TPP negotiations. 
The USTR’s most important negotiating concessions to the TPP’s regulations include: 
exceptions to the application of ISDS to “investment agreements”; more liberal policy space for 
use of capital controls; the complete carve-out of tobacco from ISDS. The TPP’s impact on state 
sovereignty is discussed below (Section III).  
 
II.B. Similarities between the NAFTA and TPP investment and financial services chapters 
The ghost of Calvo 
Far more significant than the specific differences between the NAFTA and TPP 
investment and financial services chapters are their fundamental similarities. Considering the 
diverse and wide-ranging proposals to alter the 2004 U.S. Model BIT, the Obama administration 
made only very minor revisions (outlined above) to the 2004 U.S. Model BIT in their drafting of 
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the 2012 Model BIT. The Obama administration’s wholesale endorsement of the 2004 
Model BIT signaled the structural consistency of U.S. investment policy since the Cold 
War. The 1983 U.S. Model BIT was developed by the Reagan administration which was 
then imported into the NAFTA investment chapter. The NAFTA investment chapter 
motivated some slight revisions to core investor protections in the 2004 Model BIT. In 
turn, the 2004 Model BIT was slightly expanded upon by the Obama administration in 
the 2012 Model BIT, both of which were used to negotiate the TPP investment chapter. 
From the Cold War through the “rise of China,” the main elements of U.S. investment 
policy have remained stubbornly unchanged – a broad definition of investment and the 
six core investor rights enforceable by ISDS (the six are: national treatment; most favored 
nation; minimum standard of treatment; expropriations; transfers; and performance 
requirements). Since the TPP investment chapter is an expanded version of the NAFTA 
investment chapter, then it was mostly written by the Reagan administration and not the 
Obama administration. 
In 2007, Congress adopted the “May 10th Agreement” which promised to 
rebalance the priorities of U.S. trade and investment agreements with greater emphasis on 
the public interest. The May 10th Agreement included stronger labor and environmental 
protections, intellectual property flexibilities that would facilitate greater access to life-
saving medicines, and investment language that clearly limited the rights of multinational 
investors to those afforded to domestic investors, referred to as “no greater rights.” In 
2009, during the Obama administrations’ review of the 2004 U.S. Model BIT, various 
proposals were made to insert a “no greater rights” provision into the new (2012) U.S. 
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Model BIT. These proposals were fiercely opposed by the U.S. business community, lobbyist 
Linda Menghetti warned Congress,  
“An approach to incorporate further the ‘no greater rights’ language would 
reverse decades of U.S. support for strong and binding international rules that 
largely benefit the U.S. and its investors. This return to Calvo is not necessary and 
would be very harmful” (cited in House 2009). 
Prior to Menghetti’s statement, Harvard law professor Robert Stumberg had 
demonstrated to Congress that the U.S. BIT program provides greater investor rights than the 
rights afforded by the U.S. Constitution, which business lobbyist Menghetti had implicitly 
acknowledged. However, Menghetti warned that seeking a reversion to U.S. domestic law would 
amount to a return to the Calvo doctrine. Speaking on behalf of a group of major U.S. MNCs, 
Menghetti asserted that any proposed “no greater rights” provision would “…provide few if any 
benefits to the U.S. while creating huge risks for U.S. investors overseas” (cited in House 2009). 
Menghetti explained to Congress that strong investor protections are necessary to raise investor 
confidence in foreign markets to make foreign investments, therefore, any rollback of investor 
rights to domestic law would “dramatically shift” the risk profile of foreign investments and put 
U.S. firms at disadvantage.  
In the same Congressional Hearing, Congressman John Larson was just as forthcoming, 
“…for U.S. foreign investors in other jurisdictions, we want to obtain greater substantive rights 
for our investors than domestic investors may have in those countries. That is sort of the value of 
the BIT” (cited in House 2009). The early twenty-first century debates over “no greater rights” 
were eerily reminiscent of the early twentieth century conflicts between the Calvo Doctrine and 
the Hull Doctrine. After Mexico’s mass expropriations in 1917, U.S. Secretary of State Polk 
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asserted that “on occasion” international law may afford foreigners with “broader and 
more liberal treatment” than nationals, 
“The Government of the United States is firmly of the opinion that 
the great weight of international law and practice supports the view that 
every nation has certain minimum duties to perform with regard to the 
treatment of foreigners, irrespective of its duties to its own citizens” (cited 
in Borchard 1940: 453).  
Simply put, U.S. investment policy has remained highly consistent over time 
because the international commercial interests of U.S. MNCs depend upon strong 
investor rights and protections. After President-elect Trump pledged to withdraw from 
the TPP, USTR Michael Froman, who oversaw TPP negotiations, retorted, “American 
core interests don’t change from administration to administration” (cited in AFP 2016). 
Indeed, even if the Trump administration does withdraw the U.S. from the TPP, U.S. 
investment policy will not fundamentally change with an administration change. Rather, 
the same or similar conflicts in TPP negotiations between multinational investors and 
state regulators will emerge in the next negotiations whether it be in a TPP renegotiation 
or a different FTA or BIT.  
 
Strong investor rights as comparative advantage 
Congressional Democrats, labor unions, environmental organizations, consumer 
advocacy groups, academics, and think tanks advanced complex and substantive policy 
proposals for both the 2012 U.S. Model BIT and the TPP. Most of the proposals would 
have significantly weakened investor rights and ISDS while strengthening the ability of 
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governments to regulate. Even during the NAFTA negotiations, labor unions and environmental 
organizations had presented Congress with sophisticated evidence supporting their proposals and 
debunking the arguments of U.S. MNCs. U.S. trade and investment policy became increasingly 
unpopular in the country as growing sections of the population linked globalization to job loss, 
growing inequality, environmental damage, and other problems. For this reason, during the TPP 
negotiations the Obama administration did not seek trade promotion authority from Congress as 
they sought to insulate the USTR’s negotiating positions from democratic processes. This also 
explains the unprecedented secrecy surrounding the TPP negotiations. In this context, the Obama 
administration categorically rejected any policy proposals that were unfavorable to the U.S. 
commercial interests abroad. In 1959, in sociologist C. Wright Mills’ analysis of the domestic 
power structure, he concluded that labor unions were “dependent variables…in the national 
context” (1959: 265). This analysis still holds, labor unions and all other domestic political actors 
found themselves marginalized from trade and investment policy negotiations which eliminated 
them as independent variables effecting the agreements.  
In both the NAFTA and TPP negotiations, there were consistently three independent 
variables that acted upon the texts, (1) the USTR and other relevant government agencies 
(notably the Treasury, Commerce, and State Departments), (2) U.S. MNCs, and (3) other country 
negotiators and regulators. Congress was an independent variable during the NAFTA 
negotiations because the USTR received negotiating objectives from Congress via fast track 
legislation, however, during the TPP negotiations there was no such legislation and Congress’ 
influence over the content of the negotiations was diminished. For example, even when the 
Democrats controlled Congress in 2009-10 and the majority of House Democrats supported 
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legislation for progressive trade policy reform, in response the USTR simply waited for a 
new Congress.  
The negotiating history of the NAFTA and the TPP shows that the USTR 
consulted closely with the U.S. MNCs in drafting and negotiating the agreements. In 
large measure, this is because a U.S. trade agreement must pass Congress for its 
implementation as law and Congress is highly sensitive to the needs and concerns of the 
U.S. MNCs and large exporters. As explained by former Secretary of State James Baker 
during the NAFTA negotiations, “[a trade] agreement not acceptable to the broad 
spectrum of American business is doomed to failure” (cited in Senate 1991). During TPP 
negotiations, House Republicans warned that if the Obama administration conceded to 
labor and environmental groups’ policy proposals then “…they risk eroding traditional 
support for trade…” because the business community would not support such trade and 
investment law (cited in Inside U.S. Trade 2010). To that end, the agreements advance 
the individual commercial interests of U.S. MNCs and large exporters. In TPP 
negotiations, Congress was a “mediating variable” because Congress had an ambiguous 
effect on the content of the investment negotiations, however, the Congressional 
legislative process enhanced the influence of the other independent variables, including 
by giving a powerful voice to labor unions and environmental groups. However, since all 
of the policy proposals for the investment and financial services chapters from labor 
unions and environmental organizations were rejected by the USTR, Congress’ main 
impact was to secure the power and influence that U.S. MNCs had over the agreements.  
The USTR argues that that U.S. investor protections and ISDS reflects “U.S. 
values and interests” (2015). The U.S. BIT program represents U.S. values because it 
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support an international rule of law and ISDS is a conflict resolution process that smooths 
international tensions. Indeed, without ISDS there would be a basis for developing 
countries to reject international law as they did during the Cold War, which would foreshadow a 
return to gunboat diplomacy. Simultaneously, the USTR argues that U.S. investment law is in the 
U.S. interest because the U.S. wrote the laws and China did not. The USTR and U.S. MNCs 
argue that U.S. investor protections and ISDS are in the U.S. national interest because U.S. 
MNCs employ U.S. workers and their global comparative advantage relies on U.S. investment 
agreements. For example, the fossil fuel industry promotes ISDS as in the national interest 
because it sustains the global competitiveness of U.S. energy companies and their workers. A 
spokesman from Chevron, a U.S. oil and gas company, lobbied to Congress during the Obama’s 
administration’s investment policy review in 2009,  
“Sustained progress toward a comprehensive global investment protection 
regime is necessary to both reduce the risk associated with overseas investments 
and to ensure that U.S. companies are not disadvantaged against foreign 
competitors whose investments are protected by such agreements” (cited in House 
2009). 
At the time of that testimony, Chevron was engaged in a (successful) multibillion dollar 
ISDS dispute with Ecuador under the U.S.-Ecuador BIT. Just as U.S. MNCs depend upon the 
regulatory obligations of U.S. investment agreements for their comparative advantages, the same 
regulations curtail state sovereignty.   
 
III. The TPP’s impact on state sovereignty  
The TPP and investor-state dispute settlement 
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In early 2015, as the Obama administration expended tremendous political capital 
to win the necessary Congressional votes for trade promotion authority (formerly called 
“fast-track legislation”), Senator Elizabeth Warren issued a scathing critique, “Agreeing 
to ISDS in this enormous new treaty [TPP] would tilt the playing field in the U.S. further 
in favor of big multinational corporations. Worse, it would undermine U.S. sovereignty” 
(Warren 2015). Jeff Zients, Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, publically 
responded to Warren, “ISDS does not undermine U.S. sovereignty, change U.S. law, nor 
grant any new substantive rights to multinational companies. The reality is that ISDS 
does not and cannot require countries to change any law or regulation” (Zients 2015). 
Factually, Zients was correct in that ISDS tribunals do not have the authority to change a 
country’s law. However, ISDS tribunals order governments to pay multinational investors 
and corporations monetary damages (awards have ranged up to billions of dollars) for 
breaches of investor rights. Therefore, in practice and implementation, ISDS undermines 
the authority of regulators as governments modify, amend, or withdraw legislation due to 
the threat of ISDS, called “regulatory chill.” While it is difficult to empirically 
demonstrate the existence of “regulatory chill,” there have been documented instances of 
it in North America.464  
                                                          
464 Sinclair detailed that the threat of a NAFTA ISDS suit changed cigarette regulations in 
Canada: “In the mid-1990s, as part of intensive lobbying against proposed federal regulations to 
require plain packaging of cigarettes, the tobacco industry procured a legal opinion by former 
NAFTA chief negotiator Carla Hills that asserted such regulations infringed NAFTA’s 
intellectual property rules and constituted expropriation in violation of NAFTA’s investment 
chapter. The multinational tobacco industry repeatedly threatened the Canadian government with 
trade treaty action, including an investor-state challenge. The federal government’s proposals for 
plain packaging were abandoned and replaced with watered-down requirements to increase the 
size of health warning labels on packages” (2015: 37). 
 246 
 
If Zients is correct that ISDS does not undermine state sovereignty, then this does not 
explain the reason that TPP negotiators insisted on the complete carve-out of tobacco from ISDS. 
Tobacco has become a local public health issue all over the world as smoking has increased 
cancer rates which has strained state budgets, motivating governments to regulate tobacco 
companies, marketing, and products. In turn, tobacco companies have explicitly and successfully 
used ISDS as a deregulatory tool, such as in Australia, Canada, and Uruguay. Although the 
USTR was strongly against any product-specific exceptions to ISDS as “dangerous” precedent, 
the U.S. eventually conceded to the tobacco carve-out as a compromise. President Obama 
justified his administration’s decision, “The big bugaboo that’s lifted up there is tobacco 
companies suing poorer countries to make sure that anti-smoking legislation is banned, or at least 
tying them up with so much litigation that ultimately smaller countries cave” (The White House 
2014). As ISDS tribunals mandate that countries pay MNCs monetary compensation ranging 
from millions to billions of dollars, legislators in those countries find that their capacity to 
regulate is limited by ISDS, directly undermining state sovereignty. The problem becomes 
particularly acute for capital-importing developing countries, some of which have national GDPs 
that are smaller than the market capitalizations of leading MNCs.  
 
The TPP and expansive investor rights 
Investor-state dispute settlement does not undermine state sovereignty per se, rather, it 
enforces multinational investor rights that conflict with the ability of states to regulate. The TPP 
contains some of the most expansive multinational investor rights of any international investment 
agreement in force (Alschner and Skougarevskiy 2016). Compared to other investment treaties, 
multinational investor rights are particularly strong in the TPP investment and financial services 
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chapters in at least five regulatory areas: (1) a broad definition of investment that includes 
far-reaching intellectual property rights; (2) the historically problematic “minimum 
standard of treatment” and “indirect expropriation” articles; (3) an expansive list of 
prohibitions on “performance requirements” including unprecedented regulations 
targeting state-owned enterprises; (4) limited policy space for capital controls; (5) limited 
exceptions to the application of ISDS. The TPP’s multinational investor rights in these 
five areas go well beyond WTO obligations and in some important instances they conflict 
with international regulatory norms.  
Similar to the investment agreements of other developed countries, the U.S. uses a 
broad, asset-based definition of “investment” (in contrast to an enterprise-based 
definition) that covers tangible and intangible property controlled by investors of another 
Party. The TPP’s definition of investment is not new as it includes a non-exhaustive list 
of assets that are considered to be “investments,” including intellectual property rights. 
Intellectual property law in U.S. FTAs have always gone beyond WTO obligations in 
length, strength, and scope of patentable items. The TPP intellectual property chapter 
expands into new regulatory areas, such as, data exclusivity and market exclusivity to 
prevent the development of low-cost generic drugs. Since the TPP intellectual property 
rights chapter contains unprecedented expansions of intellectual property rights, the 
definition of investment also grows to encompass these new rights. 
Over the objections and counter proposals of domestic groups and other country 
negotiators, the U.S. retained the same strong investor rights from the 2004 Model BIT in 
the TPP investment chapter, and even expanded some. The main innovation of the 2004 
U.S. Model BIT was to tie the legal interpretations of “minimum standard of treatment” 
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and “indirect expropriation” to “customary international law,” thereby weakening the strength of 
these two key investor protections. However, arbitral tribunals have not based their 
interpretations of these provisions on “customary international law” but rather have merely cited 
the standards of other tribunals, creating “evolving” standards of what constitutes “minimum 
standard of treatment” and “indirect expropriation.” Therefore, since TPP’s “minimum standard 
of treatment” and “indirect expropriation” articles can be interpreted as both narrow and broad 
investor rights, they afford strong investor protections. Moreover, the TPP significantly 
strengthened investor rights in the financial services sector by applying the “minimum standard 
of treatment” article to the financial services chapter for the first time. The TPP further 
strengthened investor rights with new provisions in the “performance requirements” article that 
are directed at state-owned enterprises, specifically, they ban host states from requiring the use of 
domestic technology, require host states to allow multinational investors to participate in the 
development of industry standards, and clarify that all of the TPP’s investment obligations apply 
to state-owned enterprises.  
Lastly, the TPP incorporates strong investor rights because exceptions to investor 
protections are highly limited and specified. The two key areas were capital controls and the 
application of ISDS to “investment agreements.” The USTR was forced to concede to a more 
liberal approach to capital controls than it originally intended, nonetheless, the policy space for 
capital controls is simultaneously vague yet highly conditional and temporary. The other most 
contentious area of investment negotiations was the U.S.’ proposal to apply ISDS to “investment 
agreements” and an “investment authorizations,” which cover all major contracts between an 
investor and a host state, including, natural resource exploration and extraction (such as mining, 
oil, gas, etc.), public utility services (such as electricity and water treatment), and public works 
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concessions (such as roads, highways, infrastructure). Except for Japan, other countries 
either rejected this proposal or sought broad exceptions. At the insistence of U.S. oil, gas, 
and extractive industries, the U.S. attempted to limit any exceptions to the application of 
ISDS to “investment authorizations.” The final agreement contained two major 
compromises, first, a reduced scope of “investment agreements” and that carved-out 
specific areas of the public domain, and second, conditions under which disputes could 
be arbitrated under an alternative legal forum to the ISDS procedures. Cumulatively, the 
TPP investment chapter provides some of the strongest investor protections of all existing 
international investment agreements (Alschner and Skougarevskiy 2016).  
 
The TPP and conflicts with public interest legislation  
Multinational investors and corporations invoke the “minimum standard of 
treatment” and “indirect expropriation” clauses when governments change or introduce 
regulations that negatively impact their investment. However, because the U.S. definition 
of the “minimum standard of treatment” and “indirect expropriation” articles offer 
investors particularly strong rights, multinational investors and corporations have 
assumed liberal interpretations of these rights. In so doing, multinational investors and 
corporations have increasingly used them to bring ISDS challenges against public interest 
legislation (Choudhury 2008). For example, the NAFTA ISDS cases overwhelming 
targeted environmental regulations.  
Strong investor rights and the offensive use of ISDS have the effect of “locking-
in” a government’s regulatory environment, thereby limiting state sovereignty to design 
and implement future market regulations. However, regulatory norms evolve. Consider 
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the TPP’s tobacco carve-out. The regulatory norms on tobacco evolved from treating tobacco as 
a “safe” product to a “dangerous” product, and states introduced public interest legislation 
accordingly. The fact that TPP negotiators had to carve-out tobacco from ISDS demonstrates that 
ISDS is used as an offensive tool by MNCs to lock-in a favorable regulatory environment in a 
particular country.  
However, tobacco is not the only commodity that is patently against the public interest 
and in which regulatory norms have evolved. Nor is tobacco the only public issue that has 
motivated public interest legislation which has been a target of ISDS claims. The U.S. fossil fuel 
industry understands that they are contributing to global warming, which is against the public 
interest as global warming has been linked to the increasing frequency of natural disasters, 
among other public issues. Yet the oil and gas industry has won billions of dollars in successful 
ISDS cases, thus weakening climate change and fossil fuel regulations in those countries. Two 
NAFTA examples include a successful ISDS case against a ban on fracking in Canada, and the 
pending $15 billion claim against the U.S. for the Obama administration’s denial of the Keystone 
XL oil pipeline. In the lead up to the 2008 global financial crisis, the “toxic assets” that were 
fraudulently sold to investors all over the world by U.S. multinational banks were malicious to 
the public welfare as they destabilized the global financial system. Yet, the TPP extends the 
“minimum standard of treatment” protection to the financial sector and one multinational bank 
has already successfully used ISDS against emergency financial measures.465 Similarly, the 
international regulatory norms on capital controls have been shifting and evolving for at least the 
last hundred years (Abdelal 2009), yet the TPP cements a stringent and limiting approach to 
                                                          
465 Saluka Investments B.V. vs. The Czech Republic, Partial Award, Ad hoc-UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules (2006). 
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capital controls that domestic lawmakers cannot change. Since at least the industrial 
revolution, the relationship between capital and labor has been mediated by government 
and labor standards have consistently changed, yet MNCs have used ISDS to challenge 
labor protections including a minimum wage bill.466 Pharmaceutical MNCs have used 
ISDS to extend patent monopolies on medicines even though many countries have laws 
recognizing that patent laws evolve over time.467 In sum, TPP negotiators have not 
adequately explained why tobacco is the only public issue that deserves to be carved-out 
from ISDS as ISDS undermines state sovereignty to address a range of public issues.  
The TPP’s limits to state sovereignty have disproportionately strong effects on 
developing countries because they are capital-importers and investor rights apply to host 
states. However, as the number of ISDS cases have steadily increased each year, high-
income and developed countries have also been increasingly defendants in ISDS cases. 
The TPP exposes the U.S. to greater risk of ISDS challenges because it extends the 
jurisdiction of ISDS to territories with which the U.S. did not have a BIT or FTA (notably 
Japan which is a capital-exporting state) and there are more than 9000 MNCs in the TPP 
countries (Weisman 2015).  
Lastly, the TPP investment chapter (and any other international investment 
agreements) lacks a corresponding arbitral mechanism to bring justice to multinational 
investors and corporations that have violated their obligations under international labor, 
environmental, and human rights laws. Specifically, there is investor-state dispute 
settlement but there is no state-investor dispute settlement not to mention a public-
                                                          
466 Veolia Propreté v. Arab Republic of Egypt (ICSID Case No. ARB/12/15) 
467 Eli Lilly and Company v. Government of Canada. 
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investor dispute settlement. A key innovation of the TPP investment chapter was an 
unprecedented “corporate social responsibility” clause,468 however, it is a “voluntary” 
commitment and entirely unenforceable. Similarly, the “environment and public health” 
article469 is phrased as a moral obligation of multinational investors and is unenforceable. 
Therefore, ISDS creates a tremendous legal disparity between multinational investors and local 
publics, in which multinational investors have access to binding and enforceable ISDS 
arbitrations but local publics are limited to municipal legal remedies.  
For example, in Peru, a TPP member, U.S. based mining company Renco Group Inc. had 
metal smelter operations that contaminated air, soil, and water to the extent that it caused an 
epidemic of lead poisoning in nearby towns. The Peruvian government ordered Renco to clean 
up the site and Renco launched an ISDS case470 against Peru citing a breach to the “minimum 
standard of treatment” article under the U.S.-Peru FTA. Meanwhile, in 2007, U.S.-based lawyers 
brought claims against Renco on behalf of 162 sickened Peruvian children in the state of 
Missouri because Missouri allows foreign plaintiffs to bring claims against companies located in 
that state (Wallach 2012). As Renco could bring its claims to ISDS tribunals but the citizens of 
Peru had to rely on U.S. domestic courts, ISDS created uneven legal rights between Renco and 
the citizens of Peru. In another example, in Mexico, another TPP member, multinational banks 
(Wachovia and HSBC) were found laundering billions of dollars for Mexican drug cartels. While 
the Obama administration refused to bring criminal charges against the banks because they 
believed it would have been “destabilizing to the global economy,” victims of the drug war in 
Mexico were left to sue the multinational banks in U.S. courts (cited in Roth 2012). The TPP 
                                                          
468 Article 9.7 
469 Article 9.6 
470 The Renco Group, Inc. v. The Republic of Peru. 
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expands the financial sectors’ access to ISDS but it does not offer a concurrent 
mechanism to check the financial sectors’ flagrant abuse of those rights. This imposed 
legal disparity between social groups further undermines state sovereignty as 
multinational investors enjoy the privileges afforded by ISDS but local publics lack 
access to international tribunals to bring justice to the crimes and transgressions of 
multinational investors. In some instances, such as the ones outlined above, this legal 
disparity between multinational investors and local publics can contribute to a situation in 
which multinational investors and corporations are “above-the-law” in nation-states.  
 
IV. Conclusion: international investment law theory revisited 
IV.A. Comparing the NAFTA and TPP investment and financial services chapters to free trade 
theory 
Are the TPP investment and financial services chapters a “golden straightjacket” 
(Freidman 2012) that constrains “arbitrary” government regulations and enhances market 
efficiency and productivity? Do these agreements remove the state from the market such 
that private investment flows respond to market forces? The short answer is no. With the 
exception of certain elements of the market access negotiations, neither the content nor 
the negotiations of the NAFTA and TPP investment and financial services chapters had 
anything to do with free trade theory. This was well argued by Ranking Rep. Sander 
Levin during Congress’ debates over trade promotion authority in 2015, 
“What do David Ricardo and Adam Smith have to say about the 
inclusion of investor-state dispute settlement in our trade agreements? 
Nothing, to my knowledge. What do they have to say about providing a 12 
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year monopoly for the sale of biologic medicines?...What does the theory of 
comparative advantage have to say about those issues? Absolutely nothing – and 
yet those are the issues at the crux of the TPP negotiations today” (Levin 2015). 
The content of U.S. investment policy represents the offensive commercial interests of 
U.S. MNCs balanced against the defensive goals of domestic regulators. The interests of U.S. 
MNCs have evolved well beyond comparative advantage and market efficiency or any other 
traditional topic in open macroeconomics. To the contrary, the NAFTA and TPP investment and 
financial services chapters are full of what can be considered protectionist measures, notably, 
long and strong patent monopolies and other related intellectual property protections (Baker 
2016). For this, one can argue that U.S. investment agreements “socially constructed” 
comparative advantages as U.S. MNCs depend upon these unique protections for gaining market 
share and mitigating risk (Streeten 1996). The other side of the coin is that the same investment 
regulations produced social and political conflicts which became the main source of contention 
in negotiations. These conflicts were not questions of free trade but public issues concerning the 
appropriate limits to state sovereignty to implement market and industry regulations.  
Free trade theory does not account for the most important content in the NAFTA and TPP 
investment and financial services chapters. Notably, free trade theory does not explain two key 
characteristics of the NAFTA and TPP investment and financial services chapters: (1) trade is 
not free but managed, and (2) the negotiations are not “country x vs. country y” but rather 
“multinational interests vs. state regulators.” 
 
(1) Trade is not free but managed 
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The NAFTA and TPP investment and financial services chapters contain 
provisions that can be characterized as market access, regulatory, or a combination of 
both. The sectoral market access negotiations were driven by U.S. MNCs seeking to 
access foreign markets, and they were countered by negotiators in those countries who 
had a competing set of motivations. The outcomes of the market access negotiations have 
commercial “winners” and “losers.” For example, during NAFTA negotiations the U.S. 
financial services industry threatened to sink the NAFTA in Congress if Mexican 
negotiators did not concede complete market access in financial services and 
subsequently Mexico’s banking system quickly became majority foreign-owned. In 
another NAFTA example, the U.S. flagships in information technology entered Mexico 
and shortly after most of the competing domestic firms in Mexico went out of business 
(Gallagher & Zarsky 2007). These examples do not reflect the theory of comparative 
advantage in which countries lower tariffs (or even non-tariff barriers) and market forces 
maximize the efficiency of scarce resources. Rather, this example shows that commercial 
“winners” and “losers” are the result of political trade-offs by trade negotiators who are 
balancing different domestic and international political pressures. In so doing, market 
access provisions (in tandem with the regulatory provisions) lead to managed trade as 
commercial outcomes were determined by trade negotiators. 
The regulatory provisions also function to manage trade. The clearest example is 
intellectual property rights, in which the U.S.’ long and strong patent monopolies are by 
definition “managed trade” because a monopoly is a guaranteed market outcome. 
Similarly, the TPP’s disciplines on state-owned enterprises, including the relevant 
provisions in the investment chapter, function to create market outcomes favorable to 
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U.S. MNCs operating in TPP territories. The NAFTA and TPP’s strong investor protections are 
not free trade but managed trade because these multinational investor rights create a regulatory 
environment that is favorable to U.S. MNCs.  
Many commentators on U.S. trade and investment policy, particularly the critics, describe 
U.S.-style multinational investor protections as deregulatory because they weaken regulations in 
host states. However, deregulation implies less or no regulation, whereas U.S. BITs and FTAs 
are packed with regulations. Therefore, it is more accurate to characterize U.S. BITs and FTAs 
as “re-regulatory” rather than deregulatory because in practice U.S. BITs and FTAs replace 
existing legislation in host countries. For example, in negotiating the NAFTA, Mexico was 
pressured to replace the Calvo doctrine with ISDS. Therefore, the political management of 
regulations leads to managed trade as regulations condition patterns of trade and investment. 
 
(2) Not “country x vs. country y” but “multinational interests vs. state regulators” 
In free trade theory, “country x” trades the goods and services that it has relative cost-
efficiencies with “country y” and vice-versa. Therefore, free trade theory assumes that trade and 
trade negotiations are between “country x” and “country y.” However, in actuality, the main 
actors in trade and trade negotiations are multinational commercial interests and state regulators.  
In the development of the NAFTA and TPP investment and financial services chapters, the 
content of the agreements was originally motivated by U.S. MNCs and then it was negotiated 
with domestic regulators in an interagency process that determined U.S. trade and investment 
negotiating objectives. The USTR then took these negotiating objectives to their counter-party 
negotiators who represented the goals of their domestic regulators. In an overly simple model of 
the process, U.S. MNCs first negotiated the agreement with U.S. domestic regulators who then 
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negotiated the agreement with regulators in other states. This is illustrated by the 
contentious debate over capital controls in the TPP. U.S. policy on capital controls was 
motivated by U.S. MNCs and then approved by domestic regulators and then in TPP 
negotiations it was disapproved by regulators in other countries who demanded greater 
policy space for capital controls. That negotiating process cannot be explained by free 
trade theory. Essentially, the NAFTA and TPP investment and financial services chapters 
can be explained as the outcome of conflicts between U.S. MNCs and state regulators, 
both in the U.S. and other countries.  
 
IV.B. Comparing free trade theory to NAFTA outcomes (investment and financial services 
chapters) 
Does trade balance? 
A central tenet of comparative advantage and free trade theory is that trade will balance, 
meaning the value of imports and exports will tend to equalize and there cannot be chronic trade 
imbalances. My findings on the U.S.-Mexico trade imbalance refute the notion of equilibrium 
due to monetary dynamics. The Mexican central bank, Banco de Mexico, has been accumulating 
dollar reserves to protect against exchange rate appreciation due to capital inflows (“The Dutch 
Disease”). Banco de Mexico’s predicament was that as U.S. capital flowed into Mexico, which 
the NAFTA was designed to promote, the Peso would appreciate against the dollar and Mexico’s 
exports would lose competitiveness vis-a-vis exporters in East Asia. Moreover, Banco de Mexico 
had to accumulate dollar reserves due to exchange rate volatility due to capital flow volatility, 
and as insurance against the risks posed by financial integration with the U.S., including global 
financial crises (Ibarra 2012; Sidaoui et. al. 2010). Mexico’s growing stock of dollar reserves has 
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financed the U.S. trade deficit with Mexico. For the aforementioned reasons, as long as Banco de 
Mexico desires to accumulate dollar reserves and not other currencies, then there is no reason to 
expect U.S.-Mexico trade to tend towards balance. 
 
Are industries national? 
Both comparative advantage and Gomory and Baumol’s theory (2001) rest on the 
assumption that industries are national. In comparative advantage, the commercial actors are 
countries. In Gomory and Baumol’s multiple equilibrium trade theory, the commercial actors are 
national industries that are retained by countries. However, to what extent are industries still 
national? In 1996, political economist Susan Strange dismissed the relevance of free trade 
theory, “[products cross borders] not because of any comparative advantages in market terms of 
one country over another but because the management of a [MNC] has decided on a production 
strategy that involves such movements” (1996: 48). The main commercial actors in trade are no 
longer nations or national industries but MNCs and their value chains.  However, this does not 
mean that MNCs have lost their national roots. Economist Ian Fletcher argued that most MNCs 
are “strongly tied” to a particular nation. According to Fletcher, “Despite the myth of the 
stateless corporation, only a few dozen firms worldwide maintain over half their production 
facilities abroad” (2010: 25). Fletcher cited a 1996 study that found, “[MNCs] typically have 
about two-thirds of their assets in their home region/country, and sell about the same proportion 
in their home region/country” (cited in Fletcher 2010: 25). In a survey of the assets and sales of 
Fortune 500 companies during the early 2000s, economists Rugman and Hoon Oh found that 
most MNCs operate regionally rather than globally (2008). They concluded, “…globalization as 
popularly understood does not exist. For example, there is no evidence that U.S. firms operate 
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globally. Instead, they both produce and sell on a home region basis, as do [MNCs] from Europe 
and Asia” (2008: 13). Only the top dozen or so MNCs operate on a truly global scale, and the 
vast majority of MNCs have regional operations and strategies.  
Economists Rugman and Hoon Oh also found that MNCs tend to dominate in their home 
region but also invest and operate in other regions. For example, there are many foreign-owned 
MNCs investing in North America, but the “home” U.S. MNCs have most of the market share in 
North America, and there are similar patterns in Europe and Asia (Rugman & Hoon Oh 2008: 
13). The NAFTA facilitated regional economies of scale for U.S. MNCs such that they could 
retain competitive advantages in North America while MNCs from Europe and Japan contested 
the market. To that end, economists Moran and Oldenski found that U.S. manufacturing MNCs 
that invested in Mexico also expanded domestic investment and operations in the U.S. (2014: 
41). Similarly, the NAFTA facilitated economies of scale in the regional financial services 
industry (dos Santos & Lapavitsas 2008). That most MNCs operate regionally rather than 
globally meets Gomory and Baumol’s assumption that industries are national. Gomory and 
Baumol’s theory can be extended from national industries to apply to regional industries. 
However, that does not mean that the current market structure is static, nor does it address 
increasing trends towards the “deregionalization” of MNCs. 
 
MNCs vs. Ricardo  
While the assets and sales of most MNCs remain regionalized, there are also strong 
trends towards their globalization. Economists Rugman and Hoon Oh found that services MNCs 
were more regionalized than MNCs that manufacture and/or sell goods. There are likely many 
contributing factors to the high degree of regionalization of services MNCs. However, “non-
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tariff barriers” to trade in services guard against competition in services markets. For this reason, 
U.S. services MNCs motivate a range of regulatory chapters in U.S. FTAs, including, state-
owned enterprises, competition policy, procurement, services, e-commerce, investment, 
telecommunications, and financial services, among others. U.S. MNCs seek to use these 
regulatory chapters in U.S. FTAs to reregulate signatory countries so that U.S. MNCs can gain 
market share in those countries, which would lead to more globalization of services MNCs.  
Economists Rugman and Hoon Oh’s study on the assets and sales of MNCs do not take 
into account trade flows. The assets and FDI of MNCs are not complete measures of the 
globalization of MNCs, as many MNCs contract production rather than invest in productive 
enterprises, particularly in East Asia. For example, Apple does not own Foxconn but contracts its 
production to Foxconn. According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 
approximately 80 percent of world trade takes place in “value chains” linked to MNCs (UNCTD 
2013). Therefore, due to trade flows, MNCs have much further global reach than is suggested by 
their regionalized assets and sales.  
The increasing globalization of MNCs lends to two conclusions related to free trade 
theory, first, national competition is increasingly obsolete, and second, the trade balance is no 
longer a measure of national competitiveness. Stephen Roach, former chief economist of Morgan 
Stanley’s China operations, declared, “Country-specific economic competition has been rendered 
obsolete by the emergence of multicounty, vertically integrated supply chains” (2014: 117). As 
developing countries, particularly in East Asia, participate in production and value chains linked 
to MNCs, these countries are not competing for production but rather sharing in production. The 
organizing logic of global value chains is not national comparative advantage but a “trade-
investment-services-intellectual property nexus” (Elms & Low 2013). This is because an 
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industry or firm’s comparative advantage becomes unbundled and dispersed across nations, as 
nations join supply chains rather than build supply chains. Therefore, a country’s trade balance is 
less a measure of national competitiveness. On the U.S. side, the trade deficit does not signify 
that U.S. firms have lost industrial competitiveness. Quite the contrary, U.S. MNCs are the most 
dynamic and competitive in the world. U.S. MNCs rely on regional and global supply chains that 
are not determined by the theory of comparative advantage with a basis in one nation or even 
region (Elms & Low 2013). As MNCs become increasingly global, they undermine the 
credibility of Gomory and Baumol’s theory, which rests on the assumption that industries are 
national. 
 
IV.C. Comparing investment law literature to NAFTA outcomes (investment and financial 
services chapters) 
International investment law is studied from three disciplines - economics, legal studies, 
and international political economy. Scholars rarely make empirical and theoretical connections 
between these three different approaches. In what follows, I will attempt to fill this gap using my 
findings from the NAFTA investment chapter. I argued that free trade theory’s assumptions 
about investment law do not match the actual content and implementation of investment law. 
Therefore, free trade theory is not a useful framework for understanding investment law. Rather, 
I propose a combination of legal studies and international political economy.  
International investment law has regulatory effects and income effects, and scholars 
typically consider them separately. I argue that the legal implementation and income effects are 
two sides of the same coin, that is, they have dynamic feedbacks to each other. As international 
investment law balances multinational investor rights against the state’s ability to regulate, a 
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growing number of legal scholars characterize this dichotomy as a “public-private” debate over 
the purpose, content, and implementation of investment law (Shan 2007; Choudhury 2008; 
Spears 2010; Mills 2011). On the income side, investment law has been a crucial tool for MNCs 
to access foreign markets and mitigate certain political risks of investing and operating in those 
markets (although that is not to say that investment law motivates FDI) (Menghetti 2011). 
However, in the existing literature there is little explicit recognition that MNCs rely upon 
investment law for their economic interests, and in turn, their market power translates into 
political power to motivate the content of investment law.  
The contentious history of investment disputes, ranging from gunboat diplomacy to 
controversial ISDS cases, demonstrates that investing in developing countries can carry great 
social and political risks for MNCs. U.S. MNCs depend upon investment law to establish basic 
conditions for investment in developing countries. International investment law combines 
technical rules on market access and regulations, with U.S. investment law as among the most 
far-reaching and demanding in the investment treaty universe. Beginning with the NAFTA 
investment chapter, U.S. MNCs began to use investment law for regulatory advantages in foreign 
markets, as opposed to using investor protections only to mitigate risk. The USTR and U.S. 
MNCs describe regulations in the host states that disadvantage U.S. MNCs as “non-tariff 
barriers” to investment and operations in foreign markets. Therefore, the USTR and U.S. MNCs 
carefully design U.S. investment law to reduce and/or eliminate these domestic regulations in 
host states. For this reason, corporate lobbies effectively barred Congress from inserting a “no 
greater rights” provision into the 2012 U.S. Model BIT, which would have limited multinational 
investor rights to the same rights as domestic investors in a host state. In U.S. FTAs, including 
the NAFTA and TPP, the investment chapters have substantive interconnections with other key 
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chapters, notably, intellectual property rights and services and financial services. This “nexus” of 
international regulations provides the indispensable legal underpinning to MNCs’ FDI into 
developing countries. In turn, MNCs’ FDI and market access in developing countries facilitates 
their economies of scale and therefore increased global market share.  
MNCs rely on FDI for global competitiveness, and in turn, their enhanced market 
position allows them to expand domestic investment and employment. As MNCs realize larger 
economies of scale, they become vital sources of jobs, growth, and exports for states. In addition, 
MNCs are the main actors in the import and export of goods, services, and capital. For these 
reasons, among others, Congress is highly sensitive to the trade policy needs and concerns of 
U.S. MNCs. In so doing, U.S. MNCs have the structural political power to motivate the content 
of U.S. trade law and policy. As U.S. investment law and policy embodies the private interests of 
U.S. MNCs, investment law increasingly comes into conflict with public interests in a range of 
regulatory areas. 
The “public-private” debate is not unique to U.S. investment law. Many of the most basic 
standards for investment protection in the NAFTA and TPP investment chapters are in the more 
than 3000 international investment agreements in force worldwide. Since the early 1990s, 
thousands of international investment agreements have proliferated to cover the planet and most 
of the agreements contain the same basic investor rights with some form of arbitration. In fact, as 
China has emerged as a major capital-exporter, China’s own investment policy has evolved to 
resemble the U.S. Model BIT (Berger 2013). The difference is that U.S. investment agreements 
contain some of the strongest and far-reaching investor protections than other investment 
agreements, including those of China and other capital-exporters.  
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States are now coming to terms with the fact that international trade and investment law 
has been driving a wedge between national public interests and multinational private interests, 
both in terms of governance (regulations) and income (distribution). For this reason, Donald 
Trump ran for the Presidency on the campaign promises of economic nationalism and 
sovereignty. The Trump administration’s “2017 Trade Policy Agenda” announced that they 
would ignore WTO rulings against the U.S. that impinged upon U.S. sovereignty, threatening to 
undermine the multilateral trade regime. States will condition global commerce in the twenty-
first century by making political tradeoffs between multinational private interests and national 
public interests.  
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Chapter Seven: Conclusion: Trump’s “America First” Trade Policy and Polanyi’s “Double 
Movement” 
I. Introduction 
II. Trump’s “America First” Trade Policy 
III. Motivations of Trump’s “America First” Trade Policy 
IV. Politics of Trump’s “America First” Trade Policy 
V. Limitations to research and future research 
 
“Fascism, like socialism, was rooted in a market society that refused to function.” 
-Karl Polanyi, 1944, The Great Transformation 
 
I. Introduction 
Karl Polanyi argued that the breakdown of the international market system in the 
1930s led to the rise of fascism and socialism in Europe (1944: 25). Polanyi observed that 
European nations responded to capital flight, rising unemployment, and social and racial 
tensions by supporting fascist and socialist leaders. The fascists promised large sections 
of the population social protections from unfettered international markets in exchange for 
a loss of “human freedoms,” while the socialists promised to subject the market to 
democratic control, even if this would threaten private property rights.  
In a curious parallel, in the twenty-first century U.S., globalization and 
automation have created polarized and precarious employment systems and the 
breakdown of the international market system in 2008 deeply exacerbated those trends 
(Kalleberg 2013). The white working class had the most to lose as employment shifted 
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from manufacturing to services and the “new economy” left many of them behind (Standing 
2011). Hard work no longer translated into success, inequality grew, and social and racial 
tensions mounted. During the 2016 Presidential race, political outsiders Donald Trump and 
Bernie Sanders, representing opposite sides of the political spectrum, won the sympathies of the 
white working class. Donald Trump’s “nationalist” rhetoric and Bernie Sander’s “socialist” 
messages offered new directions and greater social protections. In electing Trump, the white 
working class sought to swing the “double movement” pendulum from “free market” policies to 
“nationalist” policies.  
 
II. Trump’s “America First” Trade Policy 
Consequences of TPP Withdrawal 
The Trump administration has set out to abandon multilateral FTAs, including the TPP, 
in favor of bilateral FTAs (USTR 2017: 1). The new USTR explained, “These bilateral 
discussions will present unique opportunities to engage our Asia-Pacific partners in areas in 
which the TPP failed to provide adequate market access of American-made goods and 
agriculture products” (2017: 143). Trump’s Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross justified the new 
administration’s cold feet in multilateral FTAs, “The concessions made with each nation by the 
U.S. add up, and what happens is the other countries get the benefit of things they didn’t even 
ask for because you had to give them to someone else” (cited in Needham 2017). On those 
grounds, President Trump withdrew the U.S. from the TPP.  
Since the Reagan administration began to negotiate the WTO (the GATT Uruguay 
Round, 1986-1994) and through the Obama administration, U.S. trade policy has started and 
ended with WTO politics and negotiations. That is, for the last 30 years, U.S. trade policy has 
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been motivated by WTO negotiations or has been intended to motivate WTO 
negotiations. After the Bush administration walked away from the WTO Doha Round, 
they joined the TPP in 2008 as an alternative path to trade liberalization.  
It took the Obama administration nearly a year to commit publicly to the TPP. 
Within the context of the stalemated WTO Doha Round, there were three immediate 
catalysts for the Obama administration’s decision to press forward with the TPP. The first 
was that Japan was cooperating in joining the agreement, which was necessary to make 
the TPP politically viable for the U.S. The second reason was that East Asian economic 
integration was proceeding without the U.S., and the USTR and the U.S. business 
community feared marginalization in this highly valuable region. Singapore’s trade 
minister made it explicitly clear to the Obama administration that East Asian trade and 
investment integration would proceed with or without the U.S., as the ASEAN was the 
fulcrum of the China-led RCEP multilateral trade agreement. The third reason, closely 
linked with the second, was APEC politics.  
By 2007, all APEC members had committed to the long-term goal of an APEC-
wide FTA (called the FTAAP). From the U.S. perspective, an APEC-wide FTA would 
have stimulated favorable outcomes at the WTO Doha Round. However, one of the 
central obstacles to realizing an APEC-wide FTA (U.S.-China trade conflicts 
notwithstanding) was the difficult question of who would write the rules for this FTA, as 
U.S. FTAs demand far more regulatory commitments than China’s FTAs. The China-led 
RCEP and the U.S.-led TPP quickly emerged as competing visions for the trade and 
investment rules for a potential future APEC-wide FTA. Moreover, U.S. MNCs and 
exporters would have a lot at stake in an APEC-wide FTA. For this reason, President 
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Obama repeatedly stressed that the TPP would enable the U.S. to “write the rules” for the Asia-
Pacific and not China.   
By withdrawing from the TPP, the Trump administration is back to square one. They 
must now figure out how to address all three of these imperatives that launched the Obama 
administration into the TPP. The TPP set legal precedent for the Trump administration to 
negotiate bilateral FTAs with Japan and eventually Vietnam and Malaysia (the U.S. already has 
FTAs with the other TPP countries). However, without U.S. involvement in multilateral deals, 
there is no chance of revitalizing the WTO Doha Round. The purpose of the TPP was to position 
the U.S. to have a multilateral negotiating strength for a future APEC-wide FTA, which in turn 
would have catalyzed outcomes in the deadlocked WTO Doha Round. Therefore, the Trump 
administration’s trade policy marks a substantial break from the Obama and Bush 
administrations.  
 
Moving forward 
In March 2017, the USTR published its “2017 Trade Policy Agenda” with some 
exposition on an “America First” trade policy, although it lacked details on how to achieve those 
aims. The report detailed four trade policy priorities, the first two were novel, and the latter two 
were carry-overs from the Obama administration. The Trump administration’s top two trade 
policy priorities are, “(1) defend U.S. national sovereignty over trade policy; (2) strictly enforce 
U.S. trade laws” (USTR 2017: 2). Each represents potentially significant policy breaks from past 
practice.  
States arbitrate trade disputes in WTO dispute settlement procedures. The losing state 
often must make domestic regulatory changes to satisfy the winner, which entails negative 
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impacts to domestic constituencies in the losing state. The U.S. has lost numerous WTO cases, 
and past administrations and Congresses have complied with the rulings. In 2003, President 
Bush’s United States Trade Representative (USTR) Robert Zoellick explained,  
“The U.S. should live up to its obligations under WTO rules….We 
recognize that each matter [in which compliance is required] involves sensitive 
interests. Yet America should keep its word, just as we insist others must do” 
(cited in Chorev 2005: 342).  
The Bush administration, just like their predecessors and successors, made the political 
calculation that the WTO was largely established in the U.S.’ image and mostly serves U.S. 
interests. Therefore, the benefits of the multilateral trade regime outweigh the costs. For this 
reason, after the WTO Doha Round of negotiations collapsed in 2008, the Obama administration 
established their number one trade policy objective as “revitalizing the WTO Doha Round” 
(Froman 2014b). In sharp contrast, the Trump administration has put an unprecedented emphasis 
on stressing national sovereignty in relation to the WTO’s dispute settlement system, setting 
precedent for the U.S. to ignore WTO rulings that the Trump administration would consider 
violations of U.S. sovereignty. The USTR’s report asserted that, “…the Trump Administration 
will aggressively defend American sovereignty over matters of trade policy” (USTR 2017: 3). 
Moreover, Trump’s National Trade Council Director Peter Navarro reportedly asked the USTR 
to catalogue the U.S.’s options for avoiding the WTO dispute settlement system, moving more in 
the direction of protectionism.  
From a domestic perspective, to prioritize national sovereignty over trade policy is 
congruent with a nationalistic trade agenda. Given the U.S.’ contentious disputes with its largest 
trading partners at the WTO, including China, Canada, Mexico, and large economies in Asia, 
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this priority sets precedent for protectionism against unfavorable rulings at the WTO that would 
harm domestic constituents. From an international perspective, all of these actions would drain 
the effectiveness and creditability of the entire multilateral trading system, which would be 
highly consequential to the U.S. economy. This is well expressed by the mixed reactions of U.S. 
labor unions. Thea Lee, the deputy chief of staff at the AFL-CIO, commented on the USTR’s 
“2017 Trade Policy Agenda”,  
“On the one hand, we would agree with certain parts, that our trade policy 
has not been aggressive or consistent enough in looking out for the interest of 
American workers…We don’t necessarily agree that we need to go completely 
outside the international trade system” (cited in Paletta & Swanson 2017). 
U.S. trade policy was instrumental in determining the scope and framework of the WTO 
and in turn, the WTO has been highly necessary and beneficial for U.S. MNCs and agricultural 
exporters. This is why the Obama administration wanted to use the TPP to revitalize the WTO 
Doha Round. Moreover, undermining the WTO could lead the U.S. to become more isolated 
from East Asia, which in turn does not offer hope for the WTO Doha Round.  
The second of the Trump administration’s trade policy priorities is to “strictly enforce 
U.S. trade laws.” In the 1988 Omnibus Act, Congress laid out a primary trade negotiating 
objective to reduce the U.S. trade deficit. However, Congress was careful to instruct that the 
main channel to reduce the trade deficit was via an aggressive export strategy and not by trade 
protectionism on imports. Aggressive export promotion in tandem with an openness to imports 
remained trade strategy through the Obama administration. The Trump administration’s priority 
to “strictly enforce U.S. trade laws” is setting precedent to use trade remedy laws to restrict 
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imports from non-market economies that use “unfair trade practices” (read: China). Protectionist 
restrictions on imports would be a nationalistic break from past U.S. trade practice. 
 
III. Motivations of Trump’s “America First” trade policy 
In the NAFTA negotiations there were a range of “nationalist” actors who had 
denounced the agreement, such as Ross Perot and his famous quip that the NAFTA 
would produce “a giant sucking sound” of investment and jobs to Mexico. However, in 
the 1992 Presidential election, Perot only won about one percent of the vote. Republican 
incumbent President Bush was in favor of the NAFTA, as his administration had 
negotiated the NAFTA alongside the WTO. And the Democrat challenger, Bill Clinton, 
had also come out in support of the NAFTA, although he took a more careful approach 
by promising labor and environmental standards in side agreements. Over twenty years 
later, during the 2016 Presidential elections, Donald Trump repeated Ross Perot’s same 
nationalist talking points criticizing the NAFTA while promising to reverse the Obama’s 
“free trade” agenda. Why did Trump’s nationalism have far more currency with voters 
than Ross Perot’s? Why were candidate Trump’s trade promises so politically successful? 
Why were the leading Presidential candidates in the 1992 election in favor of the NAFTA 
but the leading candidates in the 2016 election against the TPP? 
Based on my analysis of the NAFTA and TPP negotiations, I propose three 
motivations to the emergence and institutionalization of Trump’s “America First” trade 
policy. First, that Trump’s trade promises were part of a larger “America First” foreign 
policy, such that trade issues intersected with other foreign policy priorities. Second, that 
Trump’s trade rhetoric had widespread receptiveness from the white working class, 
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especially in key swing states and counties. Third, that Democrat nominee Hillary Clinton lacked 
an alternative to the “free trade” model that was so deeply ingrained in both political 
establishments.  
 
“Make America Great Again” 
Despite the many sound arguments that President Obama had improved welfare in the 
country, there is equal evidence to the contrary. The “Great Recession,” which occurred during 
Obama’s tenure, had permanently damaging effects on the labor market, foreclosing 
opportunities of social mobility for millions of working class people and especially young people 
(Jaimovich & Siu 2012: Kalleberg 2013). The Obama administration’s Wall Street bailouts did 
not improve that condition. Despite Obama being the first non-white President, activists opposed 
to mass incarceration encountered the politics of a society that claimed to be “colorblind.” 
Despite Obama’s record numbers of deportations, Obama offered no long-term solutions to 
contentious debates about immigration, terrorism, border security, and the growing 
undocumented population. Despite Obama’s political rhetoric of the U.S. as a diverse and 
inclusive nation, drastic demographic changes had upended everyday life in many white 
communities and produced a politics of resentment. Internationally, as China’s rise was highly 
correlated with the decline in U.S. manufacturing employment and wages, commentators easily 
painted Obama’s multilateral initiatives as being unresponsive, if not complacent, to the China 
challenge. In contrast, Donald Trump’s campaign slogan, “Make America Great Again,” had 
something the Democrats lacked – a message of redemption. 
Despite Trump’s outlandish and completely unfeasible campaign promises, his message 
was congruent at the domestic and international level. At the heart of it, he promised to empower 
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the white working class and prioritize their interests. He promised domestic and 
international policies to restore the old industrial economy. Domestically, he claimed that 
widespread deregulations and tax reform would stimulate investment and jobs, 
particularly in the energy sector that the Obama administration had targeted with “job-
killing” environmental legislations. He promised a border wall to permanently stem the 
tide of immigration and put bans on Muslim immigration to protect the country from 
terrorist threats. He promised to strengthen the war on drugs to restore “law and order” 
and support law enforcement. Trump’s trade objectives were part of his larger pledges to 
put “America First” in all international affairs. He announced a plan to defeat ISIS and 
rebuild the military, and he assured that he would confront China’s “mercantilism” and 
get tough on MNCs that offshored manufacturing. In so doing, Trump easily 
distinguished himself as a nationalist, in contrast to Clinton’s multinational loyalties.  
 
Receptiveness of the white working-class 
In a review of news articles from major media outlets, most articles attribute 
Trump’s victory to support from the white working class and nearly half of the articles 
cite manufacturing troubles (Freund & Sidhu 2017: 2). To be sure, there is evidence that 
most of Trump’s supporters are wealthy, suburban whites (Sasson 2016).  However, 
Trump’s support in key swing states came from working class whites, and these votes 
delivered Trump the sufficient Electoral College votes for the Presidency. In the rust 
belt/swing states of Ohio, Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Wisconsin, Clinton 
underperformed Barack Obama among white working class voters, and Clinton lost those 
state to Trump (Sasson 2016). According to exit polls, whites without a college degree 
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made up a third of the voting population and Trump won them by 39 percentage points, far 
surpassing 2012 Republican nominee Mitt Romney’s 25 percent margin in 2012 (Tankersley 
2016). Uneducated whites, particularly in swing states and key counties, were the foundation of 
Trump’s victory (Freund & Sidhu 2017). 
While exit polls suggested that “the economy” was the primary motivation working class 
whites in voting for Trump, exit polls are notoriously unreliable. However, there is evidence that 
trade pattern woes can swing U.S. elections. Autor et. al. (2017) found that import competition 
from China led to more votes for Trump in 2016 than Bush in 2000, especially in key counties 
and states. Similarly, Autor et. al. (2016) found that import competition from China is 
significantly correlated with increased political polarization in congressional elections, as 
measured by the number of moderate incumbents who lost their seats. Jensen et al. (2016) 
included trade in services in their analyses and they found that while good imports are associated 
with more political polarization, services exports are associated with more support for the 
incumbent. While campaigning in these regions, Trump said that as President he would exit the 
TPP, threaten to withdraw from the WTO and NAFTA, and impose strong tariffs on imported 
Chinese goods and goods produced by U.S. MNCs that had offshored production. His message 
clearly had currency with the white working class in these key swing states because he won their 
vote. 
 
Clinton’s lack of alternatives to “free trade” 
“NAFTA is the worst trade deal maybe ever signed anywhere, but certainly ever signed 
in this country,”471 Trump taunted Clinton during a prime time television debate in the 2016 
                                                          
471 Cited in Patrick Gillespie, CNNMoney, 27 September 2016. 
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Presidential race. Clinton’s husband, President Bill Clinton, had implemented the 
NAFTA as law in 1994. According to Trump, the NAFTA was a “disaster” because of 
the subsequent multiplication of the U.S. trade deficit with Mexico, and he promised to 
renegotiate the deal, or ‘tear it up,’ to reduce the trade deficit. By Trump’s calculation, 
the trade deficit was in large measure due to the offshoring of U.S. manufacturing to 
Mexico.  
Trump observed his lone agreement with Bernie Sanders, “We have one issue 
that’s very similar, and that’s trade.” Sanders had repeatedly derided the NAFTA for 
favoring the interests of MNCs over U.S. workers. In contrast, Clinton offered little 
alternative to the “free trade” initiatives of past administrations, including her husbands’. 
As I documented in Chapter Five, as Secretary of State, Clinton had oversaw the forming 
of the 2012 U.S. Model BIT, which set key negotiating objectives for the TPP and the 
TPP investment agreements are highly consistent with the same agreements in the 
NAFTA. Clinton then proclaimed the TPP to be the “gold standard” of FTAs. During the 
Democratic primaries in the 2016 Presidential race, after Clinton suffered a string of 
surprising upset losses to Bernie Sanders in the rust belt/swing states, Clinton reverse her 
support for the TPP. However, her loss of the rust belt white working class to Sanders 
and then Trump demonstrated that voters did not trust her new trade/economic policies.  
 
IV. Politics of Trump’s “America First” trade policy 
Using the framework that I presented in the introduction (reproduced below), I 
will compare Trump’s trade rhetoric to his actual policy implementation.  
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Figure Six: Two Policy Positions in U.S. International Investment Law (reproduced)
 
 
On the Presidential campaign trial, candidate Trump clearly took the policy position to 
weaken investor protections and prioritize national sovereignty. After withdrawing the U.S. from 
the TPP, the new Trump administration requested Mexico and Canada to renegotiate the NAFTA 
in March 2017. To deliver an “America First” trade policy in the NAFTA renegotiations, the 
Trump administration would have to prevent offshoring by reducing U.S. manufacturing FDI to 
Mexico. To achieve this in the NAFTA renegotiations, they can pursue two policies, (1) to 
impose regulations that restrict manufacturing FDI to Mexico, and/or (2) to make fundamental 
reforms to the NAFTA investment chapter, which regulates regional FDI and capital flows. 
However, President Trump’s actual trade policy is moving in the direction of strong 
investor rights in the NAFTA, thereby supporting U.S. MNCs rather than the nationalist interest 
groups that voted for him. Trump’s top trade advisors understand that the global competitiveness 
of key U.S industries are dependent upon trade and investment with Mexico. Peter Navarro, head 
of Trump’s newly created White House National Trade Council, proposed to use the NAFTA 
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renegotiations to create a ‘mutually beneficial regional powerhouse where workers and 
manufacturers on both sides of the border will benefit enormously.’472 In the Trump 
administration’s draft notice to Congress, they proposed only cursory revisions of the 
NAFTA investment chapter.473  
Commentators may call this trade strategy “North America First” or “U.S. MNCs 
First,” but they cannot call it “America First.” The NAFTA is a regional, multilateral 
initiative, it is not a nationalistic one. Similarly, if the Trump administration negotiates 
the U.S.-China BIT to contain strong investor protections, then they will support 
multinational interests over national interests, contrary to his trade promises to his voting 
base. Therefore, while withdrawing from the TPP in order to prevent a deepening of the 
U.S. trade deficit was a “nationalist” trade policy, it is doubtful that Trump will remain 
true to his other core trade promises. President Trump had already decided against 
labelling China a currency manipulator, which he had promised to do as a candidate. 
 
V. Limitations to research and future research  
V.A. Limitations to research  
The main limitation to my process tracing of the NAFTA and TPP investment and 
financial services chapters was a lack of access to negotiating materials and documents. 
The NAFTA process tracing is far more complete because all of the negotiating draft 
texts for the investment chapter are publically available (publicly released 2004), while 
the TPP negotiations were highly secretive. The most useful information on the TPP 
                                                          
472 Cited in Andrew Mayeda, Eric Martin, and Nacha Cattan, Bloomberg, 15 March 15 2017. 
473 See Stephen P. Vaughn, above n 3. 
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negotiations came from leaked draft texts, documents, and emails, and the second most useful 
were leaked information to the press especially Inside Trade. Therefore, the lack of public 
transparency limited my data collection such that some important details were missing, notably, 
country-specific negotiating positions in the TPP. 
 
V.B. Areas for future research 
While the Trump administration has made certain revisions to U.S. trade policy, it is 
unclear if trade policymaking institutions have also been changed. Future empirical research 
should address whether or not the Trump administration actually changed the alliances between 
U.S. MNCs, domestic trade agencies, and multilateral trade institutions. Moreover, does the 
newly created White House National Trade Council change any of these institutional dynamics? 
Similarly, as the TPP was negotiated nearly twenty years after the NAFTA yet the 
content of the investment and financial services chapters are very similar, future research should 
address why U.S. investment policy has remained so consistent over the years. Specifically, as 
the core investor protections from the 1982 U.S. Model BIT remain the core protections in the 
2012 U.S. Model BIT, why has U.S. investment policy remained so consistent from the Cold 
War through the “rise of China”?  
Lastly, for the purposes of producing knowledge that goes beyond the academy, future 
research on trade negotiations should analyze the strategies of the different U.S. domestic 
political groups to influence U.S. trade and investment policy. Labor unions, environmental 
organizations, and consumer advocacy groups were largely unsuccessful in influencing domestic 
policy in the 2012 U.S. Model BIT. However, during TPP negotiations these domestic political 
actors formed relationships and networks with anti-TPP constituencies in other countries. For 
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example, if during the TPP negotiations U.S. domestic political actors found the USTR to 
be unresponsive to their proposals, then how did trade negotiators in other countries 
respond? Future research should analyze the “pros and cons” and the effectiveness of 
these strategies.   
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Appendices  
Appendix One:  
Overview of foreign bank operations in Mexico  
While local Mexican banks retained their advantage in relational, “soft” information, 
foreign banks rely on “hard” information for mass retail lending and new financial products such 
as derivatives (Detragiache et. al. 2006; dos Santos 2013; de Hass 2012). Foreign banks in 
Mexico enhanced and expanded consumer credit and credit card networks, introducing 
automated credit scoring, electronic lending platforms, and products such as credito a la nomina, 
or wage-linked loans (dos Santos & Lapavitsas 2008: 49). Household and consumption loans as 
a share of total loans jumped from less than 15 percent to 42 percent between 1999 and 2006. 
Further statistical analysis demonstrates that the rapid expansion of household and consumer 
loans has been led by foreign banks while domestic banks have significantly lower exposures to 
consumer credit (Schulz 2004; Haber & Musacchio 2005; dos Santos & Lapavitsas 2008: 49; dos 
Santos 2013). In 2007, the UK bank HSBC and the U.S. bank Citigroup attributed 52.4 and 75.8 
of all profits in their Mexican operations to their consumer lending segments (dos Santos 2013: 
322). The result has been a reorientation of Mexican banking credit away from productive 
enterprises while targeting household income streams. 
As foreign banks have come to dominate the Mexican banking sector, they led the 
transformation of Mexican banking operations towards a reorientation of credit towards 
household lending and fee-based income. While U.S. banks have profited from these activities, a 
number of analysts have raised policy concerns. As banks in Mexico increasingly target personal 
income as a source of profit, they simultaneously have reduced loans to productive enterprises. A 
number of studies have found that foreign banks in Mexico have led a falling availability of bank 
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credit to productive enterprises, particularly small and medium businesses (Schulz 2004; Haber 
& Musacchio 2005; Doyran & Erdogan 2015; dos Santos 2011 & 2013)474. Further, Beck and 
colleagues (2008) present evidence that while credit to productive enterprises has a statistical 
association with higher rates of per capita growth, credit to households has none. While it is 
difficult to draw conclusions based on a lack of statistical evidence, there have been a number of 
studies that point to adverse growth effects of the reorientation of credit to household lending 
(Doyran & Erdogan 2015; dos Santos 2013). Economist Paulo dos Santos observed, “Coupled 
with the central role lending to poorer households played in the U.S. credit crisis starting in 
2007, this underscores the need for deliberate consideration of the economic content of credit to 
households as an urgent matter of development policy” (2013: 317). While the number of non-
performing loans of total loan portfolios in Mexico have been declining with foreign bank entry, 
debt to income ratios have been rising for both households and firms, posing greater financial 
risks. 
Foreign banks have also reoriented the Mexican bank system towards non-interest 
income, or fee-based activities for financial market mediation, such as originating derivatives475. 
In Mexico, the share of banks’ non-interest income to total income increased from 16.71 percent 
in 1998 to 57.62 percent in 2011 (Doyran & Erdogan 2015: 339). Simultaneously, gross 
contingent liabilities as a share of total banking capital grew from 0.63 percent in 2000 to 35.31 
percent in 2006 (dos Santos & Lapavistsas 2008: 50). Further evidence suggests that these trends 
in Mexico have been largely accounted for by foreign banks (Doyran & Erdogan 2015: 338; dos 
                                                          
474 Although to the contrary, González and Peña (2012) found no distinction between foreign 
banks and domestic banks in this regard. 
475 By 2014, the gross market value of outstanding of the over-the-counter (OTC) derivative 
contracts expanded to $21 trillion dollars. The OTC derivatives market is unregulated and it is 
the largest market in the world. 
 282 
 
Santos & Lapavistsas 2008: 50; Haber & Musacchio 2005: 35). The market making activities 
and new financial products of international banks in Mexico contributed to further consolidation 
of the global banking industry. 
 
Figure Seven: Mexican Housing and Consumption Loans as Share of Total Loans 
 
Figure Eight: Banks’ Net Non-Interest Income Share of Total Income 
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Table 16: Mexico, gross contingent liabilities (as percentage of total banking capital) 
2000 0.63 
2001 2.84 
2002 4.14 
2003 6.32 
2004 15.77 
2005 24.33 
2006 35.31 
Source: dos Santos, Paulo and Costas Lapavitsas. 2008. “Globalization and Contemporary 
Banking: On the Impact of New Technology”, Contributions to Political Economy, 27(1). 
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Appendix Two 
 
Table 18: NAFTA Chapter 11 Claims and Awards by Provision and Country up to January 1, 
2015 
 
Chapter 
11 
Provision 
(NAFTA 
Article) 
Canada Mexico United States 
Total 
Citations of 
Article in all 
Decided or 
Settled Cases 
/ Total 
Citations in 
all Filed 
Cases 
Awards 
Given for 
Breaches 
of Article 
Total 
Citations of 
Article in all 
Decided or 
Settled Cases 
/ Total 
Citations in 
all Filed 
Cases 
Awards 
Given for 
Breaches of 
Article 
Total 
Citations 
of Article 
in all 
Decided 
or Settled 
Cases / 
Total 
Citations 
in all 
Filed 
Cases 
Awards 
Given 
for 
Breach
es of 
Article 
National 
Treatment 
(1102) 
7/26 3 9/15 4 6/17 0 
Most 
Favored 
Nation 
(1103) 
4/23 1 2/6 0 2/11 0 
Standard 
of 
Treatment 
(1104) 
2/4 0 2/4 0 0/3 0 
Minimum 
Standard 
of 
Treatment 
(1105) 
11/32 3* 11/19 2** 7/18 0 
Table 17: NAFTA Chapter 11 Cases up to January 1, 2015 
 Canada Mexico United States NAFTA 
(total) 
Total cases filed 
against Party  
 
35 
 
22 
 
20 
 
77 
Total decided cases 
filed against Party 
 
13 
 
11 
 
11 
 
35 
Decided cases 
won/decided cases 
lost 
 
7/6 
 
6/5 
 
11/0 
 
24/11 
Source: Sinclair, Scott. 2015. “NAFTA Chapter 11 Investor-State Disputes to January 1, 
2015.” Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives. 
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Performan
ce 
Requirem
ents 
(1106) 
5/12 2 4/6 0 1/2 0 
Transfers 
(1109) 
0/1 0 0/1 0 0/1 0 
Expropriat
ion (1110) 
9/26 2 11/18 1 5/13 0 
Cases with 
unavailabl
e 
documents 
(missing 
data) 
 
- 
 
3 
 
1 
Cases 
outstandin
g 
8 2 2 
*Two of the three awards given by Canada as breaches of Article 1105 were issued prior to 
the 2001 FTC Interpretation of Article 1105 
**One of the two awards given by Mexico as breaches of Article 1105 were issued prior to 
the 2001 FTC Interpretation of Article 1105 
Author’s compilation based on Sinclair, 2015 
 
Table 19: NAFTA Chapter 11 Cases Filed by Investors by Nationality 
 Canadian Investors Mexican Investors U.S. Investors NAFTA 
(total) Against 
Mexico 
Against 
U.S. 
Against 
Canada 
Against 
U.S. 
Against 
Canada 
Against 
Mexico 
Cases 
Filed 
1 19 1 1 34 21 77 
Source: Sinclair, Scott. 2015. “NAFTA Chapter 11 Investor-State Disputes to January 1, 
2015.” Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives. 
 
Table 20: Types of Regulation Challenged under NAFTA Chapter 11 up to January 1, 2015 
Policy Challenged Cases 
Environmental protection 18 
Administration of justice 7 
Agriculture 6 
Health care, pharmaceuticals 6 
Trade remedies 5 
Land use planning 5 
Financial regulation, taxation 5 
Postal services 2 
Other 11 
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Source: Sinclair, Scott. 2015. “NAFTA Chapter 11 Investor-State Disputes to January 1, 
2015.” Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives. 
Appendix Three: 
NAFTA Free Trade Commission carefully scales back “minimum standard of treatment” in 2001 
The NAFTA established476 the Free Trade Commission (FTC) to supervise its 
implementation and resolve disputes arising from its interpretation. The FTC is composed of 
“cabinet level representatives” of the NAFTA parties and the FTC’s legal interpretations of the 
agreement are binding upon investor-state arbitral tribunals. To date, the FTC has issued one 
interpretation477, in 2001, and its effect was to scale back “minimum standard of treatment” in 
response to broad claims made by investors under the provision. As the NAFTA came into force 
in 1994, there was a relatively small amount of BITs in existence and there had been no arbitral 
awards under the U.S. BIT program. The original drafters of the BIT had never considered that 
the U.S. could be a respondent to an investor-state case because BITs were initially designed for 
contract with developing countries, which had not been capital-exporters (Vandevelde 2009: 
285). In addition, the U.S. legal system was congruent with the BIT provisions. However, when 
the U.S. became a NAFTA Chapter 11 defendant in 1998 against a Canadian company seeking a 
$500 million award it initiated changes to U.S. trade policy. 
Early investor-state claims against the NAFTA states rotated around the phrase “fair and 
equitable treatment” as well as the other minimum standard of treatment provisions. Investors 
have argued that “fair and equitable treatment” means that once an investment contract is made 
an investor has an expectation of the regulatory environment for that investment, and 
governments breach “fair and equitable treatment” when they make regulatory changes after an 
                                                          
476 Article 2001 of the NAFTA 
477 Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions, NAFTA Free Trade Commission, 
July 31, 2001. (http://www.sice.oas.org/tpd/nafta/Commission/CH11understanding_e.asp) 
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investor has set their expectations. In Metalclad Corporation v. United Mexican States (2001), 
Metalclad had won a decision against Mexico in which Metalclad claimed expropriation because 
Mexico denied it fair and equitable treatment. Metalclad was a U.S. company that had purchased 
land in Mexico to establish a waste disposal facility but the local government denied Metalclad 
the right to establish the waste facility on environmental grounds. Similarly, in S.D. Myers, Inc. 
v. Government of Canada (2002), U.S. company S.D. Myers, Inc., which produced hazardous 
waste, had won a partial award against Canada for its claims that Canada’s environmentally 
motivated ban on PCB exports breached the minimum standard of treatment provisions on the 
grounds that other NAFTA provisions were breached as well. Then in 2001, Methanex, a 
Canadian firm that produces hazardous gas methanol, brought claims against the State of 
California seeking $970 million in damages for a ban on the fuel additive MTBE on the grounds 
that the ban breaches national treatment, denies fair and equitable treatment, and effectively 
expropriates its investment by diminishing its market share (Methanex v. United States 
(2004)).478 All three cases became highly controversial in U.S. trade policy debates as the U.S. 
was negotiating the Free Trade Area of the Americas479. 
When the U.S. became a defendant in the Methanex case the USTR began to change its 
tune about the definition of minimum standard of treatment, and the USTR asserted that in the 
early cases the NAFTA tribunal panels had adopted too expansive interpretations of this 
provision. The USTR and State Department believed that the language “fair and equitable 
treatment” was limited to the norms that have been “crystallized” in international law through 
                                                          
478 Inside U.S. Trade. “U.S. Cites NAFTA Party Agreement to Limit Investor-State Disputes.” 
May 18, 2001. 
479 Inside U.S. Trade. “Zoellick Cool to Restrictions on Investor-State Disputes.” April 4, 2001. 
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repeated decisions over centuries480. In contrast, Methanex and other companies argued that fair 
and equitable treatment was a “free standing commitment” in addition to the obligation to 
provide treatment according to other trade and investment laws, such as WTO obligations481. 
After the launch of Methanex v. United States, USTR Zoellick favored issuing the FTC 
Interpretation of the treatment provision scaling back investor rights on this provision. 
Regardless of the FTC Interpretation, the tribunal dismissed Methanex’s claims in 2004. 
The 2001 FTC Interpretation clarified two minimum standard of treatment provisions, 
firstly, it limited the absolute minimum standard of treatment for investments to “customary” 
international law, and secondly, it asserted that a breach of another NAFTA article or a different 
international agreement (such as the WTO) did not constitute a breach of the NAFTA. By 
inserting the word “customary” into the treatment provision, the FTC referred to “uniform, 
extensive and representative State practice” (ABA 2010). In so doing, the 2001 FTC 
Interpretation established a narrower minimum standard of treatment afforded to investments 
thereby scaling back investor rights to bring claims against states. 
 
                                                          
480 Ibd 
481 Ibd 
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Annexes 
Annex One 
“Fast-track” and the process of developing of the USTR’s negotiating objectives in the NAFTA 
The U.S. Constitution assigns to Congress the authority to “regulate commerce with 
foreign nations” and “lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises.”482 Simultaneously, the 
Constitution transfers to the President broad authority of foreign affairs and the exclusive 
authority to negotiate treaties and international agreements.483 The President appoints the USTR, 
and the USTR centralizes government policy-making on trade and negotiates international trade 
and investment.484 In so doing, both the executive and congressional authorities develop and 
execute U.S. trade and investment agreements.  
Fast-track was created by the Trade Act of 1974 and it was designed as a solution the 
“unwillingness” of trade partners to negotiate due to special interests “inherent” in U.S. trade 
policy making (cited in Fergusson 2015). Trade partners called upon Congress to not reopen any 
negotiated provisions and consider trade agreements within a “definite time-frame” (cited in 
Fergusson 2015). Fast-track was the solution and it mandated Congress to “suspend its ordinary 
legislative procedures” and vote a trade agreement “up or down” with limited debate and no 
amendments. In addition, “fast-track” legislation also contained Congress’ negotiating objectives 
for the President, among other checks on the Executive including consultations with 
Congressional committees. 
Fast-track procedures are as follows: the President submits a trade agreement for fast-
track authority, Congress has 60 or 90 legislative days to review the proposal and either approve 
                                                          
482 U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 8 
483 U.S. Constitution, Article II 
484 Trade Act of 1974, Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1979 
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or disapprove fast-track for the trade agreement. Upon approval of fast-track, during negotiations 
the USTR must consult the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives and 
the Committee on Finance of the Senate, as each joint committee of the Congress “has 
jurisdiction over legislation involving subject matters which would be affected by the trade 
agreement.”485 The consultations include: the nature, purposes, policies, and objectives of the 
agreement and all matters relating to its implementation.486 In addition, the USTR consults 
closely with U.S. business and business groups, “since an agreement not acceptable to the broad 
spectrum of American business is doomed to failure.”487 Beginning with the NAFTA, the USTR 
would hold stakeholder consultations with non-governmental organizations, including labor 
unions and environmental groups, who also influence votes in Congress. Lastly, after 
negotiations are concluded, the President must submit the agreement to Congress for final 
approval on an “up or down” vote. In sum, the fast-track mechanism provides Congress with: the 
authority to mandate negotiating objectives; consultations between the USTR and Congress; and 
Congress’ authority over final implementation. In so doing, fast-track grants Congress the 
authority to influence the outcome of negotiations while the negotiations are within the domain 
of the Executive. 
                                                          
485 Trade Act of 1974 
486 Ibid 
487 James Baker, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 
testimony U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Finance. 1990. “United States-Mexico Free 
Trade Agreement : hearings before the Committee on Finance”, One Hundred Second Congress, 
first session, February 6 and 20, 1991. 
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Figure Nine: Organizational inputs into USTR’s objectives during NAFTA negotiations 
   
 
Negotiating process and structure in the NAFTA 
As mandated by the 1974 Trade Act and the 1988 Omnibus Act, the USTR centralized trade 
policy and negotiations by coordinating with different governmental agencies to determine trade 
policy, including the State Department, Treasury, Department of Commerce, Agriculture, the 
Environmental Protection Agency, and other governmental agencies. Therefore, the USTR had 
members from different governmental agencies. In turn, the USTR had a number of interfaces 
with the private sector and state governments via the advisory committee system, established by 
the 1974 Trade Act, which mandated that the USTR “adequately reflect U.S. public and private 
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sector interests.”488 The Advisory Committee on Trade Policy and Negotiations reflects private 
sector interests, composed of 45 advisors representing business, industry, and agriculture, and 
these members were appointed by the President but recommended for appointment but the 
USTR. 489 The Intergovernmental Policy Advisory Committee provided policy advice on trade 
matters with significance to state and local governments, and other advisory committees included 
agriculture, labor, and the environment. In addition, the USTR regularly consulted policy and 
negotiations with business lobbies and relevant Congressional committees. 
  
                                                          
488 “Advisory Committees”, Office of the United States Trade Representative, accessed 2014, 
(available: https://ustr.gov/about-us/advisory-committees) 
489 “Charter of the Advisory Committee on Trade Policy and Negotiations”, Office of the United 
States Trade Representative. 
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Annex Two 
Do U.S. BIT provisions stimulate FDI inflows to developing countries? 
The effects of U.S. BIT provisions on capital and FDI flows have been studied and 
debated since the U.S. BIT program began, and the results are very mixed. Some studies 
demonstrate that U.S. BITs lead to higher FDI inflows while other studies argue that U.S. BITs 
have no effect on FDI flows. Economists Salacuse and Sullivan (2005) and Buthe and Milner 
(2009) both determined that BITs attract FDI inflows to developing countries particularly when 
the developing country contracts with an OECD country. Moreover, Salacuse and Sullivan 
(2005) found that the U.S. BITs have a greater effect in attracting FDI to developing countries 
than the BITs of other OECD countries, in particular in attracting U.S. FDI. To the contrary, a 
1998 UNCTAD study, one of the first to evaluate the relationship, concluded that “…BITs did 
not play a primary role in increasing FDI, and that a larger number of BITs ratified by a host 
country would not necessarily lead to higher FDI inflows” (cited in Sachs and Sauvant 2009: 21). 
Economist Hallward-Driemeier (2003) and Yackee (2007) also found little support that BITs 
impact FDI flows. Hallward-Driemeier (2003) found that “…rather than encouraging more FDI 
flows in riskier environments, BITs only have a positive effect on FDI flows in countries with an 
already stable business environment and reasonably strong domestic institutions" (cited in Sachs 
and Sauvant 2009: 21).  
The U.S. BIT experience in Africa also casts serious doubt on the relationship between 
U.S. BITs and FDI. In 2011, only six490 of the forty-eight countries in Sub-Saharan Africa 
accounted for 96.4 percent of total U.S. FDI in the region and none had entered into a BIT with 
the U.S. (Ofodile 2011: 5). The clear lack of correlation between BITs and FDI in Africa was 
                                                          
490  South Africa, Nigeria, Mauritius, Equatorial Guinea, Angola, and Liberia 
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frankly stated by President Clinton in two different letters to the Senate for the ratification of 
BITs with Ecuador and Mozambique, “It is the U.S. policy…to advise potential treaty partners 
during BIT negotiations that conclusion of such a treaty does not necessarily result in increase in 
private U.S. investment flows.”491 
 FDI is motivated by a range of factors and BITs are only one of those variables. Any 
analysis of the relationship between BITs and FDI must be done on a case-by-case basis as 
situational independent and intervening variables clearly must also be considered. Therefore, any 
conclusions based on the economic and social performance of the NAFTA Investment Chapter 
are not readily generalizable to other TPP members. 
  
                                                          
491 Letter Of Submittal from U.S. President Clinton to U.S. Senate regarding Treaty Between the 
United States of America and the Republic of Mozambique Concerning the Encouragement and 
Reciprocal Protection of Investment, U.S. Department of State (May 1, 2000). 
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Annex Three 
Mexico’s pre-NAFTA trade and investment liberalizations 
The NAFTA likely had little impact on inward FDI to Canada and the U.S. because both 
countries were already open to investment and with strong investor rights. However, for Mexico 
the NAFTA and pre-NAFTA investment liberalizations were a stark departure from Mexico’s 
import substitution industrialization strategy during the Cold War. In 1993, Mexico’s inward 
stock of FDI was just $52 billion, about 7 percent of GDP. By 2012, the stock reached $315 
billion, some 27 percent of GDP (Hufbauer et. al. 2014). However, it is difficult to separate the 
effects of NAFTA from Mexico’s pre-NAFTA investment liberalizations on inward FDI to 
Mexico. 
The U.S.-Mexico trade and investment relationship has international attention as the U.S. 
is the top capital-exporting developed country and Mexico has been among the top two capital-
importing developing countries in the hemisphere (Brazil is the other), and they share a large 
border. Until the early 1980s, Mexico had far reaching restrictions on foreign investment as 
Mexico pursued import-substitution industrialization. Following the Mexican debt crisis in the 
early 1980s, which left Mexico in need of dollars to pay its debt, Mexico began to liberalize 
foreign investment measures beginning by reforming the maquiladora program in 1983 by 
relaxing controls on foreign investment for the Mexican border region.  
Maquiladoras are production plants on the Mexican side of the U.S. border that export 
goods assembled with imported inputs. Maquiladoras are generally foreign firms that perform 
the assembly stage of production of goods using low-wage (typically female) Mexican labor and 
relaxed environmental standards. From the perspective of Mexican policymakers, the 
maquiladora program served two purposes, “Mexico needed the employment, the U.S. 
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companies in particular needed industrial-competitiveness as U.S. –produced labor-intensive 
products were no longer price competitive in the U.S. market” (Hadjimarcou et. al. 2013: 208). 
In the 1980s, a series of currency devaluations helped to strengthen the attractiveness of the 
maquiladora program to U.S. FDI, and in turn, even as wages ranged between $0.60 and $0.70 
cents an hour it was 40 percent higher than the average stipend (Hadjimarcou et. al. 2013: 209). 
In 1989, the Salinas administration generalized maquiladora-type investment liberalization to the 
other Mexican states and broadened the law to include other capital flows. From the Mexican 
perspective, the NAFTA generalized the maquiladora model, and for this reason it is empirically 
difficult to isolate the effects of NAFTA on U.S. FDI to Mexico. 
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Annex Four 
Effects on U.S. Labor and Jobs, Claims of NAFTA Proponents and Opponents 
Claims of NAFTA Proponents 
NAFTA proponents at the Peterson Institute for International Economics find that since 
NAFTA’s implementation in 1994, trade with Mexico produces net gains for U.S. citizens 
despite a relatively small net job loss (Hufbauer et. al. 2014). Economists Gary Clyde Hufbauer 
et. al. (2014) estimate that from 2009 to 2011, over 4 million people in the U.S. become 
involuntarily unemployed each year and 203,000 of those workers (about 5 percent) lost their 
jobs due to trade with Mexico (2014: 11). However, based on U.S. exports to Mexico from 2009 
to 2013, in each year 188,000 workers gained new jobs that are supported by trade with Mexico, 
and those new manufacturing jobs for export pay better than the lost import-competing jobs 
(Hufbauer et. al. 2014: 13). Therefore, by arithmetic of jobs lost minus jobs gained, from 2009 to 
2013, the U.S. net job loss by trade with Mexico was roughly 15,000 annually, which is nearly 
“imperceptible” within the context of far greater job losses associated with the broader trends of 
the U.S. economy (Hufbauer et. al. 2014: 13).  
Despite the small net job loss from trade with Mexico, Hufbauer et. al. cite economist 
Robert Z. Lawerence who found that in 2008, for each net U.S. job loss to trade with China the 
US economy gained about $900,000 via enhanced productivity and lower prices in goods and 
services (2014: 13). Hufbauer et. al. estimate by these same calculations, from 2009 to 2013, for 
each net job lost to Mexico the US economy gained “several hundred thousand dollars” (2014: 
13). To that end, Hufbauer et. al. do not find any correlation between the U.S. trade deficit and 
the unemployment rate. 
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Figure Ten: No correlation between U.S. trade deficit and official unemployment rate (from 
Hufbauer et. al. 2014) 
  
To the support of NAFTA proponents, Autor et al. (2013) found that while U.S. imports 
from China have exerted “a modest negative effect” on U.S. wages in manufacturing, imports 
from Mexico had no significant effect on US wages in the manufacturing sector (cited in 
(Hufbauer et. al. 2014: 17). These findings were supported by studies from McLaren and 
Hakobyan (2010), Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013), and Edwards and Lawrence (2013). Based 
on this literature review, Hufbauer et. al. concluded that import competition from Mexico has not 
suppressed wage growth over the past two decades (2014: 17). The takeaway conclusion from 
Hufbauer et. al. (2014) is that since NAFTA, trade with Mexico has produced net benefits to the 
U.S. economy but with uneven distribution, whether or not the winners compensate the losers is 
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a political question (usually addressed by debates in Congress over the Trade Adjustment 
Assistance program which provides support for workers displaced by international trade).  
Similarly, economists Theodore H. Moran and Lindsay Oldenski conclude that U.S. 
TNCs that have offshored to Mexico have become more competitive globally and in turn they 
have increased their investment and employment at home in the U.S. (2014). Moran and 
Oldenski analyzed confidential firm-level data from U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis on the 
international activities of US-owned MNCs between the years 1990 and 2009. Moran and 
Oldenski reported,  
“…expansion in Mexico by a [US-based MNC] is associated with 
domestic U.S. expansion by the same firm…These results are consistent with the 
complementarities that we found using all countries in which U.S. firms invest. 
U.S. firms that have greater sales, hire more workers, spend more on R&D, export 
more goods, and invest more capital in Mexico also have greater sales, hire more 
workers, spend more on R&D, export more goods, and invest more capital in the 
United States. So the overall message is that greater investment in Mexico by U.S. 
firms benefits both countries” (2014: 40). 
By these results, outward FDI helps U.S. firms to become more globally competitive 
which in turn expands their domestic operations and employment in the U.S. due to their 
increased dynamism. Responding to United Auto Workers’ demands for cessation to offshoring 
to Mexico, Moran and Oldsenski contest that offshoring to Mexico benefits U.S. workers 
inasmuch as it facilitates the globally competitive position of the firm, “…the competitive fate of 
UAW workers at Ford’s US assembly facilities actually depends on NAFTA” (2014: 41).  
 
 300 
 
Claims of NAFTA opponents 
In direct opposition to research from the Peterson Institute for International Economics, 
U.S. public interest group Public Citizen argued that NAFTA has contributed to U.S. 
unemployment and income inequality (2014). In their own report on the twenty year legacy of 
NAFTA, they cite an estimate from the Economic Policy Institute that since NAFTA, the U.S- 
trade deficit to Mexico and Canada produced a net job loss of one million by 2004, and one third 
of those jobs were in the service sector which lost business due to closed manufacturing plants 
(2014: 8). However, between NAFTA’s implementation in 1994 and 2010, U.S. trade with 
Mexico caused a net loss of 700,000 jobs, a figure reduced from 2004. Public Citizen is clear 
that, “Much of the job erosion stems from the decisions of U.S. firms to embrace NAFTA’s new 
foreign investor privileges and relocate production to Mexico to take advantage of its lower 
wages and weaker environmental standards” (2014: 8).  
NAFTA opponents, as expressed in the Public Citizen (2014) report, argue that the treaty 
has reduced wages and undermined unions inasmuch as it enabled firms to threaten workers with 
offshoring during wage bargaining sessions. A Cornell University study commissioned by the 
NAFTA Labor Commission found that since NAFTA, as many as 62 percent of U.S. union 
drives faced employer threats to relocate abroad, and the factory shut-down rate following 
successful union certifications tripled (cited in “Public Citizen” 2014: 11). The report found that 
companies made explicit threats to relocate to Mexico in more than 10 percent of the cases, and 
in other cases there were implicit threats, such as “given NAFTA we may need to reconsider our 
options,” or handing out statistics to workers on the wage differentials between U.S. and 
Mexican autoworkers (cited in Hufbauer et. al. 2014: 17). The study concluded, “NAFTA 
created a climate that has emboldened employers to more aggressively threaten to close, or 
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actually close their plants to avoid unionization” (cited in Hufbauer et. al. 2014: 17). In addition, 
the AFL-CIO claimed that loss of bargaining power not only undermined wages and hours but 
also work conditions including health and safety standards (AFL-CIO 1999). 
Public Citizen argues that the NAFTA has produced negative welfare effects because 
workers who have lost their jobs due to trade and have found new employment will typically find 
said new employment in lower-paying jobs. Further, the wage losses from workers taking lower-
paying jobs have been greater than gains in lower prices by cheaper imports. Since NAFTA, two 
out of every five displaced manufacturing workers who were rehired experienced an annual 
wage loss of an average of $10,000, and by 2012 that figure had increased to two out of every 
three workers (2014: 10). Lastly, these wage losses have been far greater than price gains from 
NAFTA imports. The Center for Economic and Policy Research calculated that U.S. workers 
without college degrees (63 percent of the workforce) have likely lost an amount equal to 12.2 
percent of their wages under NAFTA-style trade even after accounting for the benefits of 
cheaper goods (a net loss of more than $3,300 per year for a worker earning the median annual 
wage of $27,500.67) (2014: 12). This welfare loss has contributed to income inequality inasmuch 
as the average U.S. wage has grown less than one percent annually in real terms while worker 
productivity has risen at more than three times that pace. 
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Figure Eleven: U.S. labor force participation rate vs. trade balance 
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Annex Five: Inputs into the development of the United States Trade Representative’s negotiating 
objectives in the TPP 
Figure Twelve: Organizational inputs into USTR’s objectives during TPP negotiations 
 
The battle for trade promotion authority (TPA, formerly “fast-track”) 
The USTR sought to finish the TPP by the end of 2013, and during summer of that year 
Obama publically requested TPA from Congress, although many in Congress were skeptical of 
the administration’s commitment.492 As the relevant Congressional committees began the 
process of drafting TPA legislation, Congress members from both parties warned the 
administration that it would “take all hands on deck” to win TPA in a hostile Congress.493 Led by 
Ranking Rep. Sander Levin, some House Democrats drafted an alternative TPA bill which 
introduced substantive reforms to trade and investment policy and the bill had the support of the 
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majority of House Democrats.494 Simultaneously, the majority of House Democrats and a bloc of 
Republicans announced their opposition to the current TPA while a coalition of labor, 
environmental, and public interest groups charged that the TPP is a repeat of past “failed” FTAs 
and pledged to lobby Congress members to oppose TPA, among other goals.495  
It was not until fall of 2014 that the administration went into full gear to pursue to the 
TPA. In an essay published in Foreign Affairs, USTR Froman announced that TPP negotiations 
had reached the stage in which TPA was necessary to conclude the TPP, “[B]y ensuring that 
Congress will consider trade agreements as they have been negotiated by the executive branch, 
[TPA] would give U.S. trading partners the necessary confidence to put their best and final offers 
on the table.”496 However, winning the necessary Congressional votes for TPA was complicated 
by a catch-twenty two - the White House could not get TPA without showing Congress the text 
of the TPP, and the White House could not show Congress the TPP text without getting TPA to 
finalize the negotiations.497 The debate was further compounded by the release of the State 
Department’s annual human rights report which found grave instances of human rights abuses 
ranging from slavery to pervasive sex trafficking in TPP members Vietnam, Brunei, and 
especially Malaysia.498 The TPA contained an amendment that forbade the U.S. to enter FTAs 
                                                          
494 “TPP Issue Analysis: Investment Chapter,” U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on 
Ways & Means, Minority Staff Report, 114th Congress, November 30, 2015. 
495 “Unions Detail Opposition To Fast Track, TPP After Singapore Ministerial,” Inside U.S. 
Trade, December 13, 2013.  
496 Froman, Micheal. 2014. “The Strategic Logic of Trade: New Rules of the Road for the Global 
Market.” Foreign Affairs: November/December Issue, 2014.  
497 “White House Advisor Says TPP, Other Deals Hard to Conclude without TPA”, Inside U.S. 
Trade, May 2, 2014. 
498 “Senate Republicans, Business Seek To Tackle TPA Trafficking Amendment”, Inside U.S. 
Trade, May 1, 2015.  
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with any country in the most egregious category of human trafficking, however, the problem was 
eventually resolved when the State Department issued a revision upgrading Malaysia’s status. 
In May and June of 2014, the TPA failed its original votes in the House and Senate as 
many Congressional Democrats were demanding a renewal of Trade Adjustment Assistance and 
measures against currency manipulation as the price for their support for TPA.499 Trade 
Adjustment Assistance coordinates federal programs aimed at reducing the impact of import 
competition as a result of trade and investment agreements. Beginning in 2015, the AFL-CIO in 
tandem with other unions froze all campaign contributions to pressure Congress members to 
oppose TPA while growing conservative opposition to U.S. trade policy led to new political 
alliances across party lines. Minority House Leader Nancy Pelosi announced her opposition to 
the legislation because House Democrats felt as though they did not have enough input into the 
TPA. Political trade-offs were made in favor of a stronger Trade Adjustment Assistance while 
major industry groups stepped up lobbying efforts to win the necessary Congressional votes. 
Research by Maplight, a research organization that specializes in measuring campaign 
contributions, found that industry groups gave 8.6 times more money ($197.9 million) to House 
Representatives who voted in favor of TPA than to those who opposed the legislation ($23.1 
million).500 By the end of June, 2015, the TPA had been reintroduced to both the House and 
Senate where it narrowly passed and the President signed it into law in July. TPA passage 
                                                          
499 “Froman Sees TPP Deal in 2015; Kind Says White House Linking TPA, TAA”, Inside U.S. 
Trade, December 5, 2014. 
500 “Industries Supporting Trade Bill Contribute Nearly Nine Times More Than Opposing 
Industries,” Maplight.org, submitted by Daniel Stevens, June 12, 2015, (available: 
http://maplight.org/content/industries-supporting-trade-bill-contribute-nearly-nine-times-more-
than-opposing-industries) 
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enabled the conclusion of TPP negotiations in October and the final text of the agreement was 
made public in November. 
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Annex Six: 
Negotiations in market access for FDI and financial services FDI 
2010: 
As Malaysia applied for membership in the TPP, it had to address the issues that led to 
the collapse of negotiations in the U.S.-Malaysia FTA in 2007, and the most painful of these 
issues were in the financial services sector where Malaysia heavily restricted foreign investment. 
In Malaysia, foreign investment in a range of sectors had been roughly capped at 30 percent, and 
in financial services industries caps were much higher if not entirely restricted.501 In Malaysia’s 
domestic reforms, Malay policymakers addressed affirmative action regulations requiring 
employment of ethnic Malays, requirements to enter into joint ventures with Malaysian 
companies, and technology transfers.502 In financial services, Malaysia increased the amount of 
equity a foreign investors could own in a financial services companies from 49 percent to 70 
percent.503 A USTR spokesperson responded that Malaysia’s unilateral reforms in financial 
services were a “good initial step” as Malaysia considered TPP membership.504 To join the TPP, 
the Malaysian government had to overcome resistance from its independent central bank which 
was “wary” of financial services liberalization as a boon to foreigners and potential financial 
instability.505 
 
2011: 
                                                          
501 “Senior Malaysian Officials Signal Strong Interest In TPP Participation,” Inside U.S. Trade, 
Vol. 28, No. 15, April 16, 2010. 
502 Ibid. 
503 Ibid. 
504 Ibid. 
505 “Malaysian Trade Minister Sees Need to Enter TPP Talks in Near Term,” Inside U.S. Trade, 
Vol. 28, No. 38, October 1, 2010. 
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While labor and skeptical Democrats warned of offshoring of jobs, the business 
community insisted on the deepest market access for FDI as possible, especially the financial 
services lobbies. Since the inception of the TPP, as all countries agreed to seek a “high-standard” 
outcome, countries negotiated market access on a “negative list” basis, in which all sectors are 
opened and exceptions are negotiated.506 In March, 2011, negotiators exchanged their initial 
offers on market access in investment and financial services.507 Negotiators in investment and 
services negotiated their countries’ sectoral exceptions to TPP obligations as a group.508 
Singapore had tabled a rollback of market access from the U.S.-Singapore FTA, to which the 
USTR responded that it was a “non-starter.” Vietnam had never signed a U.S.-style FTA and was 
not prepared to offer deep market access and they were the last to make market access offers, 
which slowed the negotiations. In his December Congressional testimony, a leader of The U.S. 
Business Coalition for TPP demanded, “Singapore and Vietnam must open their financial 
markets.”509 
 
2012: 
Major U.S. financial services lobbies penned two open letters to the USTR in 2012. The 
first urged the USTR, “As the 13th negotiating round in San Diego approaches, we are 
concerned that a final TPP financial services chapter may fail to meet the high-standards 
                                                          
506 Ibid. 
507 “TPP Blog,” Office of the United States Trade Representative, Free Trade Agreements, TPP, 
(available: https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-partnership/tpp-
blog) 
508 “TPP Makes Slow Progress on Market Access, Vietnam Takes Tough Line,” Inside U.S. 
Trade, Vol. 29, No. 30, July 29, 2011. 
509 “Hearing on Trans-Pacific Partnership”, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Trade of the 
Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives, One Hundred Twelfth 
Congress, First Session, December 14, 2011. 
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established by past FTAs, including full market access, national treatment, and a clear and 
enforceable commitment to permit cross-border data transfer and processing.”510 The financial 
services lobbies outlined bullet point market access and regulatory demands of each TPP 
member, in addition to expanding core investor protections from the investment chapter to 
financial services investors (in past U.S. FTAs, ISDS only applied to “most favored nation” and 
“national treatment” for the financial services sector).511 Conversely, the ASEAN countries in the 
TPP (Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, and Vietnam) were particularly resistant to U.S. market 
access in financial services.512 In 2009, Malaysia had increased the cap on foreign ownership in 
the banking and financial sector but would not go further. In response, U.S. negotiators took the 
position that opening their service sectors was in their own best interest while U.S. financial 
services lobbies pressed Malaysia for an elimination of caps on FDI in financial services.513 For 
Vietnam, USTR officials had been helping their Vietnamese counterparts to structure Vietnam’s 
offer on market access in services and investment such that it only addresses Vietnam’s “discrete 
interests.”514 
The second letter from financial services lobbies was to issue a “strong support” for the 
inclusion of Mexico, Canada, and Japan in the TPP, provided that each country worked to further 
                                                          
510 “Re: Financial Services Protections in the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement,” Letter to 
USTR Kirk from The Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA) and The 
Financial Services Forum, June 29, 2012. 
511 Ibid. 
512 “USTR Official Flags ASEAN Countries’ Sensitives in TPP Services Talks,” Inside U.S. 
Trade, Vol. 30, No. 30, July 27, 2012. 
513 Ibid. 
514 “U.S. Trade Officials Visit Vietnam to Discuss TPP Services, Investment,” Inside U.S. Trade, Vol. 30, No. 46, 
November 23, 2012. 
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the objectives of the financial services lobbies.515 In the case of Japan, a major sticking point in 
bilateral consultations between Japan and the U.S. was competition policy with the state-owned 
banking and insurance entity, Japan Post. In 2012, Japan had issued new legislation that would 
allow Japan Post Bank and Japan Post Insurance to issue new financial products with less 
regulatory hurdles than a foreign owned bank or insurance company. U.S. industry and the 
USTR responded that it was a step back from moving toward the high-standards of the TPP and 
for Japan to join the TPP then Japan would need to address the USTR’s “…serious and long-
standing level playing field concerns with respect to Japan Post in the insurance, banking and 
express delivery sectors.”516  
Moreover, the financial services lobby was calling for a ban on regulations that would 
require financial institutions to store financial data within a country’s borders, and they described 
it as an “essential” provision of any trade deal.517 Indeed, the USTR had insisted on an “e-
commerce” chapter in the TPP and binding obligations that would require MNCs to establish or 
use local service providers. In 2011, the largest U.S. services MNCs, ranging from Silicon 
Valley to global banks, drafted a position paper on the issue for presentation to APEC. 518 A 
senior vice president at global bank Citigroup explained that developing countries were 
beginning to implement data localization requirements as a means to boost domestic 
employment, technology transfer, or foreign investment.519 
                                                          
515 “Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association Comments on the Participation of 
Mexico, Canada and Japan in the Trans-Pacific Partnership,” Securities Industry and Financial 
Markets Association, February 27, 2012, 
516 “Japan Post Reform Bill May Complicate Efforts For Japan to Join TPP,” Inside U.S. Trade, 
Vol. 30, No. 14, April 6, 2012. 
517 Ibid. 
518 “Businesses Unveil Free Data Flow Objectives, Plan to Highlight at APEC,” Inside U.S. 
Trade, Vol. 29, No. 43, November 4, 2011. 
519 Ibid. 
 311 
 
 
2013: 
The leaked notes from the anonymous Chief Negotiator revealed that the U.S. was trying 
to limit the scope of general exceptions to the investment chapter, thereby creating greater 
market access for FDI. The U.S. proposal, which was supported by Australia and New Zealand, 
was to limit the sectoral carve-outs from the obligations of the investment chapter to only 
specific provisions, notably, “national treatment” and “most favored nation.”520 The counter 
proposal, which was supported by Chile, Japan, Brunei, Malaysia, and Vietnam, would have 
entirely carved-out economic sectors or industries from the all of the obligations of the 
investment chapter, not just specific provisions, which would limit market access.521 
 
2014: 
By 2014, negotiations in investment and financial services had largely been concluded in 
the area of investor rights and technical rules and the focus of the talks shifted to market access 
and general exceptions to market access. Malaysia, Vietnam, and Japan were the countries that 
did not have a previous FTA in place with the U.S. and they continued to have the most 
contentious market access proposals relative to the demands of the USTR and U.S. business 
groups, who sought an agreement with the highest commercial value possible. By mid-year, 
according to a U.S. business lobbyist, Vietnam, Malaysia and Japan proposed a broad exception 
that would exempt all new services that are developed in the future from the TPP investment 
                                                          
520 “Excerpts from internal government commentary on the TPP negotiations, minor editing to 
protect the author country,” Wikileaks, November, 2013, (available: 
https://wikileaks.org/IMG/pdf/tpp-salt-lake-extracts-.pdf) 
521 Ibid. 
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chapter and other rules.522 As market access commitments were on a “negative list” basis, in 
which all sectors are on the table and countries negotiate exceptions, the proposal would 
undermine the “negative list” format which was unacceptable for the USTR and U.S. business 
groups. Moreover, Vietnam and Malaysia sought to ban investment on entire sectors which was 
rejected by the USTR as a basis for negotiations.523 Their resistance was particularly strong 
towards FDI in the financial services sector, where each country had highly protected and 
regulated banking and financial industries.  
 
2015: 
Data localization requirements 
Since at least 2012, the U.S. financial services industry had lobbied the USTR for a ban 
on any regulations that would require multinational financial institutions to store its client data 
on local data servers.524 By summer 2015, U.S. financial institutions learned that the TPP did not 
include this provision, motivating a lobbying effort to change the TPP text while setting 
precedent for future agreements. At the crucial moment in which the Obama administration was 
trying to gather industry support for the TPP, the major financial services lobbies chose to 
withhold their support for the TPP until the administration addressed the issue (in addition to a 
market access restraint in Malaysia, discussed below).525 In response, officials from the Treasury, 
                                                          
522 “Under The Radar, TPP Parties Wrestle Over Carveouts On Services, State-owned 
enterprises,” Inside U.S. Trade, July 25, 2014.  
523 Ibid. 
524 “Re: Financial Services Protections in the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement,” Letter to 
USTR Kirk from The Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA) and The 
Financial Services Forum, June 29, 2012. 
525 Including the Coalition for Service Industries, Financial Services Roundtable, and American 
Council of Life Insurers. 
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the State Department, and the USTR met with representatives of the industry to determine the 
type of assurances the industry was seeking.526 The meeting revealed that the Obama 
administration had an inter-agency dispute over the issue. The Treasury Department, with the 
support of the Federal Reserve and the Federal Communications Commission, had opposed the 
provision during negotiations because they wanted to maintain access to banking and other 
financial data for regulatory purposes.527 However, the USTR advocated for the provision on 
behalf of financial industries, arguing that without the provision U.S. firms would be at a 
competitive disadvantage in the region. Since the TPP was already concluded and the negotiators 
had agreed not to reopen the text, the issue could not be resolved in the TPP. As a compromise 
with the financial industry, the Treasury drafted language to include in future FTAs and BITs 
that would address the issue and the industries realigned themselves to support the TPP.528  
 
Market access for FDI 
As the conclusion of negotiations neared the market access talks became increasingly 
“heated,” particularly as some ASEAN countries were seeking broad sectoral exceptions or 
carve-outs and especially in financial services.529 The most problematic market access exception 
was that Malaysia had secured the right to block inward FDI in the financial services sector if 
Malaysian authorities determined that such investment was not in the “national interest.”530 In 
                                                          
526 “TPP support springs another leak: financial services” by Victoria Guida and Colin Wilhelm, 
Politico, November 24, 2015. 
527 Ibid. 
528 “Lew Reiterates Possibility of TPP Side Deal, But Emphasizes Future Fix,” Inside U.S. 
Trade, March 25, 2016. 
529 “Ministers Face Down Long List of Thorny Issues as Hawaii Round Starts,” Inside U.S. 
Trade, July 24, 2015. 
530 “Financial Services Firms Fight TPP Data Flow Rules, Backed by House GOP,” Inside U.S. 
Trade, November 20, 2015. 
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response, U.S. financial services industries and a handful of supportive Congress members 
withheld their support for the TPP, arguing that Malaysia’s investment screening in financial 
services is “highly subjective” and “perpetuates discrimination” while setting bad precedent for 
future negotiations.531 Other countries (Australia, Canada, Mexico, and New Zealand) also 
retained investment screens although not specific to the financial services sector, however, 
according to U.S. industry groups, “U.S. negotiators were successful in mitigating the potential 
impact of these screens.”532 The USTR successfully increased the monetary threshold and/or 
scope of investment screening in Canada, Mexico, Australia, and New Zealand (notably, 
Canada’s threshold was significantly increased over the current NAFTA threshold).533 U.S. 
industry groups advised the USTR that TPP market access talks should be a minimum baseline 
for future market access negotiations, “If new countries express interest in acceding to TPP, their 
offers must improve on the existing TPP provisions and not replicate the barriers described 
above.”534 The USTR concurred and industry moved to support the TPP. 
The long, thorny list of sectoral exceptions to TPP investment obligations mostly affected 
U.S. multinational services firms. In many services sectors, including accounting, engineering, 
audiovisual services, and energy services, countries generally matched their TPP market access 
commitments to their WTO obligations in an unproblematic way.535 However, in other sectors, 
                                                          
531 Ibid. 
532 “Report of the Industry Trade Advisory Committee on Services and Finance Industries,” 
December 3, 2015, Industry Trade Advisory Committee on Services and Finance Industries 
(ITAC 10), Advisory Committee Report to the President, the Congress and the United States 
Trade Representative on the Trans-Pacific Partnership Trade Agreement (TPP). 
533 Ibid. 
534 “Report of the Industry Trade Advisory Committee on Services and Finance Industries,” 
December 3, 2015, Industry Trade Advisory Committee on Services and Finance Industries 
(ITAC 10), Advisory Committee Report to the President, the Congress and the United States 
Trade Representative on the Trans-Pacific Partnership Trade Agreement (TPP). 
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U.S. services corporations took issue with restrictive market access commitments, including 
healthcare services (Vietnam, Singapore, Mexico); legal services (Brunei, Chile, Malaysia, 
Singapore, and Vietnam); and financial services which were the most complex and were 
contained in a separate annex. Countries took a range of exceptions to the financial services 
chapter, including, foreign ownership limitations and restrictions in operations when 
incorporated in a certain form (Canada, Vietnam); branching restrictions or requirements 
(Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore, Vietnam); subsidies and other advantages for local entities 
(Brunei, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand and Singapore); “arbitrary” nationality or citizenship 
requirements for employees and personnel (Brunei, Canada, Chile, Malaysia, Mexico, 
Singapore).536 Moreover, according to the U.S. financial services industry, some TPP members 
did not improve upon commitments from existing FTAs with the U.S. (Singapore, Chile), while 
other TPP members made “low quality” offers (Vietnam, Malaysia).537 In the banking and 
insurance sectors in Japan, Japan and the U.S. came to a bilateral agreement codified in a side 
letter to the TPP that Japan’s state-owned enterprise in banking and insurance, Japan Post, would 
open its sales network to foreign investors.538 Malaysia successfully secured broad carve-outs for 
their “Bumiputra policies” which provide preferential treatment to businesses owned by ethnic 
Malays in areas like services and government procurement.539 
  
                                                          
536 Ibid. 
537 Ibid. 
538 “Japan Has 18 Side Letters to TPP, Including on Autos, NTMS, Rice with U.S.,” Inside U.S. 
Trade, October 30, 2015. 
539 Ibid. 
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